Gary R., List: Back in 2009, I started an Engineering Philosophy Committee within the Structural Engineering Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers, and it still exists to this day despite not attracting any additional members beyond the original cohort. "AI" has been its primary topic of discussion lately, so I shared the link to Pietarinen's paper. One of the other members proposed defining intelligence as "using innate and external tools to enhance the survival of the individual and the species," and I replied that I am now open to defining it instead as the capability to participate in the genuine (triadic) process of semiosis, in contrast with inanimate objects and their non-intelligent reactions being degenerate (dyadic) outcomes of that process. I also quoted Peirce directly, as follows.
CSP: The action of a sign calls for a little closer attention. Let me remind you of the distinction referred to above between dynamical, or dyadic, action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by brute force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn produce a third event, C. The fact that the event, C, is about to be produced by B has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It is impossible that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a contingent future event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic action, which is so called because each step of it concerns a pair of objects. But now when a microscopist is in doubt whether a motion of an animalcule is guided by intelligence, of however low an order, the test he always used to apply when I went to school, and I suppose he does so still, is to ascertain whether event, A, produces a second event, B, *as a means* to the production of a third event, C, or not. That is, he asks whether B will be produced if it will produce or is likely to produce C in its turn, but will not be produced if it will not produce C in its turn nor is likely to do so. (CP 5.472-3, 1907) This seems consistent with my colleague's proposal, but even more general--using tools to enhance survival is just one example of the kind of means-ends reasoning that Peirce evidently associates with intelligence. The question, then, is whether current and foreseeably imminent "AI" systems qualify as intelligent in either sense. Can they use tools to enhance *their own* survival, or produce one event as a means of producing another in pursuit of *their own* ends? Or are they merely additional tools that we humans can use to enhance *our *survival, and as means of pursuing *our *ends? I strongly suspect the latter. Moreover, as I have said before, despite their increasing sophistication, they still only ever execute *discrete* operations--they do not perform *continuous *inferences. Hence, my ongoing use of scare quotes for "AI." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 11:32 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Jon, thank you for sending a link to this recent paper by Ahti-Veikko > Pietarinen on organizational semiotics. Although his principal concern is > not artificial intelligence as such, his conclusions seem highly relevant > to the topic of this thread. > > One of the most interesting features of Pietarinen's paper is that he > deliberately broadens the scope of Peirce's semeiotic beyond human > organizations. He argues that pragmaticism "does not assume that sign users > are human beings" and that Peirce's framework is broad enough to include > "nonhuman elements of intelligent action and agency." Instead, he proposes > that human organizations, institutions, synthetic sign systems, and > human-computer interactions ought to be understood within the same semiotic > framework and not as fundamentally different kinds of phenomena. > > I think that Pietarinen offers an important clarification of the position > I have recently been trying to develop. My earlier posts argued that AI > should not be evaluated primarily by asking whether it possesses > consciousness, subjective experience, or mind in the human sense. In my > view, the more fundamental Peircean question concerns the role AI may play > within semiosis itself. If intelligence is understood as participation in > the generation, evaluation, and development of interpretants, then the > question becomes whether AI systems can genuinely contribute to the growth > of inquiry. > > Pietarinen's conclusion appears to point in this direction as he argues > that machine intelligence should be understood neither as an imitation of > human consciousness nor as an autonomous superintelligence standing outside > human inquiry. Instead, it belongs within a much broader semiotic universe > in which both human and nonhuman agents may participate in sign processes, > semiotic habit formation, and the development of meaning as I argued > earlier. > > This also helps -- I hope-- clarify something I suggested in my previous > post concerning long-term interaction with AI. The continuity that develops > is not, in my experience, the persistence of an artificial self: it is the > continuity of an inquiry itself. As questions accumulate, hypotheses are > refined, arguments revised, and habits of interpretation established, a > continuous semiotic process develops that neither participant could sustain > alone. The continuity lies not in an enduring machine personality but in > the continuing development of interpretants. > > Perhaps this points toward a broader conception of inquiry than many, > perhaps most Peirce scholars have generally entertained. Peirce repeatedly > emphasized that inquiry is irreducibly communal. We have -- quite naturally > -- understood a community as consisting of human inquirers extending often > through many generations. It may now be worth asking whether responsive AI > sign systems capable of generating, criticizing, extending, and refining > interpretants have become participants -- albeit admittedly a very > different kind of participants -- in that same community of inquiry. > > Peirce's expansive conception of semiosis, habit-taking, realism > concerning signs, and his insistence that sign users need not be > exclusively human all seem to me to make the question of the > intelligence of AI and its participation in human inquiry a philosophically > legitimate one. > > Best, > > Gary R. >
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