Jon, List, If I understand you correctly, the decisive question isn't whether AI can participate in semiosis -- I think we agree that it does (but correct me if I'm mistaken). Rather, it is whether genuine interpretants require the kind of continuity that Peirce associates with 3ns, or whether a system whose internal operations are dyadic can nevertheless contribute genuine interpretants to an ongoing inquiry.
So the problem now would seem to be where we should locate the interpretant. As mentioned in my previous post, I do not think it should be identified with the internal operations of the computer. Instead, I see *the * *interpretant** as emerging within the inquiry itself in which both human participants and AI-generated responses become signs*, the relevant semiosis within the inquiry not being determined nor exhausted by what happens 'inside the machine'. Again, thanks for your incisive objections which are helping to clarify the matter for me, especially in the sense that the question seems no longer simply to be whether AI is intelligent, but *whether intelligence is located primarily within an individual sign user or within the broader process of inquiry* which, for Peirce, is essentially general and communal, a process in which interpretants are continually generated, criticized, developed, etc. Best, Gary R. On Sat, Jul 4, 2026 at 11:40 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I am not sure that "autonomous purposiveness" accurately captures what I > am suggesting as a necessary condition for something (including an "AI" > system) to be properly characterized as intelligent, although I can see how > my comments are coming across that way. Consistent with the lengthy Peirce > quotation that I provided earlier in this thread (CP 5.472-3, 1907), I > still suspect that it is more a matter of whether something is capable of > means-ends reasoning--producing one event *in order to* produce another; > not just *efficient *causation but *final *causation, of which > purposiveness is one manifestation, but not the only one. > > In other words, again, my sense is that intelligence requires *genuine *3ns, > not *degenerate *3ns that is reducible to sequential instances of 2ns. I > am not currently advocating a boundary any sharper than that and agree that > beyond it, intelligence is very much a matter of degree. However, the > operations within a digital computer, no matter how sophisticated its > programming and interface with humans might be or become, are always and > only discrete and dyadic, never continuous and triadic. > > Moreover, I do maintain that collaboration, to be worthy of the name, must > be *voluntary*--which is why I maintain that "AI" systems can only > simulate it. They are fancy new tools that humans are using as we travel > down the road of inquiry, not fellow travelers with us. They are passive > artifacts in the sense that they do not *initiate *anything, only *respond > *to human-generated prompts. They do not have habits of conduct that can > be confounded by experience, causing the irritation of doubt that prompts a > process of inquiry. > > All that said, far be it from me to *block *the way of inquiry into the > limits (or lack thereof) of machine intelligence--such questions are very > much worth exploring. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jul 3, 2026 at 4:03 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Jon, thank you thoughtful, textually rich, and challenging response. I >> found your discussion of the *commens*, quasi-minds, and the >> communicational interpretant very helpful. It has persuaded me that my use >> of Pietarinen's expression "overlapping triadic relations" may very well >> obscure distinctions that Peirce himself makes. In particular, your >> reminder that communication is but one manifestation of semiosis, and that >> signs need not always involve actual utterers or interpreters, are >> important qualifications that I readily accept. >> >> Nevertheless, I find myself wondering whether our remaining disagreement >> lies less in the nature of semiosis than in the nature of intelligence. You >> distinguish two questions: First, can AI systems participate in semiosis? >> Second, if they can, is such participation sufficient to warrant calling >> them intelligent? Your answer to the first question is 'Yes'; the second >> 'No'. >> >> I agree that participation in semiosis cannot by itself be sufficient for >> intelligence. *Every sign participates in semiosis*, although no one >> would therefore attribute intelligence to every sign. But I am less >> persuaded that *autonomous purposiveness* is a necessary condition for >> every form of intelligence recognized by Peirce. Again, he not infrequently >> attributes forms or degrees of intelligence to phenomena that are not >> autonomous persons. Animal instinct, biological adaptation, habit-taking >> throughout nature, scientific inquiry, and evolutionary growth, including >> the growth of reason throughout the cosmos *all appear to exhibit >> intelligent characteristics without thereby constituting independent >> rational agents*. So it seems to me that for Peirce intelligence admits >> of degrees and forms rather than marking the sharp ontological boundary >> you're suggesting. >> >> That is why I continue to attach considerable importance to *the >> production of interpretants*. Suppose an AI system exposes an unnoticed >> inconsistency, proposes a plausible hypothesis, reformulates an argument in >> a more illuminating way, or reveals a previously overlooked relation among >> signs (all of which I've seen AI do, although you appear to doubt it). >> Those interpretants aren't 'in the machine'; rather, *such >> interpretants **become signs within the continuing inquiry itself, *and >> as such are subject to criticism, revision, rejection, or acceptance by the >> community of inquiry. In my view, their significance is not determined by >> their origin but by their consequences in inquiry. >> >> So you will not be surprised, I think, that I hesitate to describe AI >> merely as *simulating collaboration*. Certainly it does not possess >> autonomous agency, moral responsibility, or independent ends: there is no >> argument between us there! Perhaps our disagreement is concerned less with >> the reality of the interpretants than the agency responsible for them. In >> my view, the programmer of an AI machine does not determine the >> interpretants generated within a given inquiry. So I would argue that while >> the machine is certainly not an autonomous inquirer, yet it does not seem >> to me to be simply a passive artifact. It appears to occupy an intermediate >> semiotic role that, I believe, deserves close philosophical examination. >> >> I think that our disagreement concerns less with whether AI participates >> in semiosis but, rather, what additional conditions must be satisfied >> before that participation deserves the name *intelligence*. My own >> present thinking is that intelligence, like semiosis itself, admits degrees >> rather than sharp boundaries. Autonomous purposiveness such as we humans >> possess undoubtedly is unquestionably one of its highest expressions. >> However, I am much less persuaded that it is a *necessary condition* for >> every form of intelligence capable of contributing to inquiry and the >> communal growth of knowledge. >> >> Whether or not you find this to be a defensible interpretation of Peirce >> on this matter, I am grateful that this discussion has moved from the usual >> debates over consciousness and computation to what strikes me as the far >> deeper Peircean question concerning the relation among semiosis, >> intelligence, and inquiry. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . 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