Jon, Ulysses, Jeff, List, I agree that "AQI" (or even "AQ-I") is quite unlikely to catch on any day soon.
Recently I've been reflecting on Doug Engelbart's project,* Intelligence Augmentation* (IA), which my friend and colleague, Aldo de Moor, has done much 'hands-on' work through his work on *CommunitySense *( https://www.communitysense.nl). Aldo describes his project as "Building on and generalizing from Engelbart’s views," and summarizes Engelbart's vision in "Making Doug’s Dream Come True: Collaboratories in Context" ( https://communitysense.nl/papers/iccs02b.pdf) In [Engelbart's] view, the only feasible approach [to developing 'collaboratories' functioning as mediators of distributed groups working with systems of information tools] is a long term, pragmatically guided whole-system evolution.* It is crucial not just to create good socio-technical systems, consisting of co-evolving Human and Tool Systems. Also, one should continuously improve this design process, in other words “improve the improvement capability of the organization”*. In rereading Aldo's paper I was reminded that as early as 2000 I had a keen interest in this kind of research: See a paper Aldo, Mary Keeler, and I collaborated on, "Towards a Pragmatic Web" ( https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/953ea141-d6d4-4cf9-961e-40542bd4d2f3/content ). Recently I've been working on the possibility of building on and developing Engelbart's and de Moor's work on collaboratories in consideration of AI, an idea that I've been referring to as IAAI (Intelligence Augmentation meets Artificial Intelligence). That acronym may not take hold either, but I think it captures the gist of the idea of a contemporary approach to how we humans might approach grappling with such extraordinary LLM developments. Best, Gary R xx On Wed, Jul 8, 2026 at 12:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., Ulysses, List: > > I find your latest formulations considerably less objectionable than > ascribing genuine intelligence to "AI" systems themselves. They are indeed > diagrammatic tools that augment *human *intelligence, facilitating > inquiry when they are intelligently used *by humans* for that purpose. > Since they at least arguably qualify as quasi-minds, we *might *be able > to refer to them accurately as *quasi*-intelligent; but even if so, I > doubt that "AQI" would ever catch on as a replacement for "AI." :-) > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2026 at 1:26 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Ulysses, List, >> >> Jon, I found your mention of the conference presentation on HAI >> especially relevant. It immediately brought to mind Douglas Engelbart's >> research program which he called *intelligence augmentation* (IA) [See >> his paper (1962), "Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework," >> https://www.dougengelbart.org/content/view/138] Engelbart's central >> idea, as I understand it, is that the really important question is not >> whether machines themselves become intelligent, but how human intelligence >> may be augmented through interaction with computational systems. >> >> In any event, I find myself thinking less about AI considered in >> isolation than about the larger semiotic processes within which both humans >> and machines participate. In other words, the most interesting unit of >> analysis is most definitely *not* the machine itself, but the continuing >> inquiry in which machine-generated signs aid human thinking about important >> issues, perhaps eventually even some of our most criticall, world-unsettling >> 'wicked problems'. >> >> Ulysses' description of LLMs as diagrams also seems quite relevant here. >> A diagram, after all, is not itself an argument or an inquiry (let alone an >> inquirer). Yet diagrams have long played an indispensable role in >> mathematical and scientific discovery because, as Peirce definitively showed, >> especially the 'manipulation' of them permit relations to become visible >> that might otherwise remain unnoticed. If AI systems are understood >> somewhat analogously, then perhaps their significance lies *not* in >> their possessing intelligence than in augmenting the semeiotic processes >> through which inquiry develops. >> >> I wonder whether Engelbart's idea of IA points towards a formulation which >> might reconcile our differing emphases. The machine need not be regarded >> as an autonomous intelligent agent, nor merely as a passive artifact. >> Rather, its significance may lie in the way that it can augment the >> continuing semiosis through which communities of inquiry generate fruitful >> concepts, programs, discoveries, etc. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 11:48 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> I am at least commenting on the semiotic and categorical capabilities of >>> the AI model itself in order to understand what it is capable of >>> contributing to broader inquiry and what human users need to bring to the >>> AI model if they are to use them for inquiry. >>> >>> My position is large language models are, from a semiotic perspective, a >>> diagram. Which is to say, potentially very useful for inquiry but not an >>> artificial “mind” capable of symbolic thought, which is necessary, in my >>> view, for intelligence. >>> >>> The thing I might disagree with Jon on is I am probably more likely to >>> consider the training process itself as quasi intelligent, albeit with a >>> lot of caveats. >>> >>> On Tue, 7 Jul 2026 at 11:27 pm, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R., List: >>>> >>>> As you know, I understand Peirce's late topical conception of >>>> continuity to be top-down, not bottom-up; the whole is ontologically >>>> primordial, not an assemblage of discrete parts. From that standpoint, the >>>> notion of *locating *the continuity of semiosis does not really make >>>> sense--the *entire universe* is a vast semiosic continuum from which >>>> individual signs, individual sign-users, and larger inquiries can be >>>> prescinded as artifacts of analysis. This obviously does not entail that >>>> the entire universe is properly characterized as *intelligent*; on the >>>> contrary, it still encompasses discrete things and their brute dyadic >>>> reactions, including the sequential operations within a digital computer, >>>> as *degenerate *outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis. >>>> >>>> When most people refer to "artificial intelligence," it seems to me >>>> that they are ascribing intelligence to an individual artificial >>>> system--exactly what I find problematic--not the larger inquiry that >>>> results when humans *use *it for that purpose. In fact, one of the >>>> most interesting presentations at a conference that I attended last month >>>> advocated greater attention to human interaction with "AI" systems, which >>>> effectively turns them into "HAI" systems. Research suggests that >>>> improvements in that interface might make a bigger positive difference >>>> going forward than further advancing the capabilities of the technology >>>> itself. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 3:11 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, List, >>>>> >>>>> I wonder if it is possible that we are now considering somewhat >>>>> different questions. It seems to me that you are commenting more on *the >>>>> semiotic character of the AI system* itself, while I increasingly >>>>> find myself reflecting on *the semeiotic character of the larger >>>>> inquiry *in which AI seems to me to be capable of participating. Your >>>>> sticking point as I see it seems to be that the internal operations of >>>>> present AI systems consist entirely of dyadic reactions and, therefore, >>>>> cannot participate in the continuous triadic semiosis that Peirce >>>>> identifies with intelligence. >>>>> >>>>> Say, for the sake of argument, that everything you say about the >>>>> machine's internal operations is correct, still does it necessarily follow >>>>> that the larger inquiry within which those operations become signs for >>>>> further interpretation cannot, then, exhibit genuine semiosis? >>>>> >>>>> So, I'm beginning to think that our principal disagreement has less to >>>>> do with AI, but increasingly seems concerned with *where one ought to >>>>> locate the continuity of semiosis itself*. Is it primarily within the >>>>> individual sign-user, or may that continuity also characterize the larger >>>>> inquiry through which interpretants are generated, criticized, corrected, >>>>> etc.? If the latter, then intelligence may be seen in the living semiosis >>>>> through which inquiry continually develops. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R. >>>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
