Sung,

I appreciate your sticking with this, as I think the potential connections 
between category theory,
relation theory in general, and triadic sign relations in particular is a topic well worth pursuing. At present, however, I need to keep my focus on Peirce's 1870 Logic of Relatives or else give it up
for another lifetime.

So I'll create this separate thread for collecting the appropriate background 
material and whatever
else may come to mind as time goes by.

Regards,

Jon

Sungchul Ji wrote:
Jon,

Can you clarify what you mean below ?  I presume there is some discrepancy 
between our
interpretions of the Peircean sign triad ?

"..., no, I don't actually talk that way ..."

With all the best.

Sung


Well, no, I don't actually talk that way ...

Looking back through the thread in question ...

SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140311032523/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12127
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140311054002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12131
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140311205639/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12134
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140311211000/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12141
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140313032831/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12147
JLRC:http://web.archive.org/web/20140313201902/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12156
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140313201602/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12157
JLRC:http://web.archive.org/web/20140314020223/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12158
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140314020207/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12159
JBD:http://web.archive.org/web/20140314213801/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12170
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140315024804/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12171
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140315040001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12175
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140315190001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12177
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140316030412/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12180
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140316031001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12181
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140316160001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12183
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140316203648/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12184
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140316210002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12185
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140317002001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12186
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140317212640/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12188
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140317220001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12190
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318000002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12191
JC:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318155646/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12198
SJ:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318160003/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12199
SR:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318160209/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12200
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318203010/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12205
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140318233001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12215
JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20140319180002/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12220

It looks like Sung is referring to what I said here:

http://web.archive.org/web/20140316160001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12183

Correcting some typos:

Mathematical category theory is abstracted from the properties of structured 
sets (the
objects) and structure-preserving mappings between them (the arrows or morphisms). Examples of structured sets are things like plain old sets (with no extra structure),
groups (with one binary operation), rings (with two binary operations), a host 
of
different ordered sets (with their various order relations), topologies, metric 
spaces,
and so on.  In each case there is a set of arrows Arr(X, Y) defined for each 
pair of
objects X, Y in a given category C.

Where does the triadicity come in?  In the prototypical category of sets and 
mappings
between them the sets are monadic, that is, associated with monadic predicates, 
and the
mappings between sets are dyadic, since functions are special cases of dyadic 
relations.
But the structures added to the sets can be richer, typically beginning with 
the triadic
relations that we know as "binary operations". However, this appearance of 
triadicity
comes optional with the objects taken up and is not mandated by the definition 
of a
category itself.

Working in that spirit, however, one application of category theory to 
semiotics would be
to take the category of triadic sign relations and appropriate 
structure-preserving
mappings between them. Still, the arrows are always defined on pairs of 
objects, and
therefore retain a dyadic character.

The place where triadicity really comes in as an integral part of the category 
concept is
with the composition operation, like all "binary operations" defining a triadic 
relation,
in this case on composable pairs of arrows, ∘ : Arr(C) × Arr(C) → Arr(C).

Consequently, in a commutative diagram like the following:

 ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
 ` ` f ∘ g = h ` `
 X-------------->Z
 `\` ` ` ` ` ` `^`
 ` \ ` ` ` ` ` / `
 ` `\` ` ` ` `/` `
 ` f \ ` ` ` / g `
 ` ` `\` ` `/` ` `
 ` ` ` \ ` / ` ` `
 ` ` ` `v`/` ` ` `
 ` ` ` ` Y ` ` ` `
 ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

The arrows f, g, h are in a triadic relation, namely, f ∘ g = h, but the 
objects X, Y,
Z are not. That is to say, the objects X, Y, Z are freely chosen and there are no non-trivial relations of determination among any of the objects X, Y, Z.

The point that's being missed here I think is this:  It's "putting the carte 
before the
territory" to speak of structure-preserving maps between sign relations before 
one has a
clear idea what the structure of a sign relation actually is. That seems to be the main source of confusion in all of these recent (and not so recent) discussions of semiotics.

Regards,

Jon


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