Edwina wrote (5471-1) and (5471-2):
. . . the way I read 'a single triadic relation' (5471-1)
would be that all three umbrella-spokes of the triad
were operating in the same categorical mode: ie, all
in Firstness, or all in Secondness or all in Thirdness.
Not always true.
Only three out of the ten triadic signs defied by Peirce have their
umbrella-spoke (or more accurately their three nodes, when a sign is
represented as a network) in the same categories, i.e., in Firstness,
Secondness, or Thirdness. The other six triadic signs have their nodes
distributed over all of the three categories. For example, the rhematic
indexical legisign (e.g., a demonstrative pronoun) have its three nodes
distributed over all three categories, and the dicent symbolic legisign
(e.g., a proposition) has its nodes distributed over Secondness and
Thirdness. (See Table 1 in [biosemiotics:46].)
. . . And this interaction is not, as I keep saying, (5471-2)
dyadic . . . but operative within the whole triad,
where the mediate Relation transforms input data to
output information. After all, a function is a 'whole',
ie, f(x) = y.
Like John C, I always felt uncomfortable (my Firstness response, I guess)
whenever Edwina tries to equate the Peircean triadic sign as a function or
a well-formed formula but did not know how to explain why Edwinas
formalism may be misleading. I think I now know how to explain it.
The Taborskyan sign as a well-formed formula:
f(x) = y (5471-3)
where she equates f with sign (or mediation), x with the input (or the
object), and y with the output (or interpretant). Computer scientists
usually represent Equation (5471-3) as a directed network:
f
x ---------- > y (5471-4)
Edwina apparently views (5471-3) or (5471-4) as representing a triadic
relation (and hence a triadic sign) because there are three symbols, i.e.,
x, y, and f. I think this is where she made a mistake, which probably
have resulted from her ignoring the widely accepted convention of network
notation (CNN):
A network consists of two entirely different classes (5471-5)
of symbols, i.e., nodes (e.g., x, and y) and edges
(e.g., f) and it is the edges, not the nodes, that
represent relations.
If we apply CNN to (5471-4), it would be logical to conclude that there is
only one relation in this network because there is only one edge in it,
labeled f.
In contrast, a genuine triadic relation intrinsic to the Peircean sign
represented using CNN would look like Figure 1.
The Peircean sign as a triadic network with the
commutativity or composition condition satisfied, i.e., f|g = h:
f g
x ------------ > y ------------ > z
| ^
| |
|_______________________________________|
h
Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of a triadic relation (consisting
of f, g and h), with the composition condition that f|g = h, i.e., the
combined effects of (operator) f followed by g is the same as the effect
of h alone. When there is no h, the network reduces to a dyadic
relation.
In conclusion,
The Taborskyan sign represented as a well-formed (5471-6)
formula, y = f(x), embodies a monadic relation,whereas
the Peircean sign represented as a network embodies a
triadic relation. Therefore, the Taborskyan sign is
not the Peircean sign.
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> It's all down to interpretation, Stan.
>
> Now, the way I read 'a single triadic relation' would be that all three
> umbrella-spokes of the triad were operating in the same categorical mode:
> ie, all in Firstness, or all in Secondness or all in Thirdness. That would
> fulfill, for me, the meaning of 'single. And I'd even be concerned about
> the active transformative process of the mediate Representamen...would it
> be active in a 'single triadic relation'?
>
> I am sure that John doesn't mean this - but that's how I read it.
>
> My outline of three Relations operating within a triadic set, to me,
> allows for the diversity both of the categories within each Relation AND
> also of the role of each Relation in the whole interaction. Just because
> there are three interactions doesn't mean that each one can exist
> separately on its own! They can't; a relation, by definition, can only
> exist within an interaction. And this interaction is not, as I keep
> saying, dyadic (for that's only between separate existentialities)...but
> operative within the whole triad, where the mediate Relation transforms
> input data to output information. After all, a function is a 'whole', ie,
> f(x)=y . It can't be understood as separate bits but as a whole
> interaction. Same with the sign.
>
> Edwina
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Stanley N Salthe
> To: [email protected]
> Sent: Thursday, March 20, 2014 9:51 AM
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5470] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called "a
>
>
> Edwina, John --
>
>
> Edwina says:
>
>
> On a further note, John (and I know we will probably never agree), with
> regard to my contention that the semiosic Sign is a single set of three
> interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single triadic
> relation'
>
>
>
> Could we have an example where this difference would make a difference?
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 8:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> On a further note, John (and I know we will probably never agree),
> with regard to my contention that the semiosic Sign is a single set of
> three interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single
> triadic relation'. A relation is not just a simple connection but an
> active informational process.
>
> ... Peirce's ten classes clearly refer to three relations and he
> frequently uses the term 'correlate' to refer to both the interaction
> (ie the Relation) and the categorical mode of a relation. [See his
> Division of Triadic Relations 2.233). If we take the most basic
> Peircean sign, the rhematic indexical legisign - each of the three
> Relations in this Sign is in a different categorical mode. If the Sign
> was ONE, was a single relation or even just mere connections, those
> different categories could not remain distinct. The triadic sign
> most certainly is not built up of dyads for dyads, as pointed out,
> refer primarily to existentialities. He writes that 'Signs are
> divisble by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself
> [ET:also called the Representamen] is a mere quality, is an actual
> existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of
> the sign to its object (my emphasis) consists in the sign's having
> some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that
> object, or in its relation to an interpretant....
>
> The Peircean model, that three-pronged umbrella, (1.347), a 'triadic
> identity', is made up of a set of three relations; three 'prongs', so
> to speak, each one can operate in a different categorical mode and
> all, as an interactive process, form The Sign.
>
> So- we continue to disagree.
>
> Edwina
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Edwina Taborsky
> To: [email protected]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 7:07 PM
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5461] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING
> called "a
>
>
> John, see my comments below:
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Deely, John N.
> To: [email protected]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 6:33 PM
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING
> called "a
>
>
> 1) The "representamen" is not a relation, but one of three terms
> within or "under" a single triadic relation, the one that serves
> as the sign-vehicle (one of Peirce's terms, by the way). The
> "significate" (or object) may or may not be an existential unit in
> itself: Napoleon as Emperor of the French at one time was such an
> "existential unit in itself"; Hamlet as Prince of Denmark never
> was. So there can often be a dyadic interaction with resultant
> dyadic relation between representamen and significate.
>
>
>
> EDWINA: Yes, the Representamen is a 'term' (which has no
> existential meaning!) but it exists within three Relations or
> interactions: that between itself-and-the-Object; that within
> itself; and that between itself-and-the-Interpretant.
>
>
>
> The SIGN exists as a single triadic relation - but within that
> triad, are those three Relations as I outlined above; this set of
> three are irreducible.
>
> Napoleon was a physically existential unit in itself. And Hamlet
> is an existential unit as well, a conceptually existent unit.
>
>
>
> Yes, one existential unit can dyadically interact with another
> existential unit, eg, Napoleon and his horse. That's not the same
> type of relation or interaction within a semiosic action. The
> semiosic relation is an informational interaction; where data from
> the input/external source is transformed within the organizational
> mediation of the Representamen to result in an intepretant
> 'meaning'. That's not made up of dyads; it's a full triadic
> interaction.
>
>
>
>
>
> 2)
>
> A relation I not an action but rather a
> suprasubjective connection or link that arises
> from actions. The representamen as such is such
> because of the postion it occupies in a given
> triadic relation; but the representamen is indeed
> often a thing, like that red-colored octagon with
> white markings commonly called "a stop sign". What
> doesn't represent another than itself, insofar as
> it does not, is simply not actually a
> representamen.
>
>
>
> EDWINA: No, here I disagree. That stop sign is a material object,
> a dynamic object. It functions as a sign (the triad) when it
> becomes part of a semiosic interaction...where I see the sign
> (input of data from the red sign object); my cognitive
> Representamen Process mediates that input of sense data according
> to my knowledge base: into the final part of the Sign, the
> Interpretant which means 'stop'. The Stop Sign is never in itself
> a Representamen, because the Representamen in the triad is a
> generalizing action that mediates specific particular data and
> interprets that data into information.
>
>
>
> 3)
>
> It remains that what you call the "triadic sign" is the
> consequent of one relation irreducibly triadic; whence
> there is no such thing as "a non-triadic sign"; a
> system of signs indeed is a set of relations; but a
> given "sign" is a set of terms united under one
> relation.
>
>
>
> EDWINA: And here, I agree that there is no such thing as a
> non-triadic sign, but a don't see that a Sign is a 'set of terms'
> (I see that a Sign is a set of Relations, not terms)...and don't
> see that it is united under ONE Relation.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> (Try that video --
> <http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF>
> -- all five parts, however.)
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 17:19
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5458] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING
> called "a
>
>
>
> John, the interactions, or the relation that exists between the
> Object and Representamen is not a dyad, for a dyad operates only
> when both 'end points' are existential units in themselves. These
> connections or relations are not between two existential units and
> can't even exist except within the triadic set of three such
> interactions.
>
>
>
> The mediative Relation, the Representamen, doesn't exist in
> itself and therefore, its interactions with the object and
> interpretant cannot be dyadic. In addition, I don't think that the
> Representamen Relation 'represents another than itself, for,
> again, it cannot exist 'per se'. The Representamen Relation is,
> as a generalizing action rather than particular, always embedded
> within a particular. Generals are real but not spatiotemporally
> existential in themselves.
>
>
>
> Yes, the molecule as a 'sign', i.e., as an existential entity
> (made up of three Relations) does act WITHIN an object-Relation
> with another molecule...
>
>
>
> No, I don't agree with the notion of 'ONE relation uniting the
> three semiosically'. I like your three terms, though I define them
> differently and don't consider them positions but rather
> 'relations': the 'foreground', the 'significate' and the
> 'interpretant'....and I DO call the whole set the SIGN - but I
> reject the notion that this 'Sign' (the whole set of three) is
> itself a Relation.
>
>
>
> Things or 'signs' that are in relation ...that's a different type
> of relation than what I am talking about within the triadic Sign.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> From: Deely, John N.
>
> To: [email protected]
>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:42 PM
>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5455] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING
> called "a
>
>
>
> Whatever stands in the foreground position of representing
> another than itself to or for a third is (what is commonly
> called) a "sign". So if what happens to occupy that position is
> a molecule, then the molecule in that circumstance is called "a
> sign".
>
> But what occupies that foreground position (1)
> under one set of circumstances or for one person
> at one time may well under other circumstances
> or for other persons occupy the position of the
> other represented (2) or again occupy the to or
> for position (3) - the semiotic spiral of
> ever-growing experience.
>
> But what makes, say, some molecule in given
> circumstances a "sign" may make that same
> molecule in other circumstances an "object" or
> again an "interpretant", etc.
>
> So we need to have a name for the three
> positions to be occupied, and a name for ONE
> relation uniting the three semiosically. The
> best term for position 1 or the foreground
> position is probably "representamen"; for
> position 2 "significate" (rather than "object");
> for position 3 "interpretant". Then the
> irreducibly triadic relation uniting the three
> to constitute an instance of semiosis is what
> "actually" or (as Peirce puts it) "formally"
> constitutes the sign. That also explains,
> relations as relations being only indirectly
> instantiable to sense, why alloanimals make use
> of signs but only human animals can come to know
> that there are signs, as Maritain put it,
> because only human animals can come to know
> relations, dyadic or triadic, in their
> difference from related things. (This summarizes
> the discussion on YouTube
> <http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF>.
>
> Edwina's position, if the position common to
> Peirce and Poinsot is correct, is simply wrong.
> A set of three dyadic relations does not a
> triadic relation make (as Shakespeare might say
> through some character or other).
>
>
>
> From: Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 16:28
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5453] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>
>
>
> Okay. Sign is just a triadic relation. But a molecule is not
> just a triadic relation. Therefore, molecule is not a sign.
>
> Best
>
> Kalevi
>
> 19-03-2014 23:18 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky:
>
> Kalevi- you are having fun with me! I say that a sign consists
> of three relations - and no, it is not 'something else other
> than these relations'. A sign is a function..ie, where x(f)=y.
> Or X, the input Relation (the Object-Representamen Relation)
> is mediated within/by the function or Representamen Relation
> (f) to result in the output Y, the Representamen-Interpretant
> Relation.
>
>
>
> Taken together, these three interations or relations (for the
> sign is always active!!!) are..The Sign. So, the Sign is an
> irreducible set of three Relations. And no, the Sign is NOT
> something else other than these Relations. The Sign
> IS...nothing other than the whole three Relations as they
> interact.
>
>
>
> X, or the Object-Representamen Relation can provide input data
> within three modes, and so, provide data that is iconic,
> indexical or symbolic to its Dynamic Object
>
>
>
> f, or the Representamen-in-itself Relation can mediate,
> generalize within three modes, and so, can constrain, organize
> that input data within either a qualisign, dicisign or
> legisign form of organization; that is, it will organize that
> input data as generalized qualities, as habitual connections
> or as habitual patterns of organization.
>
>
>
> Y, or the Representamen-Interpretant Relation can provide a
> resulting closure of these Relations within three modes, and
> so, will present that input data (X), mediated by the
> Representamen Y, as either a rheme ..a cloned version of the
> Object so to speak; or a dicent..requiring a physical
> connection...or..a pure abstract thought (there is only one
> sign that does this).
>
>
>
> But all together, the Sign is an active, interactive process,
> made up of three Relations.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> From: Kalevi Kull
>
> To: [email protected]
>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 4:40 PM
>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5451] Re: What kind of sign is a
> "gene"?
>
>
>
> Edwina,
>
> hm, you are saying here that sign is not a triadic relation.
> You say that sign only consists (mainly of?) some relations,
> actually being itself something else than these relations.
> How so?
>
> John is hinting to the same problem, as I understand.
>
> Best
>
> Kalevi
>
>
>
> 19-03-2014 18:04 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky:
>
> Kalevi, to me, a sign is a morphological existence (in
> space and time) made up of three basic relations; those
> between the Object and Representamen; the Repre. in
> itself; and that between the Repre. and the Interpretant.
> Each Relation can be in one of the three categorical modes
> (though their correlation is another issue).
>
>
>
> So, the 'sign' is not in itself a relation, but a
> morphological reality (which I call a morpheme) made up of
> relations...and able to relate to other morphemes.
> Therefore, I consider the molecule a sign. I know that
> many biologists reject this inclusion of the
> physico-chemical realm within semiosis, but so far, no-one
> has provided me with a strong enough argument to make me
> reject that inclusion.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> From: Kalevi Kull
>
> To: [email protected]
>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:00 AM
>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5430] Re: What kind of sign is a
> "gene"?
>
>
>
> Dear Gary,
>
> thank you. But, well, a molecule never can be a sign.
> Because sign is a relation, while molecule is not a
> relation.
>
> Best
>
> Kalevi
>
> 19-03-2014 15:26 kirjutas Gary Fuhrman:
>
> Kalevi, if I might play a variation on your theme: a
> "gene" defined as a piece of a physically existing DNA
> molecule can be regarded as an indexical sinsign
> (which is a replica of a legisign); but its object is
> certainly not a cell. Its dynamic object can only be
> the dynamic process which produced it, which is of the
> type that generates DNA molecules of a structure which
> includes that gene. And like the gene, that process
> can only make sense (or exist) in its context, which
> includes both its (cellular) environment and the
> evolutionary history of that type of process. It's
> indexical because it has a real (causal) relation to
> that object, which determines it to determine its
> interpretant (say, a protein).
>
>
>
> It is certainly not a sign in the symbolic way that
> the word "chair" is a sign of the static physical
> object we call by that name. The cell is not the
> gene's object but the quasi-mind informed by the gene,
> which carries the semotic process forward.
>
>
>
> A "gene", like a letter of the alphabet, can only mean
> something as part of a larger sign. The concept of
> "gene" is a product of analysis; it has no independent
> physical existence. That's why I say it can be
> regarded as an indexical sinsign (just as a letter can
> be regarded as a symbol).
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: 18-Mar-14 10:55 AM
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
> if to define gene as a piece of DNA molecule, then it
> is not a sign (of whatever kind) for a cell. It may
> only be a sign for a biologist, or for somebody who
> does not pay attention to the intracellular processes.
>
> Or you mean something else by gene.
>
> :-))
>
> Best,
>
> Kalevi
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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