Michael, List, and it should be mentioned that the Bally/Sechehaye-Saussure is different from a critically edited Saussure (e.g. by Engler).
Best Stefan Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> schrieb: >body{font-size:10pt;font-family:arial,sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;color:black;}p{margin:0px;}Vinicius, > Jon, list, > >Since most of the members of this list discussion are not linguists, it >occurred to me to attach an article I wrote which starts out by contrasting >Saussure and Peirce's approach to the sign. The matter of "arbitrariness" >should be understood, when it comes to Saussure, as something like "pure >conventionality." Peirce was not a linguist in the modern sense and did not >venture into areas of linguistics that are crucially dependent for progress in >the new century on ideas that draw on his semeiotic but which have largely >been ignored by mainstream linguists. > >Best, >Michael > >-----Original Message----- >From: Vinicius Romanini >Sent: Mar 24, 2014 10:10 AM >To: Peirce List >Subject: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the doctrine of >signs > >Dear list members, > > >Here I start the discussions of chapter five from the book "Peirce - a guide >for the perplexed", by Cornelis de Waal. The chapter is entitled "Semeiotics, >or the doctrine of signs". > > >In this introductory message I make some few general comments about the whole >chapter but advance remarks mostly from my reading of its first part, the >relation between Saussure and Peirce. > > >Kees' intention was to address a general audience that might not be yet >familiar with Peirce's sometimes difficult terminology and deep insights into >mathematic and logic. To keep the subject under a treatable exposition, he >chose to discuss Peirce's semiotic mostly from the narrower perspective of >Speculative Grammar, which is Peirce's first division of Logic understood as a >normative science. This means that the chapter provides just an outline of >Peirce's motivations to dedicate most of his life as a researcher to the >development of semeiotic, his definition of sign as a genuine triadic >relation, and his attempts do describe how the sign and its correlates, the >object and interpretant, can be further analysed into aspects that might help >us understand semiosis, or the action of signs. > > >The task is difficult because Peirce's whole philosophic work can be >considered, in a very meaningful way, as a narrative around the questions >related to Logic considered as a general doctrine of signs. Much of what has >already been said in previous chapters about phaneroscopy and the categories, >mathematics, logic of relatives; and what will come up in the following >discussions, can be framed as part of a more general view of semeiotic as the >study of all types of signs and their relation to perception, cognition, >representation and communication not only in humans but beyond any assignable >limit to reach even cosmology. In fact, Peirce was convinced that was >precisely on the metaphysical questions that the rigorous logical approach was >mostly needed. > > >I have read the whole book and can assure that in the final chapters semeiotic >will show up again in its more general view. Nevertheless, I must also say >that the focus on Speculative Grammar, although justifiable due the the goals >and audience of the book, left out too much of flesh and blood of Peirce's >doctrine of signs. Some of the features left out but that I think are >important to understand Peirce's broader view of semeiotic and could show up >during our discussions: > > >1) Peirce's original concept of information and its role in the growth of >symbols and in the development and complexity. Peirce was the first thinker to >use the concept of information in a scientific and systematic manner. Kees >does not talk about it in book, and I think it is a missing point (some list >members, particularly Ulysses, have already advanced some opinions during this >seminar) > > >2) Peirce's late emphasis of semiosis as the action of signs and his several >tries, mainly in the letters to Welby and James, to describe semiosis as a >dialogical, communicational or rhetorical process in which minds must be >welded by a common ground of knowledge. The concept of semiosis appears the >last chapter but is certainly part of Peirce's doctrine of signs, which is the >subject matter of this chapter. > > >3) Peirce's late notion of the modality of "would-be" as a realist "form" that >governs the being of symbols. > > >4) Peirce's theory of final causation (the law of mind), which involves >"finious" or teleological process and is important to understand how his >theory of signs might help us tackle with metaphysics and cosmology. I don't >remember Kees discussing this subject in the book. > > >Again, although none of the above might no be strictly necessary to understand >Peirce's grammar of sigs, they all become important when we try to apply the >classes of signs to an evolving and dynamic reality, which was Peirce's >intention. > > > >About Peirce and Saussure > > >As the prospective readers of the book might be more familiar with the >Saussurian tradition, Kees offers a synoptic but fairly sufficient comparison >between the two doctrines, describing the eventual points of contact but also >the dangers of trying to reduce one to the other due to the very different >backgrounds, purposes and models adopted by each author. > > >It is already fairly known that Saussurean semiotics (born as semiology but >then assimilated under the same general program of semiotic studies) is based >on a dyadic relation while Peircean "semeiotics" is based on triads (and, out >of simple curiosity, I would like to hear from Kees why he chooses >"semeiotics" among other possibilities, as semeiotic, semiotic, semeotic). > > >One common mistake when newcomers compare Peirce and Saussure is to assume >that they have an identical conception of the symbol as a conventional sign. >As this is constantly repeated in some communities, the result is that there >is much confusion and difficulty to admit that animal behavior can be >naturally symbolic. For this reason, I offer here a quote that I find quite >elucidating in this regard, although it will certainly raise objections and >questions - which is precisely what I hope it will happen. > > >It is a undated fragment from MS797, page 4. What interests me here is that >Peirce himself brings up the most important features of Saussurean symbol (a >diadic match-word, arbitrary, deliberately instituted, or conventional), and >then explains how he himself departs and expands from it: > > >"Symbols: The word "symbol" has already many meanings; and I shall ask leave >to add a new one. Among its early significations, perhaps the original one, is >that of a match-word, a somewhat arbitrarily adopted word or phrase, by which >persons of one party recognize one another. It is nearly in this sense that >the church creeds are called symbols. So a flag is a symbol, etc. I think, >then, that I shall not merck the word too much if I use it to mean a sign to >which a general idea is attached by virtue of a habit, which may have been >deliberately instituted, or may have grown up in a natural way, and perhaps >have been acquired with one's mother milk, or even by heredity". > > >Another interesting point in the relation Peirce/Saussure: although >arbitrariness and conventionality might be nearly equivalent in Saussure's >doctrine (and so they appear in Kees' book), they might not the same in a >Peircean approach. > > >Peirce would certainly accept conventional linguistic signs as symbolic but I >don't think he would accept that linguistic symbols are totally arbitrary. >Traces of iconicity and indexicality might be present in symbols even after >they have been largely generalized by their use in a community. In fact, the >words of natural language usually develop from icons, become indexical when >used in historical context and grow into more abstract symbols. Egyptian >hieroglyphs, chinese ideograms and certainly all kinds of "animal languaging" >cannot be counted as arbitrary only. > > >Even more important to semeiotic, the grammar of a specific natural language >systems seem to embody a universal syntax, which Peirce believe to be the >Filonian material implication or the Latin "nota notae" - and maybe related to >the schema of time. Complete linguistic arbitrariness would mean a non >translatability among natural languages. What we see, actually, is that >languages are not only translatable one into another but there might be a >possibility of capturing the essence of this general syntax to create a >diagrammatic system to represent thought in general. This belief will lead >Peirce to conceive his logical graphs. > > >In my next message I will put some specific questions and doubts about >Peirce's semeiotic and the division of signs as presented and discussed by >Kees. > > > >Best for now, > > >-- > >Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. >Professor of Communication Studies >School of Communications and Arts >University of Sao Paulo, Brazil >www.minutesemeiotic.org > >www.semeiosis.com.br > > >Skype:vinicius_romanini >
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