Vicinius wrote: ". . . you can call the gene symbolic. It's fine (5565-1) but it does not explain the magic of how the gene functions in a cell."
Yes, it does. By referring to a gene as "symbolic", the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign (PAS)is implied, which accounts for one of the most basic properties of DNA. As you know, PAS is also fundamental in understanding human languages. It is my impression that Peirce did not discuss PAS much, if at all, in his writings. Correct me if I am wrong. With all the best. Sung ____________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > HP: That's fine with me as long as it requires empiricism and parsimony; > but that's not the issue of the thread. > Do you agree that calling the information in the gene *symbolic* is > justified by how it functions in a cell? Or would Peircean vocabular not > accept this? > > VR: Yes, you can call the gene symbolic. It's fine but it does not explain > the magic of how the gene functions in a cell. A symbol is a general, a > law. It is a sort of abstract idea, like the letter of constitution of a > non-existent nation. By itself, the symbol is useless. To function, a > symbol needs indices attached to it. Indices are quantifiers. Frege and > Peirce independently developed the theory of quantification in logic. When > indices are attached to a symbol, it becomes a cognition, a "know-how" and > only then it can do its job. > But you do not attach indices to abstract ideas. Indices are existents, > abstract ideas are not. You must first bring them down to earth in the > guise of replicas. So a gene in a particular cell is a replica of a symbol > having an index attached to it (the index being the specific position it > occupies, the excitation it participates, the stimulus it responds). When > it functions, it delivers its 'know-how', or information, in a way > analogous to assertions. The gene "tells" the cell what to do. > > About empiricism... no, that's nominalism and does not go along with > Peirce. > Parsimony... yes, monism is very parsimonious. But what kind of monism? > Materialism or Idealism? > > Vinicius > > > 2014-03-23 23:30 GMT-04:00 Howard Pattee <[email protected]>: > >> At 05:03 PM 3/23/2014,Vinicius wrote: >> >> Dear Howard, >> Now you are talking like a real Peircean pragmatist. >> >> >> HP: That's fine with me as long as it requires empiricism and parsimony; >> but that's not the issue of the thread. >> Do you agree that calling the information in the gene *symbolic* is >> justified by how it functions in a cell? Or would Peircean vocabular not >> accept this? >> >> Howard >> >> > > > -- > Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. > Professor of Communication Studies > School of Communications and Arts > University of Sao Paulo, Brazil > www.minutesemeiotic.org > www.semeiosis.com.br > > Skype:vinicius_romanini >
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