I forward this contribution from Ulysses, since it was clearly meant to the
list and not to myself only.

I also agree with you, Ulysses, but are you putting the threshold
somewhere? Only living beings? Only intelligent beings? Whatever is
intelligible in the universe?

Vinicius

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: U Pascal <[email protected]>
Date: 2014-03-25 13:56 GMT-04:00
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5. Semeiotics, or the
Doctrine of Signs
To: Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]>


Vinicius, list

That is a false dilemma Vinicius.
Whether or not all signs are hypostatic abstractions, we do not need to
assume that humans are the only entities capable of hypostatic abstraction.


On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 10:14 AM, Vinicius Romanini <[email protected]>wrote:

> Jon A.
>
> I fully agree that theoretical enterprise needs hypostatic abstraction,
> and these are signs.
> But if we confine signs to hypostatic abstraction only, then whatever is
> not part of the human inquiry is not a sign? Do not plants make their
> living by uttering signs, for instance?
> Or a message sent by aliens living in a distant planet and that has not
> arrived on Earth yet. Is this a sign already, or will it be a sign only
> when some human mind decipher it?
>
> best,
> Vinicius
>
>
> 2014-03-25 10:28 GMT-04:00 Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>:
>
>> Vinicius,
>>
>> One does not engage in any sort of theoretical enterprise at all without
>> invoking hypostatic abstractions.  To speak of the letter "a" or the word
>> "apple" is already to speak of hypostatic abstractions, a fact going back
>> to Aristotle's observation that knowledge is only of generals.
>>
>> But we always deals with generals as represented by their concrete
>> representatives.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> Vinicius Romanini wrote:
>>
>>> Dear list members,
>>>
>>> In this second message I will comment on Kees' excursion on Peirce's
>>> definition of signs and its elements: the representamen (or the sign
>>> prescinded from the other correlates), the object the sign professes to
>>> represent and the interpretant as the effect of the action of the sign.
>>> Kees gives us a rather succinct overview and avoids going too much into
>>> questions still open to scholar debate, sometimes with very strong
>>> disagreements (that's what I would do too, by the way, if I were to
>>> write a
>>> panoramic text).
>>>
>>> Actually, I have never found two Peirce scholars who would totally agree
>>> when it comes to Peirce's theory of signs - and I would not expect this
>>> will happen during this seminar either. I myself have some disagreements
>>> with Kees in minor details but also on some at least one important
>>> example
>>> of applying the above mentioned analysis of the correlates.
>>>
>>> As we know, Peirce wrote dozens of different definitions for "sign" in
>>> his
>>> more than 40 years of work around the subject and it seems that he ended
>>> his life never totally satisfied with any, for his last MS's, from
>>> 1908-11,
>>> are full of tentative definitions to accommodate his commitment to
>>> pragmatism, the reality of the three categories but also his further
>>> division of the three correlates into ten a aspects.
>>>
>>> These variations use verbs like "represent", "determine" , "affect",
>>> "influence", "cause", "specialize" etc. Although written in different
>>> wordings, all of them have the same fundamental goal which is to define
>>> what a genuine triadic relation is. Since there are three correlates, one
>>> can choose how to punctuate this triadic relation.
>>>
>>> Kees explains all this and also warns us that Peirce would sometime
>>> write a
>>> definition that he thought would be more intelligible. He would use for
>>> example the term "interpreter" instead of the more logical
>>> "interpretant" -
>>> a word that Peirce himself created to eliminate traces of psychologism in
>>> his logic.
>>>
>>> Having the above in mind, I two disagreements with Kees' account:
>>>
>>> - The first is that Kees suggests that all signs might be hypostatic
>>> abstractions (either entia realis or rationis) but I do not see why.
>>>  Although hypostatic abstractions are certainly signs (such as the
>>> relations among the objects of a proposition), there might be signs which
>>> are not abstractions. Since any cognizable can be a sign, this would
>>> include real possibilities and existents not yet cognized. For example, I
>>> recall Peirce saying that a fossil fish is thought (and hence a sign)
>>> even
>>> if not yet found by anyone. Maybe Kees could clarify what he meant.
>>>
>>> - The second objection is the example he offers on page 80:
>>>
>>> "Thus we can say that, though any object, say a footprint on the beach,
>>> can
>>> give rise to a great variety of signs (human presence, the firmness of
>>> the
>>> sand, etc.), and though any sign can give rise to a variety of
>>> interpretations (a spouse's infidelity, the movement of the tide), each
>>> object limits, or determines, what may be a sign of it, and each sign
>>> similarly limits what may be an interpretant of it. Peirce's account
>>> suggests that what is picked out as a sign and how it is interpreted
>>> relates to the purpose of the interpreter (...)".
>>>
>>> I think this might not the best way to describe a genuine triadic
>>> relation.
>>> The object appears here as some "thing" quite independent of the other
>>> correlates and that "can give rise" to a variety of signs. Actually the
>>> object of the sign is always in a logical relation to the sign. If the
>>> relation does not subsist, then it is not the object of the sign. Besides
>>> that, a sign might have several objects (or a complex object), but I
>>> don't
>>> see how an object cannot "give rise" to several signs.
>>>
>>> On the same vein, it is true that the sign can produce a variety of
>>> interpretations, but each interpretation effectively produced is the
>>> result
>>> of the potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted independently
>>> of any psychological consideration such as "the purpose of the
>>> interpreter". The purpose, which might be understood as related to the
>>> final interpretant of the sign, must also be considered part of the
>>> logical
>>> relation and should not be introduced "ex machina".
>>>
>>> *Data maxima venia*, I thought it would be interesting to offer to the
>>> members of the list a more detailed description of semiosis involving
>>> this
>>> example. This would certainly not be the case in a book directed to a
>>> more
>>> general audience, which would only lead to perplexity. But since I assume
>>> that most of us here are already passed the state of perplexity when
>>> dealing with Peirce's terminology, I will risk bothering you with my own
>>> interpretation from the same example.
>>>
>>> I would rather consider the footprint as the sign. Taken as an
>>> individual,
>>> it is a sinsign. Considered as a true symptom, it is an index that
>>> represents existentially its object, which is the very foot (and the
>>> person
>>> related too such foot) that determined the form of that singular
>>> footprint.
>>> As an indexical sinsign, it only represents that "something with this
>>> shape
>>> was here", which is its interpretant dicisign. I am assuming that the
>>> interpreter has already familiarity with the shape of a shoe, that shoes
>>> leave their marks on the sand etc. We could put this into the analysis
>>> too,
>>> but would lead us to nearly an infinite regress. As Peirce states, we
>>> must
>>> start our inquiry with our own prejudices, or the "state of information"
>>> about the universe we live in.
>>>
>>> Anything beyond this will depend on the familiarity of the interpreter
>>> with
>>> the object being represented by the sign, gathered by what Peirce calls
>>> collateral experience. Not the "purpose", but the familiarity. In the
>>> case
>>> of the tide, the mental habits about how ocean waves usually erase
>>> footprints, how tides come and go. In the case of the spouse infidelity,
>>> the knowledge that people are sometimes unfaithful, etc.
>>>
>>> The important here is that his knowledge must have been gathered by
>>> previous experiences with related situations, be it directly or
>>> indirectly
>>> perceived from from other sources (books, movies, newspapers,
>>> conversations
>>> etc). If memory of these past experiences is vivid enough in the mind
>>> when
>>> the sign footprint comes to the phaneron, associations will follow
>>> naturally, even unconsciously, putting it in relation with information
>>> already in the memory. This synthetical inference, which is an abduction,
>>> will create a new and more developed sign.
>>>
>>> But how is new sign and its information is created? The indexical sign
>>> "footprint" is attached to this "idea" already present in the mind (the
>>> immediate object of this new sign), which is a sort of composite image of
>>> all similar situations that are present in the mind. Attaching an index
>>> to
>>> an idea embodied on a particular moment produces the cognition - which is
>>> the sign that brings information to the mind.
>>>
>>> In the case that the inference is about the spouse's infidelity, the
>>> complex object of this new sign (the hypothesis) will be the owner of the
>>> foot that produced the footprint  (her lover), the spouse, and the act of
>>> infidelity. The predicate would be the logical principle that holds all
>>> these objects together (that is, the form of the argument that prescribes
>>> that "if something would be true, than the observed relations among the
>>> objects would follow logically".  That is: "if the spouse is unfaithful,
>>> then the foot of the footprint could be from her lover".
>>>
>>> In the case of the tide, a similar set of objects and a relational
>>> predicate would be necessary to produce meaning, which is always
>>> interpretations.
>>>
>>> Furthermore, it might be the case that a mind seeing the footprint will
>>> produce both inferences (about the tide AND about the spouse infidelity).
>>> These two former inferences would appear then as premises of a new and
>>> more
>>> developed sign, which now gets the shape of an argument.
>>>
>>> This is what Peirce's rhetoric (or methodeutic) is about: a continuous
>>> production of hypostatic abstractions and putting them in communication
>>> to
>>> create ever more embracing arguments about the reality. Starting with
>>> facts
>>> and cognitions initially not associated, a systematic and more coherent
>>> view becomes diagrammatized in the mind. Deduction then would extract the
>>> necessary consequences and induction would eventually put them to the
>>> text
>>> of experience.
>>>
>>> Certainly this outline could be refined to bring into scene the plethora
>>> of
>>> Peirce's types and classes of signs. I write all this to show, in
>>> advance,
>>> how difficult it is  to put a "tag" such "this is an index, that is an
>>> abduction" without considering the whole "movement of the thought"
>>> involved.  As in my next message we will have to deal with Peirce's
>>> classes
>>> of signs, I think it is good to keep this in mind.
>>>
>>> All the best,
>>> Vinicius
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
> Professor of Communication Studies
> School of Communications and Arts
> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
> www.minutesemeiotic.org
> www.semeiosis.com.br
>
> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Ulysses



-- 
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br

Skype:vinicius_romanini
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