Ulysses asked:
"Could you elaborate on the connection you see (5623-1)
between context and arbitrariness?"
All I was trying to say was that the meaning of a sign is not just the
function of the sign itself(with all its elaborate structures described by
Peirce) but also of the context in which the sign is used. Hence the
meaning of a word is undefinable or arbitrary without its context being
taken into account.
A similar relation seems to exist between a system and its environment:
They are of equal importance in determining the function of a system. In
other words, the function of a system is not determined by the system
alone but by the combination of a system and its environment, for which I
coined a new word, systome in [biosemiotics:4003]:
Function <---> Systome = System + Environment (5623-2)
Similarly, it may be useful to coin a word, X, that fits the following
eqaurtion:
Meaning <---> X = Sign + Context (5623-3)
If anyone on this list has any suggestion for a short name for X, please
let me know. One possibility that came to mind is
X = signtext (read as sign + text) (5623-4)
but there must be more poetic ones than this.
If the definition given by 5623-3) is aadopted, then the arbitrariness of
sign would be much reduced, if not totally eliminated. In other words,
Signtexts are less arbitrary than signs. (5623-5)
Or,
Signtexts carry more information than signs. (5623-6)
In conclusion, I would predict that
"If signtexts are used instead of traditional (5623-7)
signs in human communications, the probability
of misunderstanding will be greatly reduced and
many unnecessary debates will be eliminated."
With all the best.
Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Sung, list
>
> Sung: "Peirce himself, I fear, may have over-emphasized the triadic
> structure of a sign at the neglect of the fundamental role that the
> context plays in determining the meaning of a sign, thereby missing the
> semiotic significance of the Principle of the Arbitrariness of Signs that
> was first clearly recognized by Saussure."
>
>
> Could you elaborate on the connection you see between context and
> arbitrariness?
>
> If context is required to reach an interpretation, then the required
> context is an element of whatever sign afforded that interpretation.
>
> The word "this" doesn't mean much without context. However, if the word is
> coupled with a gesture, such as pointing to an apple, one might reach
> the conclusion that "this" means "apple" in the given context. The sign
> that led to that interpretant is not merely the word "this" but the two
> part sign of "this" AND the gesture of pointing to the apple.
>
> It is not context in general that determines the meaning of context
> dependent signs, but *relevant* aspects of the context.
> These aspects must be selected and incorporated into a more developed sign
> as part of the semiotic process in order to produce a more developed
> interpretant.
>
> The type of sign relation that points to relevant aspects of the context
> is called an index.
>
> ---Ulysses
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 12:59 AM, Vinicius Romanini
> <vinir...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> Thanks Edwina for your careful reading and comments.
>> I think we agree in most of our opinions but disagree on the very
>> ontological status of a symbol. Since we both have sorted this out, we
>> can focus on applying Peirce's semeiotic to the riddle of life knowing
>> well the limits of our agreement.
>> All the best,
>> Vinicius
>>
>>
>> 2014-03-24 16:21 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>
>>> Thanks - I've lifted a few sentences from the Peircean introduction.
>>>
>>> 1) "A symbol is something which has the power of reproducing itself,
>>> and that essentially, since it is constituted a symbol only by the
>>> interpretation."
>>>
>>> Again, I'm referring to the symbol only within three classes; the
>>> Dicent Symbol, the rhematic symbol and the argument. Those are the only
>>> three triads that include the symbol relation. And I agree - it is
>>> constituted a symbol only by the interpretation. And that interpretation
>>> rests within the community-of-users.
>>>
>>> 2) This interpretation involves a power of the symbol to cause a real
>>> fact;
>>>
>>> I've got no problem with the above. Such Arguments as 'the Golden Rule'
>>> cause real factual behaviour. The rhematic symbol of 'honour' causes
>>> real factual behaviour.
>>>
>>> 3) Now it is of the essential nature of a symbol that it determines an
>>> interpretant, which is itself a symbol. A symbol, therefore, produces
>>> an endless series of interpretants.
>>>
>>> Again, I've no problem with the above.
>>>
>>>
>>> 4) But the universe is intelligible; and therefore it is possible to
>>> give a general account of it and its origin. This general account is a
>>> symbol; and from the nature of a symbol, it must begin with the formal
>>> assertion
>>> hat there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol.
>>>
>>> Ah, now here - I DO have a problem. That's setting up the origin of the
>>> universe as a symbol, even, as an Argument. That sounds essentialist to
>>> me...rather similar to Derrida's 'Logos'. And I note Houser's later
>>> comments on the difficulty of this part of Peirce's writing. That the
>>> Universe is rational - I can accept; that the laws of nature are
>>> 'natural'
>>> and even, an expression of reason, I can accept...but any implication
>>> of an
>>> a priori agenda...I have a problem with that. See also Houser's outline
>>> in
>>> the later pages of his article.
>>>
>>> 5) As a symbol it produced its infinite series of interpretants, which
>>> in
>>> the beginning were absolutely vague like itself. Butthe direct
>>> interpretant
>>> of any symbol must in the first stage of it be merely the
>>> *tabula rasa *for an interpretant. Hence the immediate interpretant of
>>> this vague Nothing was not even determinately vague, but only vaguely
>>> hovering between determinacy and vagueness; and its immediate
>>> interpretant
>>> was vaguely hovering between vaguely hovering between vagueness and
>>> determinacy and determinate vagueness or determinacy, and so on, *ad
>>> infinitum*.
>>>
>>> I can see that Peirce is defining the universe as a pure Argument -
>>> but,
>>> with its first Interpretants as vague. I can, on the other hand, see
>>> the
>>> universe as Rational, which is akin to the aspatial and atemporal
>>> nature of
>>> the pure Argument; and I can see the first interpretants as in a mode
>>> of
>>> Firstness. But frankly, I can't see any 'symbolic' relations (which are
>>> in
>>> a mode of Thirdness) in this phase.
>>>
>>> 6) Herein is a real effect; but a symbol could not be without that
>>> power
>>> of producing a real effect.
>>>
>>> And the 'real effect' is vagueness? [Which is Firstness not Thirdness].
>>> But Peirce continues in this passage that
>>>
>>> 7) That is logical which it is necessary to admit in order to render
>>> the
>>> universe intelligible. And the first of all logical principles is that
>>> the
>>> indeterminate should determine itself as best it may.
>>>
>>> Again, that the universe is a force 'seeking to express its basic
>>> logical
>>> nature' - I have no problem with that. But then, to say that the symbol
>>> is
>>> the possibly highest form of such an expression - well, that could mean
>>> that human reasoning is the highest form of the universe's rationality.
>>> I
>>> can see this - and also - wonder about the inherent frailty of human
>>> reasoning.
>>>
>>> 8) Houser writes that: he identified three kinds of sign relations,
>>> icons, indexes, and symbols corresponding to the three
>>> ways signs "connect with" the truth: icons by possessing the very
>>> quality
>>> signified, indexes by reacting directly with the object denoted, and
>>> symbols by actually determining the interpretant sign.
>>>
>>> I'd comment that these are three ways of connecting with the external
>>> dynamic object (which can be said to be 'the truth') - and the
>>> definition
>>> of symbol is that it determines the interpretant. How does it determine
>>> the
>>> interpretant? By assigning a meaning, such as the symbol 'cat'
>>> determines
>>> the meaning/reality of that external animal sitting over there.
>>>
>>> 9) Of symbols, Peirce said that they alone express laws and that they
>>> are
>>> essential for language and all abstract thought and are the only kind
>>> of
>>> sign that can express an argument.
>>>
>>> Agreed; the 'laws' are the rules of the language.
>>>
>>> 10) In themselves, symbols have no real existence and thus cannot exert
>>> real force. They exist only in replica, embodied in words or gestures
>>> or
>>> other instantiations. But Peirce insisted that symbols, thoughwithout
>>> force, are by no means powerless: "I maintain that every sufficiently
>>> completesymbol governs things, and that symbols alone do this. I mean
>>> that
>>> though it is not a force, it is a law" (EP 2: 313, 1904).
>>>
>>> Agreed: a symbol has no existence on its own; it exists within the
>>> norms
>>> of a community and as articulated within that community. As such, it is
>>> a
>>> 'law' in that the word 'STOP' has a normative meaning within the
>>> community and means one thing and one thing only and certainly has a
>>> real
>>> effect. All symbols are legisigns, ie, laws. My point is that these are
>>> assigned laws within the community and not 'naturally connected' to the
>>> object.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Difficult topic - and open to much debate.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original M
>>>
>>>
>>> essage -----
>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 3:30 PM
>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5595] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>
>>> Dear Edwina,
>>> I think we are stuck here.
>>>
>>> Maybe reading the introductory pages of this article by Nathan Houser
>>> comenting from Peirce's Kaina Stoicheia will make you ponder on what
>>> grounds my opinion:
>>>
>>>
> Sung, list
>
> Sung: "Peirce himself, I fear, may have over-emphasized the triadic
> structure of
> a sign at the neglect of the fundamental role that the context plays in
> determining the meaning of a sign, thereby missing the semiotic
> significance of the Principle of the Arbitrariness of Signs that was first
> clearly recognized by Saussure."
>
>
> Could you elaborate on the connection you see between context and
> arbitrariness?
>
> If context is required to reach an interpretation, then the required
> context is an element of whatever sign afforded that interpretation.
>
> The word "this" doesn't mean much without context. However, if the word is
> coupled with a gesture, such as pointing to an apple, one might reach
> the conclusion that "this" means "apple" in the given context. The sign
> that led to that interpretant is not merely the word "this" but the two
> part sign of "this" AND the gesture of pointing to the apple.
>
> It is not context in general that determines the meaning of context
> dependent signs, but *relevant* aspects of the context.
> These aspects must be selected and incorporated into a more developed sign
> as part of the semiotic process in order to produce a more developed
> interpretant.
>
> The type of sign relation that points to relevant aspects of the context
> is
> called an index.
>
> ---Ulysses
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 12:59 AM, Vinicius Romanini
> <vinir...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> Thanks Edwina for your careful reading and comments.
>> I think we agree in most of our opinions but disagree on the very
>> ontological status of a symbol. Since we both have sorted this out, we
>> can
>> focus on applying Peirce's semeiotic to the riddle of life knowing well
>> the
>> limits of our agreement.
>> All the best,
>> Vinicius
>>
>>
>> 2014-03-24 16:21 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>
>>> Thanks - I've lifted a few sentences from the Peircean introduction.
>>>
>>> 1) "A symbol is something which has the power of reproducing itself,
>>> and
>>> that essentially, since it is constituted a symbol only by the
>>> interpretation."
>>>
>>> Again, I'm referring to the symbol only within three classes; the
>>> Dicent
>>> Symbol, the rhematic symbol and the argument. Those are the only three
>>> triads that include the symbol relation. And I agree - it is
>>> constituted a
>>> symbol only by the interpretation. And that interpretation rests within
>>> the
>>> community-of-users.
>>>
>>> 2) This interpretation involves a power of the symbol to cause a real
>>> fact;
>>>
>>> I've got no problem with the above. Such Arguments as 'the Golden Rule'
>>> cause real factual behaviour. The rhematic symbol of 'honour' causes
>>> real
>>> factual behaviour.
>>>
>>> 3) Now it is of the essential nature of a symbol that it determines an
>>> interpretant, which is itself a symbol. A symbol, therefore, produces
>>> an
>>> endless series of interpretants.
>>>
>>> Again, I've no problem with the above.
>>>
>>>
>>> 4) But the universe is intelligible; and therefore it is possible to
>>> give
>>> a general account of it and its origin. This general account is a
>>> symbol;
>>> and from the nature of a symbol, it must begin with the formal
>>> assertion
>>> that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol.
>>>
>>> Ah, now here - I DO have a problem. That's setting up the origin of the
>>> universe as a symbol, even, as an Argument. That sounds essentialist to
>>> me...rather similar to Derrida's 'Logos'. And I note Houser's later
>>> comments on the difficulty of this part of Peirce's writing. That the
>>> Universe is rational - I can accept; that the laws of nature are
>>> 'natural'
>>> and even, an expression of reason, I can accept...but any implication
>>> of an
>>> a priori agenda...I have a problem with that. See also Houser's outline
>>> in
>>> the later pages of his article.
>>>
>>> 5) As a symbol it produced its infinite series of interpretants, which
>>> in
>>> the beginning were absolutely vague like itself. Butthe direct
>>> interpretant
>>> of any symbol must in the first stage of it be merely the
>>> *tabula rasa *for an interpretant. Hence the immediate interpretant of
>>> this vague Nothing was not even determinately vague, but only vaguely
>>> hovering between determinacy and vagueness; and its immediate
>>> interpretant
>>> was vaguely hovering between vaguely hovering between vagueness and
>>> determinacy and determinate vagueness or determinacy, and so on, *ad
>>> infinitum*.
>>>
>>> I can see that Peirce is defining the universe as a pure Argument -
>>> but,
>>> with its first Interpretants as vague. I can, on the other hand, see
>>> the
>>> universe as Rational, which is akin to the aspatial and atemporal
>>> nature of
>>> the pure Argument; and I can see the first interpretants as in a mode
>>> of
>>> Firstness. But frankly, I can't see any 'symbolic' relations (which are
>>> in
>>> a mode of Thirdness) in this phase.
>>>
>>> 6) Herein is a real effect; but a symbol could not be without that
>>> power
>>> of producing a real effect.
>>>
>>> And the 'real effect' is vagueness? [Which is Firstness not Thirdness].
>>> But Peirce continues in this passage that
>>>
>>> 7) That is logical which it is necessary to admit in order to render
>>> the
>>> universe intelligible. And the first of all logical principles is that
>>> the
>>> indeterminate should determine itself as best it may.
>>>
>>> Again, that the universe is a force 'seeking to express its basic
>>> logical
>>> nature' - I have no problem with that. But then, to say that the symbol
>>> is
>>> the possibly highest form of such an expression - well, that could mean
>>> that human reasoning is the highest form of the universe's rationality.
>>> I
>>> can see this - and also - wonder about the inherent frailty of human
>>> reasoning.
>>>
>>> 8) Houser writes that: he identified three kinds of sign relations,
>>> icons, indexes, and symbols corresponding to the three
>>> ways signs "connect with" the truth: icons by possessing the very
>>> quality
>>> signified, indexes by reacting directly with the object denoted, and
>>> symbols by actually determining the interpretant sign.
>>>
>>> I'd comment that these are three ways of connecting with the external
>>> dynamic object (which can be said to be 'the truth') - and the
>>> definition
>>> of symbol is that it determines the interpretant. How does it determine
>>> the
>>> interpretant? By assigning a meaning, such as the symbol 'cat'
>>> determines
>>> the meaning/reality of that external animal sitting over there.
>>>
>>> 9) Of symbols, Peirce said that they alone express laws and that they
>>> are
>>> essential for language and all abstract thought and are the only kind
>>> of
>>> sign that can express an argument.
>>>
>>> Agreed; the 'laws' are the rules of the language.
>>>
>>> 10) In themselves, symbols have no real existence and thus cannot exert
>>> real force. They exist only in replica, embodied in words or gestures
>>> or
>>> other instantiations. But Peirce insisted that symbols, thoughwithout
>>> force, are by no means powerless: "I maintain that every sufficiently
>>> completesymbol governs things, and that symbols alone do this. I mean
>>> that
>>> though it is not a force, it is a law" (EP 2: 313, 1904).
>>>
>>> Agreed: a symbol has no existence on its own; it exists within the
>>> norms
>>> of a community and as articulated within that community. As such, it is
>>> a
>>> 'law' in that the word 'STOP' has a normative meaning within the
>>> community and means one thing and one thing only and certainly has a
>>> real
>>> effect. All symbols are legisigns, ie, laws. My point is that these are
>>> assigned laws within the community and not 'naturally connected' to the
>>> object.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Difficult topic - and open to much debate.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original M
>>>
>>>
>>> essage -----
>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 3:30 PM
>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5595] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>
>>> Dear Edwina,
>>> I think we are stuck here.
>>>
>>> Maybe reading the introductory pages of this article by Nathan Houser
>>> comenting from Peirce's Kaina Stoicheia will make you ponder on what
>>> grounds my opinion:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9789400777316-c1.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1448411-p175468571
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-03-24 15:12 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>
>>>> Vinicius - I don't see that the quotation that you provided from
>>>> Peirce denies my claim that the symbolic relation - DOES exist - but
>>>> is
>>>> assigned by humans.
>>>>
>>>> I've said nothing about generals (and general objects) and of course I
>>>> admit that they are real. I'm talking about the semiosic process of
>>>> referring to that dynamic object and even to generals. Among humans,
>>>> the
>>>> process can be iconic, indexical AND symbolic. The symbolic method of
>>>> referring to that REAL dynamic object is arbitrary and assigned within
>>>> a
>>>> community. This enables mankind, alone of all species, to 'be a spy',
>>>> to
>>>> set up hidden codes, to lie, 'to speak with different tongues and yet,
>>>> be
>>>> able to mean the same thing and refer to the same dynamic object'.
>>>>
>>>> Furthermore, being able to refer to the same external reality, but
>>>> using
>>>> different symbols, was, I suggest an important process within the
>>>> development of humans on this planet. That is, tribalism, or the
>>>> development of self-organized communities in interaction with their
>>>> local
>>>> ecological realities, strengthened the ability of human societies to
>>>> exist
>>>> as stable 'communities of knowledge', with constructive adaptations to
>>>> their local environments....and this notion of living as a tribe
>>>> rather
>>>> than a global species...was enabled by different languages. After all,
>>>> it
>>>> is astonishing how many different languages this ONE species has
>>>> developed
>>>> over the globe - and I suggest this early isolation strengthened the
>>>> tribal
>>>> stability and knowledge base in that environment.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 2:55 PM
>>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5592] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>>
>>>> Edwina,
>>>> Your definition is antropocentric. A true symbolic relation is real,
>>>> and
>>>> whatever is real is independent of any mind or group of minds.
>>>> A true symbol is grounded by the laws of nature, which are independent
>>>> of what humans might think of them. It is only a contingency that our
>>>> species can represent the laws of nature. And nothing forbids, a
>>>> priori,
>>>> that other species here on earth or on any other part of our universe
>>>> could
>>>> develop the ability o represent these laws, even if biased by their
>>>> perceptive limitations.
>>>>
>>>> In *What Pragmatism Is* (1905, EP2: 331), Peirce writes that we should
>>>> "not
>>>> overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says nothing of single
>>>> experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is
>>>> conditionally
>>>> true *in futuro *can hardly be singular), but only speaks of general
>>>> kinds of experimental phenomena. Its adherent does not shrink from
>>>> speaking
>>>> of general objects as real, since whatever is true represents a real.
>>>> Now
>>>> the laws of nature are true". (CP 5.426)
>>>>
>>>> Vinicius
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2014-03-24 14:34 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I know that Peirce was an objective idealist, but I don't see
>>>>> how that affects the definition of a symbolic relation. Remember, I
>>>>> don't
>>>>> call the whole triad a symbol, only the interaction between the
>>>>> representamen and the object - and it's a symbolic interaction in
>>>>> only
>>>>> three of the ten classes. The three classes in which the symbol
>>>>> operates
>>>>> (the dicent symbol, rhematic symbol and argument) seem, to me, to
>>>>> function
>>>>> only within human semiosis.
>>>>>
>>>>> What is a symbolic relation? To me, it is, as I said, assigned by an
>>>>> external agent and is thus arbitrary and must be learned within the
>>>>> community. Now, this symbolic Relation is not the same as human
>>>>> language -
>>>>> which is a logical mode of reasoning and is innate. That is..language
>>>>> is
>>>>> not a sum of words (symbols) but is a logical pattern of thinking.
>>>>> The
>>>>> tendency to develop a logical pattern of thought and expression is
>>>>> innate
>>>>> to humans, (other animals are also logical but don't use symbols) and
>>>>> the
>>>>> words used to articulate objects within this logical pattern...are
>>>>> learned
>>>>> within the community. If you deprive a child of the words - they
>>>>> might
>>>>> develop a basic logic ..and their own 'sounds' to refer to
>>>>> objects...but
>>>>> these sounds will not be communal. The key criterion of a symbol is
>>>>> that
>>>>> its connection to the object is externally assigned; it can be
>>>>> changed...that is, the connection can exist *no matter what 'name' or
>>>>> symbol is used* as long as the community accepts that connection.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 2:14 PM
>>>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5590] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>>>
>>>>> I see. But you must have in mind that Peirce did not think so. He was
>>>>> an objective idealist, as you certainly know.
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Vinicius
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2014-03-24 13:27 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Vinicius - yes, in my view, the symbol's 'content' has to be
>>>>>> assigned by an external agent; it's not from any physical attachment
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> mimesis. I'm not sure what you mean by 'psychological', but i
>>>>>> confine the
>>>>>> symbol to human semiosis. In fact, of the ten classes of signs, the
>>>>>> symbol
>>>>>> (as input or the Relation between Object and Representamen) is only
>>>>>> found
>>>>>> in three classes:
>>>>>> the dicent symbolic legisign, the rhematic symbolic legisign, and
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> argument symbolic legisign. I'd confine all three to human semiosis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 10:27 AM
>>>>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5576] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Edwina,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can certainly refine my latest statement using Peirce's more
>>>>>> detailed classes of signs. A symbol is necessarily a legisign, for
>>>>>> instance. To deliver its information, it must be a dicisign, but a
>>>>>> dicisign
>>>>>> will embody a rhema and so on.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I gave up trying to put "tags" such "this is a rhema" or "this is a
>>>>>> dicisign" to explain semeiosis because it is always dynamic and
>>>>>> involving
>>>>>> several classes of signs, which makes it more difficult but also
>>>>>> much more
>>>>>> interesting for a semeiotic analysis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think our only serious disagreements here is that I hold symbols
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> be "entia realis" that do not need to be assigned by any external
>>>>>> agent.
>>>>>> Actually, what you say would mean that logic is dependent on
>>>>>> psychology,
>>>>>> which is not Peirce's view. The agent is in the symbol, and not out
>>>>>> of it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Vinicius
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2014-03-24 8:42 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Perfectly outlined, Vinicius. That's why I reject Howard's use of
>>>>>>> the term symbol, because he doesn't explain its connection to
>>>>>>> reality and,
>>>>>>> he doesn't explain why it is a symbol rather than, as others have
>>>>>>> suggested, a rhematic indexical legisign (my suggestion) or Gary
>>>>>>> F's
>>>>>>> suggestion (a dicent indexical legisign)...in other words, why does
>>>>>>> Howard
>>>>>>> use the term 'symbol' which is an assigned abstract...rather than a
>>>>>>> legisign...which is a general and not necessarily assigned by an
>>>>>>> external
>>>>>>> agent (as is a symbol, in my view).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>>>> *From:* Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>>>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 24, 2014 8:11 AM
>>>>>>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:5565] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> HP: That's fine with me as long as it requires empiricism and
>>>>>>> parsimony; but that's not the issue of the thread.
>>>>>>> Do you agree that calling the information in the gene *symbolic* is
>>>>>>> justified by how it functions in a cell? Or would Peircean
>>>>>>> vocabular not
>>>>>>> accept this?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> VR: Yes, you can call the gene symbolic. It's fine but it does not
>>>>>>> explain the magic of how the gene functions in a cell. A symbol is
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> general, a law. It is a sort of abstract idea, like the letter of
>>>>>>> constitution of a non-existent nation. By itself, the symbol is
>>>>>>> useless. To
>>>>>>> function, a symbol needs indices attached to it. Indices are
>>>>>>> quantifiers.
>>>>>>> Frege and Peirce independently developed the theory of
>>>>>>> quantification in
>>>>>>> logic. When indices are attached to a symbol, it becomes a
>>>>>>> cognition, a
>>>>>>> "know-how" and only then it can do its job.
>>>>>>> But you do not attach indices to abstract ideas. Indices are
>>>>>>> existents, abstract ideas are not. You must first bring them down
>>>>>>> to earth
>>>>>>> in the guise of replicas. So a gene in a particular cell is a
>>>>>>> replica of a
>>>>>>> symbol having an index attached to it (the index being the specific
>>>>>>> position it occupies, the excitation it participates, the stimulus
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> responds). When it functions, it delivers its 'know-how', or
>>>>>>> information,
>>>>>>> in a way analogous to assertions. The gene "tells" the cell what to
>>>>>>> do.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> About empiricism... no, that's nominalism and does not go along
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> Peirce.
>>>>>>> Parsimony... yes, monism is very parsimonious. But what kind of
>>>>>>> monism? Materialism or Idealism?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Vinicius
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2014-03-23 23:30 GMT-04:00 Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com>:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> At 05:03 PM 3/23/2014,Vinicius wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Dear Howard,
>>>>>>>> Now you are talking like a real Peircean pragmatist.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> HP: That's fine with me as long as it requires empiricism and
>>>>>>>> parsimony; but that's not the issue of the thread.
>>>>>>>> Do you agree that calling the information in the gene *symbolic*
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> justified by how it functions in a cell? Or would Peircean
>>>>>>>> vocabular not
>>>>>>>> accept this?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Howard
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>>>>>> Professor of Communication Studies
>>>>>>> School of Communications and Arts
>>>>>>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>>>>>>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>>>>>>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>>>>> Professor of Communication Studies
>>>>>> School of Communications and Arts
>>>>>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>>>>>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>>>>>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>>>> Professor of Communication Studies
>>>>> School of Communications and Arts
>>>>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>>>>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>>>>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>>>>
>>>>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>>> Professor of Communication Studies
>>>> School of Communications and Arts
>>>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>>>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>>>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>>>
>>>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>> Professor of Communication Studies
>>> School of Communications and Arts
>>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>>
>>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>> Professor of Communication Studies
>> School of Communications and Arts
>> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
>> www.minutesemeiotic.org
>> www.semeiosis.com.br
>>
>> Skype:vinicius_romanini
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Ulysses
>
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