Coinage and Actual Spelling of Locke’s Term “Semiotics”
Everyone agrees that “semiotics” in whatever variants comes originally
from John Locke’s Essay concerning Humane Understanding, published in December
of 1689 but bearing the date of 1690. Kees refers to the 1690 text, but he
cites only the 1975 [supposedly “critical”] Oxford edition, which, along with
most editions made after Locke’s death, “corrected”, i.e., silently distorted,
both the text and the intention of its author in the matter of his proposal
that the doctrine of signs be called semiotica, i.e., σημιωτική, “semiotics”.
It is well known that the main Greek term for “sign” is σημείον. The
etymologically “obvious” spelling for the study of signs thus would be
σημειωτική, except for one slight detail: that is not the name that Locke gave
to his proposal precisely because he wanted to distinguish his proposal for a
“new general science” from the specific branch of medicine already known in his
time as σημειωτική, i.e., “semeiotics” transliterated.
In ancient Greek philosophy the only signs commonly recognized were what
would come to be known after Augustine as natural signs, σημεία. The main study
of signs of this type (outside of divination, “astrology”) was in medicine,
where by Locke’s time symptomatology had already been named Σημειωτική. Kees
(p. 73) cites the 1625 Anatomy of Urine by James Hart (though Kees does not
include the work in his Bibliography), where “semeiotics [is] the art that
teaches us the nature, causes, and substance of a disease by its signs.” Kees
then tells his readers (p. 73) that “in essence, Locke proposes to apply the
method developed for interpreting the symptoms of diseases to all knowledge,
and his Essay, particularly Book 4, is an attempt to do this.” Although good
enough as a guess, Kees on this point needs to attend to the third phase of
inquiry, where a developed guess is tested against the facts. The only way for
Kees to maintain his abduction on this point is by avoiding what would best be
termed “retroduction” (“induction” in Peirce’s sense of that term – details in
the full TAJS review), i.e., a scholarly testing of his hypothesis.2
Tested against the facts, what Kees tells his readers on this score turns
out to be factually false — generating for his readers a needless perplexity,
since the facts in question have been on public record for some years now
before Kees published his Guide for the Perplexed.
To begin with, Locke did not propose Σημειωτική as his name for a general
doctrine of signs. He proposed rather Σημιωτική, which would transliterate into
Latin as “semiotica”, and into English as “semiotics”. Further, he did not
propose Σημιωτική as an extension to all knowledge of “the method of
interpreting symptoms of diseases”, as Kees (p. 73) would have his readers
believe. Locke proposed Semiotics as an entirely new science (or “doctrine of
signs”, as he synonymously stated expressly) embracing the whole of speculative
knowledge as well as of practical knowledge (under which latter branch alone
would symptomatology belong), conventional signs as well as natural signs – a
general science, in cognizant contrast to the special science of symptomatology.
Now take note of this fact. Not only did Locke use his own new spelling,
Σημιωτική, to name the general study of signs, in the original 1690 edition of
his Essay. He undertook personally to oversee the completion of four subsequent
editions for publication; and in every one of these five editions prepared
within his own house and lifetime, the spelling Σημιωτική is retained.
Only after his death in 1704 do we find Σημιωτική replaced by Σημειωτική,
usually (always so far as I have been able to examine editions) with no
explanation given. Unless the editors had themselves examined all five of the
Locke editions between 1689 and 1704, scholars could readily assume that
Σημειωτική was the “correct” form according to established Greek orthography.
But Locke was not writing from that point of view. He was writing from the
point of view of an entirely new proposal for Logic and Philosophy, that
thinkers recognize and develop a new general science of signs via a distinction
of the means whereby all knowledge is acquired and developed which would unite
in a transdisciplinary perspective both speculative and practical fields of
knowing – a distinction which would not confuse this “new science” with the
already extant special science of symptomatology.
Locke’s proposal was not received by his fellow moderns, early or late,
with any enthusiasm, with the partial exception of Berkeley, who nonetheless
did not systematically take up the proposal. (See “Reception of the Proposal
among the Moderns” in Four Ages of Understanding, pp. 592-93.) Often enough,
when a later modern abridged version of the Essay was published, the concluding
chapter on semiotics would be omitted. The modern preoccupation with
“epistemology” took the center stage of philosophical attention among the
philosophers, not Locke’s proposal for the doctrine of signs (still less
Poinsot’s systematic Treatise on Signs published the year of Locke’s birth, but
in Latin, and in Spain).
So the answer is readily available to Kees’s implicit perplexity (p. 75)
as to why in the world has “semiotics” become “the variant most commonly used
today”, instead of the variant “semeiotic” (let alone “semeiotics”) preferred
(not really by Peirce himself, but for some years now) by the self-styled
Peirceans after Fisch:
The term “semiotics” as a name for the doctrine of signs had a powerful
advantage when the time finally came that authors began to think seriously
about the prospects and thematic development of such a doctrine. It not only
had the Greek pedigree of a derivation from σημείον, it had the further
advantage of derivation therefrom by way of medicine, “very likely the most
deeply rooted”, as Sebeok put it (1975: 181), “leg upon which semiotics rests.”
And its spelling, however inferior from the point of view of the purist of
Greek orthography, has the advantage of directly reflecting the spelling Locke
chose for naming the doctrine of signs, σημιωτικὴ, in its distinction from the
medical specialization of similar nomination, σημειωτική.
An observation made by Sebeok as far back as 1971 provides some amusement in
the present context:
A minute holdout dismisses both [“semiotic” and “semiotics”], in favor of
semeiotics, on the argument that “the spelling is better etymology than
semiotics, and it avoids the ambiguity of semi-. Semi-otics would be nonsense.
Would Kees have the would-be Peirceans continue to cling to a variant spelling
(“semeiotic” or “semeiotics”) which in fact confuses the general study Locke
proposed with a specific branch of medical science? Such a “clinging to” is
counterproductive, both etymologically and theoretically.
The title of Kees Chapter 5 could have been fully correct and
appropriate had he followed what Ransdell – never cited by Kees, an oddity
considering Ransdell’s looming online presence regarding Peirce – had plainly
and accurately said in his 1989 inquiry “Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?”
(original English version online at
<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/phenom.htm>): “Logic is
identified with Peirce’s general theory of representation (theory of signs),
for which Peirce’s usual technical term is ‘semiotic’.”
End of Post 2 re title of Chap. 5.
________________________________
2 See Section 4c. below, “The Semiotic Spiral”, p. ff.
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