Hi Mara, You've asked: "What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science) should play in the development of religious thought?"
I don't believe that Peirce tried to answer this question in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." We could look to the broader context of his other writings--both early and late--in order to look for an answer. Or, we could develop our own answers in manners that are more or less in consonance with the view he has articulated. One question that surfaced in the earlier discussion of "The Fixation of Belief" was the following: Is Peirce's argument against the alternate methods of fixing belief meant to be exhaustive? If it is, then he is arguing that the scientific method is the only method that will enable us to discover and properly test purported explanations of what is really the case. There may be aims other than finding the truth about what is really so, but other methods are not well designed to help us with the particular aim of discovering the truth. If the argument in "Fixation" isn't meant to be exhaustive of all of the options, then we might consider other possible methods of inquiry--and some of those methods might be used to answer religious questions. Let's consider an alternate method of inquiry. Hermeneutics was developed as part of the debates about how we should interpret sacred texts within a religious tradition. Following this line of thought, one might argue that the scientific method is the proper way to inquire about the real nature of bread and wine, but that the hermeneutic method is the right way to go about interpreting the parts of the sacred texts that have to do with the Eucharist. As such, we could say that the scientific method can be used to determine the biological, chemical and physical properties of bread and wine. It is not, however, the right method to use when interpreting the meaning of holy sacraments, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist. My view of the matter is that the scientific method is the only method that admits of a real difference between a right and a wrong way of fixing our beliefs. As such, I am agreeing with Peirce on this, and I think that the arguments are meant to be exhaustive of all of the possible methods of inquiry. As such, it is the only method that gives us a reasonable approach to determining what the truth is about the matter. Having said that, the scientific method is called "scientific" because it is highly developed in its application to specific areas of inquiry. In our common sense, we rely on experimental modes of inquiry--largely because these are the only modes of valid inference. As such, any attempt to put a fence around different modes of inquiry (i.e., by separating between the various areas of scientific inquiry and religious modes of experience as Stephen J. Gould tries to do) will raise a number of hard questions about what the aims of these other modes of experience are. We could say that they are largely practical in orientation. Or, we could say that religious experience is similar in orientation to artistic expression. Either way, religious experience would then not involve a theoretical orientation towards finding the truth of the matter. James and Dewey seem to head in this direction. James appears to be happy with the separation. Dewey tries to say that religious experience can reveal "truths" by saying that they are revelatory of experience considered broadly. As such, the separation between religion and science is more a matter of degree and not a bright line. As far as I can tell, Peirce is not satisfied with James's or Dewey's approach to articulating the relationship between science and religion. Peirce seems to hope that the religious dimensions of ordinary experience involve an elaboration on fundamental aspects of our common experience, and that a deeper harmony can be found between the scientific, the common sense, and the religious aspirations to finding and expressing truth. Like Peirce, I want to see greater continuity between all forms of experience and understanding--including science, practice, artistic expression, and religious experience. Each involves experimental modes of thinking, and each has an orientation towards truth. After all, every proposition involves reference to truth--even those expressed in works of literary fiction. Such an reference to truth is requisite for those propositions to be meaningful. --Jeff PS I've responded to your question using a subject line that will move the discussion back to a thread that will be archived under the seminar on Kees's book. While we started with an example from "How to Make our Ideas Clear," we've moved to questions about the scientific method and "The Fixation of Belief". As such, I'm using the heading for Chap. 6. In the future, I think it will be helpful to those who are organizing the seminar to continue the practice of keeping the discussions under the headings for the chapters--and to avoid creating new threads--at least where we are trying to stay on track with respect to our discussion of the <Guide for the Perplexed>. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Mara Woods [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, May 02, 2014 8:26 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Jeffrey, Thank you for the explanatory context; it helps to see the entire issue explained. The echo of the different methods of the fixation of belief here would suggests that the pragmatic maxim is applicable only to science because that's the only method that would require making such practical distinctions using the phaneron. If the issue of transubstantiation cannot, by definition, be decided through any test, which indeed makes any assertions meaningless from the point of view of the method of science. Does this mean that any doubt that arises about the validity of the issue of transubstantiation can only be resolved through one of the other three methods? Or is Peirce saying that the lack of meaning of the proposition suggests that there is, in fact, nothing meaningful to doubt in the first place? Another way to ask this question is: What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science) should play in the development of religious thought? Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Mara, Phyllis, List, In order to understand the point of the example concerning transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. Here is a short summary of a few key points: 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind of thing. 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ himself is the agent of the change. 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are changed into the form of body and blood. 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a nominal definition that is based on common sense. In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real differences between the hypotheses insofar as they are considered to be scientific explanations. Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. Hope that helps to explain why this is a good example of how we might use the pragmatic maxim to clarify the meaning of competing metaphysical hypotheses. --Jeff P.S. There is a nice summary of Aquinas's position in Teresa Whalen's The Authentic Doctrine of the Eucharist (pp. 12-19<tel:12-19>) if you want to see more detail. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU
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