Franklin,
Why do you see a fifth method here? I don’t see any significant difference between the method of “public opinion” and the “a priori” or “consensus” method (as I proposed to call it). And in his preface to the draft that you (or Liszka) refer to, CP 7.313 ff., he refers to “four methods.” gary f. From: Frank Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 4-May-14 3:42 PM To: [email protected] Cc: Frank Ransom Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science List, Reading through the posts, I've noticed that no one has mentioned the fifth method Peirce identified. Quoting from Liszka's A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce: "In this last case, authority must give way to the method of public opinion. In this method, the fixing of belief is established not by imposing a set of beliefs on members of a community but by getting them to enthusiastically adopt a set of beliefs of their own accord. Under this method it is still possible to control the community's beliefs, but it must be done in a way that appeals to the population other than through force or intimidation, that is, out of self-interest or commonly held sentiments, fears, or hatreds (cf. CP 7.325). But this turns out to be a rather unstable basis of establishing belief, precisely because the appeal is to sentiments, appearances, and opinions that are not firmly established. This method has a tendency to create sweeping and rapid changes but ones that do not persist as circumstances or public mood changes (cf. CP 7.318). Since some list members have been making much of the four methods and how to properly justify the distinction of the four from each other, I felt it would be well to mention this other method. In general, it is probably best to think of method in the more general sense in which Peirce uses that term, as having to do with a procedure for knowing a thing, and that the notion of method used in "Fixation of Belief" and identification of four such methods is aimed at the specific purpose of identifying in general, not methods, but the kinds of methods by which belief might become fixed. Peirce's list of five kinds of method strikes me as somewhat arbitrary and more a matter of Peirce's observations than a thorough-going systematic approach. I do believe that a systematic approach should be possible for distinguishing the kinds, that there are likley more kinds, and the categories might prove helpful in such an approach. It's just not clear at all to me yet how it should be accomplished, and I am reticent to turn to Kant for suggestions. -- Franklin
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