Gary, List, Sorry for the late response!
I read through the selections given for MS 318 in EP2:399-431 (again, it had been a few years). I didn't really see much about information in the selection, except with respect to collateral experience. The discussion of the logic of relatives didn't strike me as particularly helpful either, except for Peirce's distinction (tristinction?) between three kind of characters, which seemed to be different from each other according to the categorical mode that they have to do with. Very interesting and suggestive, I think. But not much helpful overall for understanding the difference made by introducing the logic of relatives to the theory of information; or, at least, no thorough-going discussion of the connection between the two. I might check out the Prolegomena soon. Also, I think it's about time I sat down and read through Peirce's early work on the logic of relatives that Jon A. has been slow-reading on the list, and maybe the 1885 (?) paper on related developments. -- Franklin On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Franklin, my responses are inserted below. > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Frank Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 10-Apr-14 4:55 PM > > Gary, list, > > > > I pasted below my post Gary's post from [PEIRCE-L] Re: > [biosemiotics:5398] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? to show to what > I'm responding, separating out this discussion from a discussion of Ch. 5 > of Kees's book that we were having that is no longer relevant to Kees's > book and from the discussion of Peirce's theory of information in respect > to the question "What kind of sign is a 'gene'?", which question is not of > particular interest to myself. > > > > Gary, you mention that: > > > > "In the logic of relations (as opposed to the more traditional syllogistic > logic), the *predicate* of a proposition provides any depth it has, by > *signifying* (iconically or symbolically) the recognizable *form* which > is shared by object and sign, and conveyed to the interpretant by the act > of recognition or the event of interpretation. The *subject* of the > proposition *denotes* (indexically) its object, and thus the indexical > relation provides the proposition with its breadth." > > > > In the earlier work found in the Harvard lectures of 1865, and later the > paper "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension", we don't find the logic > of relations. At least, not that I know of? Would you please offer me some > references to Peirce's discussion of the logic of relations with respect to > the theory of information? It's not that I doubt you; certainly it sounds > right. I'm just embarrassed to admit that I don't have as much familiarity > with Peirce's work on the logic of relations, so I would love to find out > where I could read him discussing these topics together, if you happen to > have any ready-to-mind references. > > gf: Peirce didn’t start working with the logic of relations (or > “relatives”) until almost 1870. One place where he discusses both > information and the logic of relations (along with the various > interpretants) is MS 318 of 1907 — see especially EP2:404 ff. on > information, and 424 ff. on the logic of relatives. > > > > Also, you said "by *signifying* (iconically or symbolically) the > recognizable *form* which is shared by object and sign". Might you be > able to elaborate a little on why you said iconically *or* symbolically? > Is there a difference in the way that a proposition is interpreted, whether > the predicate informs the proposition iconically or symbolically? Or if you > believe this makes a difference in the depth of the proposition? > > gf: A verbal predicate is of course a symbolic way of signifying the > ‘characters’ or ‘quality’ of the object. But when the Object of the > proposition is complex, which is usually the case, it may equally well be > regarded as several objects, and the rhematic form of the predicate can > represent *relations between these objects* iconically. This is made > especially clear by Existential Graphs, where the representation of the > proposition is especially iconic (except for the words). Actually I should > have said “iconically *and* symbolically,” as that kind of sign is almost > always a mixture of the two. The “Prolegomena to an Apology for > Pragmaticism” has a lot to say about diagrams, iconicity and propositions > too: > > http://www.gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm > > > > > > -- Franklin > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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