Yes, I think it would be more correct from Peirce's perspective to say that green is a quality (property, characteristic) of some frogs. Qualities may (or likely do) relate to the physical properties of humans in some way, but Peirce's semiotic is normative, logically objective and not dependent upon human minds. It's both the whole of formal logic and the lead of formal logic, as speculative grammar.
The late semiotician, Thomas Sebock developed a thoroughgoing "semiotic web" that is shown in diagrammatic form in John Deeley's intro to the book "FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS." I find that diagram and Deeley's introduction to this book as a very useful overview for understanding/explaining the breadth/depth of Peircean semiotics (and its contrast with de Saussure). Regards, Phyllis Chiasson Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >(oops, ok, not klick answer, but fill in peirce list adress) > >So would it be better not to say, the name of the object is "green", but: >"Green is a quality things can have"? This would be a memory content, and I >assume, that memory contents are parts of the form of a human (possible >objects): They have their limited space somewhere (in the cortex), but are >permanent in time. Behaviour parts (possible representamens) are limited in >time (like an impulse), but have no spatial limits in the system of >interpretance: Like the sighting of a green frog. > > > Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: > > >Can a quality be an object? Or is an object a relationship between a quality >(or qualities) and a thing? > >Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > >Dear Peircers, > >I think, there is one assumption that hinders the understanding of semiotics: >The triad of representamen-object-interpretant suggests, that there be only >one object implied. I think that this is not so. In one semiosis, there are >most likely more than one objects involved. Example: Representamen being the >sighting of a green frog. You being a young child, who knows a frog from a >black-and-white sketch in a fairy tale book. Also you know colours. One object >is "frog", the other is "green", the third is the concept you already have >about relations between attitude and entity, namely: "A sighted trait might be >typical for the sighted thing". This third object is also called by the >representamen, because the representamen is carrying with it a trait (green) >and a frog. Now the representamen fits to these three objects, and in an >abductive process of your mind, a new object is created: "possibly all frogs >are green". This object is (by induction) strenghened by the subsequent >sighting of some more green frogs. But then you spot a red frog, and you have >a deduction: The object is inverted: "possibly all frogs are green" is deleted >and replaced by: "Not all frogs are green". The object "A sighted trait might >be typical for the sighted thing" is slightly weakened. Well, thats how I >assume, thinking works, dont you think so? A reflexive process always implies >abduction, induction and deduction, and at least abduction requires more than >one object. Now dont say, that the green frog is the one object: He is long >gone, diven into the water, as you are still thinking about it, dont you? >Best, Helmut > >----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >"Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the >message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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