I've misspelled a name here. It is John Deely --no extra e.
Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: >Yes, I think it would be more correct from Peirce's perspective to say that >green is a quality (property, characteristic) of some frogs. Qualities may (or >likely do) relate to the physical properties of humans in some way, but >Peirce's semiotic is normative, logically objective and not dependent upon >human minds. It's both the whole of formal logic and the lead of formal logic, > as speculative grammar. > >The late semiotician, Thomas Sebock developed a thoroughgoing "semiotic web" >that is shown in diagrammatic form in John Deeley's intro to the book >"FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS." I find that diagram and Deeley's introduction to >this book as a very useful overview for understanding/explaining the >breadth/depth of Peircean semiotics (and its contrast with de Saussure). > >Regards, >Phyllis Chiasson > >Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >>(oops, ok, not klick answer, but fill in peirce list adress) >> >>So would it be better not to say, the name of the object is "green", but: >>"Green is a quality things can have"? This would be a memory content, and I >>assume, that memory contents are parts of the form of a human (possible >>objects): They have their limited space somewhere (in the cortex), but are >>permanent in time. Behaviour parts (possible representamens) are limited in >>time (like an impulse), but have no spatial limits in the system of >>interpretance: Like the sighting of a green frog. >> >> >> Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: >> >> >>Can a quality be an object? Or is an object a relationship between a quality >>(or qualities) and a thing? >> >>Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> >>Dear Peircers, >> >>I think, there is one assumption that hinders the understanding of semiotics: >>The triad of representamen-object-interpretant suggests, that there be only >>one object implied. I think that this is not so. In one semiosis, there are >>most likely more than one objects involved. Example: Representamen being the >>sighting of a green frog. You being a young child, who knows a frog from a >>black-and-white sketch in a fairy tale book. Also you know colours. One >>object is "frog", the other is "green", the third is the concept you already >>have about relations between attitude and entity, namely: "A sighted trait >>might be typical for the sighted thing". This third object is also called by >>the representamen, because the representamen is carrying with it a trait >>(green) and a frog. Now the representamen fits to these three objects, and in >>an abductive process of your mind, a new object is created: "possibly all >>frogs are green". This object is (by induction) strenghened by the >>subsequent sighting of some more green frogs. But then you spot a red frog, >>and you have a deduction: The object is inverted: "possibly all frogs are >>green" is deleted and replaced by: "Not all frogs are green". The object "A >>sighted trait might be typical for the sighted thing" is slightly weakened. >>Well, thats how I assume, thinking works, dont you think so? A reflexive >>process always implies abduction, induction and deduction, and at least >>abduction requires more than one object. Now dont say, that the green frog is >>the one object: He is long gone, diven into the water, as you are still >>thinking about it, dont you? Best, Helmut >> >>----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or >>"Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >>to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >>the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>
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