Am I correct in interpreting Peirce's concept of Nominalism as believing that we make it up as we go; that before we name a thing or concept, it does not have being? And that Peirce's realism says things, including concepts and stuff, have being (and therefore reality) whether anyone ever knows or names things?
If I read him correctly, then we may be essential for the practice (existence?) of pragmaticism but not for being or reality, which do not require human minds or any minds for its operation. (Speaking of which, I just had one, so I may have missed the point of this conversation.) Regards, Phyllis
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