*Gary (R) – the principled realism of 3) and 4) is very nice – thanks for that!*
*Cathy* Jim Willgoose once analyzed Peirce's dictum that "Generals are really operative in nature" from the standpoint of semiotic, and I would tend to agree with his analysis: 1) "Really operative" signs are not just in the ego of an individual or community 2) "We" includes nature 3) "Really operative" signs are not deduced from cases of actual knowledge 4) The hypothesis of knowledge is abduced from cases of "really operative" signs http://osdir.com/ml/science.philosophy.peirce/2007-06/msg00057.html Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 4:57 AM, Gary Moore <[email protected]> wrote: GCM: GR's point was that he said that Nominalists, like he said we all are as opposed to himself, do not believe in "real generals" or "Thirdness" or the "Interpretant". I proposed purely provisionally that I and Umberto Eco do not believe in "real generals" but do believe in "Thirdness" and the "Interpretant" as ποίησίς: production (Herstellung), and έπιστήμη: science, familiarity with things, knowledge. So then are we still Nominalists? On Saturday, June 14, 2014 11:19 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: Am I correct in interpreting Peirce's concept of Nominalism as believing that we make it up as we go; that before we name a thing or concept, it does not have being? And that Peirce's realism says things, including concepts and stuff, have being (and therefore reality) whether anyone ever knows or names things? If I read him correctly, then we may be essential for the practice (existence?) of pragmaticism but not for being or reality, which do not require human minds or any minds for its operation. (Speaking of which, I just had one, so I may have missed the point of this conversation.) Regards, Phyllis ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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