My experience with NA has lead me to similar understandings. If God and love are synonymous terms, as even many fundamentalists will agree. And if love (&justice) are Real forces as Peirce says, then love and/or God is (or can be) physically efficient. The future effects of said efficiency rely upon a definition (in this case vague) from which to test and measure outcomes. NA, after all is merely a hypothesis.
Phyllis Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote: ><!-- @font-face {font-family:Cambria} @font-face >{font-family:Calibri} @font-face {font-family:Tahoma} @font-face > {font-family:"Trebuchet MS"} p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal >{margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:12.0pt; >font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"} h1 {margin-right:0cm; >margin-left:0cm; font-size:24.0pt; font-family:"Times New >Roman","serif"; font-weight:bold} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {color:blue; > text-decoration:underline} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed >{color:purple; text-decoration:underline} p {margin-right:0cm; >margin-left:0cm; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New >Roman","serif"} p.MsoAcetate, li.MsoAcetate, div.MsoAcetate {margin:0cm; > margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:8.0pt; >font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"} span.Heading1Char >{font-family:"Cambria","serif"; color:#365F91; font-weight:bold} >span.BalloonTextChar {font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"} span.heading1char0 >{font-family:"Cambria","serif"; color:#365F91; font-weight:bold} >span.emailstyle19 {font-family:"Trebuchet MS","sans-serif"; >color:#1F497D} span.balloontextchar0 {font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"} >span.EmailStyle24 {font-family:"Trebuchet MS","sans-serif"; >color:#1F497D} .MsoChpDefault {font-size:10.0pt} @page WordSection1 >{margin:72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt} --> > >Gary F., List, > > >I think the argument at 6.303 rehearses Peirce's larger argumentative >strategy, which is to draw on the formal relations examined in the >phenomenology and the kinds of signs and principles of inference studied in >logic as basis for setting up the principles of metaphysics. Once he has >shown that tychasm and anancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm, he is then in >a position to argue that a principle of love is the highest of the three >principles--and the only one that will supply us with adequate explanations of >such things as the growth of order. > > >As such, I think Peirce gives a pretty strong cable of arguments grounded in >his phenomenology and logic for thinking that the world is governed by a >principle of love. In fact, I think the neglected argument is an argument >drawn from common experience for thinking that a particularly general and >vague conception of God can serve as a kind of global hypothesis for >explaining the growth of order in all three universes of experience--and that >this hypothesis is a central strand of the cable he is winding together into a >system of ideas. > > >As an interpretation of the text, I do think he provides arguments for a >metaphysical principle that is, as you've put it, a benign cause. Having said >that, I understand that you can disagree with Peirce on this matter. > > >--Jeff > > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 > >From: Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] >Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2014 5:22 AM >To: [email protected] >Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and >religion: text 1 > >Thanks, Jeff, this helps to clarify the issue. Your quote from CP 6.295 is a >kind of precursor to the Neglected Argument: “strong feeling is in itself, I >think, an argument of some weight”. But of course it only has much weight for >those who have the feeling! > >In your first quote, while summarizing the history of cosmology, Peirce >remarks that “the ontological gospeller [John], in whose days those views were >familiar topics, made the One Supreme Being, by whom all things have been made >out of nothing, to be cherishing-love”, and it's clear that his own “warmth of >feeling” supports that idea. However, he also recognizes the logical problem >in reconciling this belief with monotheism: the Creator of love must also be >Creator of hate. This isn't a problem for an evolutionary cosmology such as >Peirce is outlining here, which aims to explain how the various universal >tendencies work themselves out; but it doesn't provide any rational basis for >identifying that One Supreme Being with the “Real creator of all three >Universes of Experience” (and therefore of all those tendencies). Besides, the >idea that love is supreme among all tendencies, or more genuine than the >others, even if we accept it, doesn't prove that the Creator of all universes >is “benign.” —But then that's the kind of theological argument that Peirce >prefers to avoid, by appealing to instinct as the best guide to belief in >practical matters. > >Anyway, I don’t think you’ve given me good reason to change what I said >before, but you have thrown a strong light on its Peircean context. > >gary f. > > > >} I thank thee that I am none of the wheels of power but I am one of the >living creatures that are crushed by it. [Tagore] { > >www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > > >From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: 21-Jun-14 8:30 PM > > > >Gary F., > > > >You say: "I’m not aware of any argument in Peirce’s scientific metaphysics >supporting the proposition that God is benign." > > > >Peirce starts the discussion of Evolutionary love with the following question >about the possible relationships that might hold between principles of love >and hate. > > > >6.287. Philosophy, when just escaping from its golden pupa-skin, mythology, > >proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be Love. Or, since >this > >pirate-lingo, English, is poor in such-like words, let us say Eros, the >exuberance-love. > >Afterwards, Empedocles set up passionate love and hate as the two coördinate > >powers of the universe. In some passages, kindness is the word. But certainly, >in any > >sense in which it has an opposite, to be senior partner of that opposite, is >the highest > >position that love can attain. Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller, in >whose days > >those views were familiar topics, made the One Supreme Being, by whom all >things > >have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love. What, then, can he say >to hate? > > > >Later in the essay, Peirce seems to think that he has offered an argument of >sorts. > > > >6.295. Much is to be said on both sides. I have not concealed, I could not > >conceal, my own passionate predilection. Such a confession will probably shock >my > >scientific brethren. Yet the strong feeling is in itself, I think, an argument >of some > >weight in favor of the agapastic theory of evolution -- so far as it may be >presumed to > >bespeak the normal judgment of the Sensible Heart. Certainly, if it were >possible to > >believe in agapasm without believing it warmly, that fact would be an argument > >against the truth of the doctrine. At any rate, since the warmth of feeling >exists, it > >should on every account be candidly confessed; especially since it creates a >liability > >to one-sidedness on my part against which it behooves my readers and me to be > >severally on our guard. > > > >Is this the only argument he's given in "Evolutionary Love" for the thesis >that the principle of love has priority in his metaphysical explanations of >the evolution of order in the cosmos? For my part, I think there is an >argument in the following passage: > > > >6.303. All three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements. > >Agapasm exhibits them the most clearly. The good result is here brought to >pass, first, > >by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, >second, > >by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it >and thus to > >subserve the general purpose. In order to express the relation that tychasm >and > >anancasm bear to agapasm let me borrow a word from geometry. An ellipse >crossed > >by a straight line is a sort of cubic curve; for a cubic is a curve which is >cut thrice by a > >straight line; now a straight line might cut the ellipse twice and its >associated straight > >line a third time. Still the ellipse with the straight line across it would >not have the > >characteristics of a cubic. It would have, for instance, no contrary flexure, >which no > >true cubic wants; and it would have two nodes, which no true cubic has. The > >geometers say that it is a degenerate cubic. Just so, tychasm and anancasm are > >degenerate forms of agapasm. > > > >--Jeff > > > >Jeff Downard >Associate Professor >Department of Philosophy >NAU >(o) 523-8354 > >From: Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] >Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2014 5:28 AM >To: [email protected] >Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and >religion: text 1 > >Having just caught up with this thread, I’d like to add one belated comment. > > > >Peirce’s God is ens necessarium personified. He views the personification as >instinctive. Some of us have an aversion to this kind of personification. >Whether that aversion is itself instinctive is a difficult psychological >question, I think. But it’s clear that in Peirce’s view, religious belief >should be more instinctive than rational; that’s a central point of the >“Neglected Argument” essay. EP2:435: > >“If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded >truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all >others, we should naturally expect that there would be some Argument for His >Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should >earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter; and further, that this >Argument should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical >theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full >of nutrition for man's highest growth.” > > > >There’s a pair of big IFs at the beginning of that sentence, and Peirce >focusses on the first while neglecting the second. The first sentence of the >NA affirms his belief that God as ens necessarium is “Really creator of all >three Universes of Experience.” But he does not address the question of >whether the Creator is “benign.” > >Now, from a rational point of view, there is nothing necessarily benign about >creative power. I’m not aware of any argument in Peirce’s scientific >metaphysics supporting the proposition that God is benign. Rather I think it’s >a pragmatic requirement for any monotheistic religion to believe that Creation >is benign. This belief, like the habit of personification, may be instinctive >for some people and not for others; but for a religion that is “directly >applicable to the conduct of life,” this kind of optimism is parallel to the >belief that truth is discoverable, which is a logical requirement for doing >science, according to Peirce. Optimism is pragmatically nutritious, while >pessimism is insane, or at least unhealthy. > >Personally I don’t share Peirce’s optimism — not on an instinctive level, that >is. But I think he’s quite right that it’s healthy for both religion and >science as communal enterprises. The religious expression of that optimism is >the belief that the personified Creator is also the personification of Good or >benignity. I also think that from a rhetorical point of view, Peirce was wise >to slip that premise into his argument almost surreptitiously (in the sentence >quoted above) — because I don’t think there’s any reason to believe it except >that it’s ethically “nutritious” if we concede “that religion, were it but >proved, would be a good outweighing all others.” > > > >gary f. > > > >} Be! Verb imprincipiant through the entrancitive spaces! [FW2 463] { > >www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > >
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