Matt wrote: "You assumed Peirce's Mind is equal to a (062414-8) consistently progressive organization. . ."
No. I did not assume this. But Peirce apparently did, according to Edwina. ". . . so any backwards motion, disassembling, (062414-9) shows that it is not-Mind. " No. Any backward motion, as long as it is directional, must be accompanied by the dissiaption of free energy, accodirng to the Second Law. In other words, Mind can disassemble what it assembled previously, as long as it dissipates free energy. It is akin to the situation where it takes, sometimes, as mcuh money to build a building as to 'un-build' it, since both are directed, goal-oriented processes and all such directed processes require dissipating free energy (or disorganzing a part of the Universe) With all the best. Sung > Ha! I love it! Inscribed on the walls of every music conservatory in the > US are the words "If your gonna make a mistake, make it big!" Or as Peirce > said of Sigwart's idea of Gefhl, "Good! This is good intelligent work, > such as advances philosophyâa good, square, explicit fallacy that can be > squarely met and definitively refuted." > > You've been assuming Cartesian duality, redefined Peirce's "Mind", which > is a strictly idealist concept, into dualistic terms, and concluded that > it is illogical. > You assumed Peirce's Mind is equal to a consistently progressive > organization; so any backwards motion, disassembling, shows that it is > not-Mind. This distinction for Mind is not necessary. I think Peirce > made it clear that Mind is rather marked by the greater tendency toward > organization so to reach toward an ultimate end. The backwards motion > that you call disorganization is necessary to regroup so to move > forward farther toward the end than what would otherwise be possible. > Do you look at your own mind only as a mind when it is assembling order > and not a mind when disassembling? > I know that this disorganizing that precedes regrouping sometimes > happens when you think it would be better if it had not happened, that > in specific cases the disorganizing is nothing but the evil of > randomness, but this is your anthropocentric intrepretation. In the > bigger picture Chance is the oil of our machine. > Sometimes I'll lose writings or musical compositions and I'm put in the > uncomfortable position of trying to recall what I had written. Every > time the loosely recalled version is better! > I think of Tarkovsky's movie The Stalker, which had to be completely > scrapped for some reason, so he had to start over and this time had to > rush through it. His movies are excruciatingly slow so I can only > imagine that the second version had a better ability to connect with > more people, and it certainly wasn't dumbed down. > > When you earlier asked if I implied that matter is a necessary condition > for mind you were assuming a duality. This is why I said I can't agree. > > Matt > >> On Jun 24, 2014, at 11:53 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> Edwina wrote: >> >> "After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or Thirdness (062414-6) >> or habits-of-organization, are evolving . . ." >> >> >> If Peirce's 'Mind' is identifiable with 'organization' in the Universe, >> what would be identifiable with the 'disorganization' in the Universe >> whose existence is mandated by the Second Law of Thermodynamics (as I >> explained in my previous post) ? 'Mindless' ? >> >> Just to stimulate the discussion and based on the thermodynamic argument >> presented above, I am tempted to make the following assertion: >> >> "Only the 'Mindless' may be content with the (062414-7) >> 'Mind' of Peirce." >> >> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> ____________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >>> Ah, I see, thanks. But I wasn't commenting on your comment that 'Peirce >>> looked askance on James' portrayal of a will to believe'. I was >>> focusing >>> on >>> the fact that Peirce rejected Platonic Forms; he was an Aristotelian - >>> and >>> the 'form' of the matter was never, in Aristotle, separate from that >>> matter, >>> whereas for Plato, it existed as a pure ideal. >>> >>> The notion of a demiurge, i.e., an agent controlling the Forms and >>> using >>> them in moulding matter - would be rejected by Peirce whereas it was >>> accepted within Plato's outline. After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or >>> Thirdness >>> or >>> habits-of-organization, are evolving and therefore, operate within >>> matter >>> and not by some external agent's Will. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> >>> To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> Cc: "Matt Faunce" <mattfau...@gmail.com>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:50 PM >>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; >>> Science >>> and Religion >>> >>> >>>> Edwina, >>>> >>>> Sorry for the ambiguous construction. >>>> I meant that Peirce looked askance on >>>> James' portrayal of a will to believe. >>>> Not sure about the rejection of Forms, >>>> as it's hard if not impossible to sift >>>> the spirit of Plato from the flesh of >>>> Scholastic Realism. And the Timaeus >>>> is allegory or parable, so it has to >>>> be taken with a grain of hermeneutic >>>> salt, to my taste, anyway. >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> Edwina Taborsky wrote: >>>>> Yes, that's a very good comment - Plato's demiurge who was a 'master >>>>> craftsman' using the Pure Forms to create matter. And yes, Peirce >>>>> did >>>>> indeed reject Platonism is all its forms - both the ideal Forms and >>>>> the >>>>> metaphysical Master Craftsman. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> >>>>> To: "Matt Faunce" <mattfau...@gmail.com> >>>>> Cc: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>>> Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:16 PM >>>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; >>>>> Science and Religion >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Matt, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> I was minded more of Plato's demiurge >>>>>> than James' will to believe, a notion >>>>>> on which Peirce looked rather askance, >>>>>> if I recall correctly ... >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> Matt Faunce wrote: >>>>>>> Here is William James in his lecture Is Life Worth Living? on the >>>>>>> urge y'all are speaking of. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Is it not sheer dogmatic folly to say that our inner interests can >>>>>>> have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world may >>>>>>> contain? In other cases divinations based on inner interests have >>>>>>> proved prophetic enough. Take science itself! Without an imperious >>>>>>> inner demand on our part for ideal logical and mathematical >>>>>>> harmonies, we should never have attained to proving that such >>>>>>> harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the >>>>>>> crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in science, >>>>>>> hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often >>>>>>> with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs >>>>>>> come from we do not know: we find them in us, and biological >>>>>>> psychology so far only classes them with Darwin's 'accidental >>>>>>> variations.' But the inner need of believing that this world of >>>>>>> nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>> is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the >>>>>>> inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a >>>>>>> professionally >>>>>>> scientific head. The toil of many generations has proved the latter >>>>>>> need prophetic. Why may not the former one be prophetic, too? And >>>>>>> if >>>>>>> needs of ours outrun the physical universe, why may not that be a >>>>>>> sign >>>>>>> that an invisible universe is there? What, in short, has the >>>>>>> authority >>>>>>> to debar us from trusting our religious demands? Science as such >>>>>>> assuredly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> not; and the agnostic 'thou shall not believe without coercive >>>>>>> sensible evidence' is simply an expression (free to anyone to make) >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> private personal appetite for evidence of a certain peculiar kind." >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >>>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ >>>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >>>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >>>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >>> >>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L >>>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>>> . >>
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