Thanks Gary, Ben, and Jon, By relativism I meant that truth is mutable, and I was thinking that some form of, development of, historicism might one day prove to be just as robust as Peirce's Realism.
Esthetic ideals are not subject to “belief” in their “truth”, but beliefs are pulled by the esthetic ideal, (I assume that the esthetic ideal is an aspect of the final cause,) and if truth is the would-be final opinion then this won't allow for the esthetic ideal to shift over time. In that case there might be final opinions (plural) regarding any proposition, each different opinion being relative to a different zeitgeist. Regarding James's will to believe, My understanding has been that this 'will' is just a desire to believe something, not a decision to desire something. And in the essay James defends the right to believe it against Clifford's objections that to do so only because you had a desire, without logic, is immoral and a sin against logic. I'll re-read it this week sometime to double check. Matt > On Jun 25, 2014, at 8:04 AM, "Gary Fuhrman" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Matt, I’m short of time too, but want to register agreement with Jon’s point. > (And Ben’s too, which arrived as I write this.) > > Your restatement still looks kind of “sloppy” to me … Peirce’s realism is > opposed to nominalism, not to relativism in the sense you seem to mean here. > And you’re putting the cart before the horse when you speak of a “fixed > esthetic ideal”. Esthetics is the normative science prior to logic in > Peirce’s classification, so esthetic ideals are not subject to “belief” in > their “truth”; “realism”, in conjunction with the logic of relatives, just > asserts that the generality of a symbol or legisign is no obstacle to its > reality. An esthetic ideal would have to be essentially iconic, and since an > icon unconnected with an index can carry no information, there is no question > of “belief” in it. Only late in life did Peirce affirm that esthetics was a > normative science; his “objective idealism” is a logical doctrine, not an > esthetic or ethical one, and does not stem from any “will to believe”. > > This comment by Peirce might clarify the issue: > > [[[ When a hand at whist has reached the point at which each player has but > three cards left, the one who has to lead often goes on the assumption that > the cards are distributed in a certain way, because it is only on that > assumption that the odd trick can be saved. This is indisputably logical; and > on a more critical analogous occasion there might be some psychological > excuse, or even warrant, for a “will to believe” that such was really the > case. But all that logic warrants is a hope, and not a belief. It must be > admitted, however, that such hopes play a considerable part in logic. For > example, when we discuss a vexed question, we hope that there is some > ascertainable truth about it, and that the discussion is not to go on forever > and to no purpose. A transcendentalist would claim that it is an > indispensable “presupposition” that there is an ascertainable true answer to > every intelligible question. I used to talk like that, myself; for when I was > a babe in philosophy my bottle was filled from the udders of Kant. But by > this time I have come to want something more substantial. ]] CP2.113, from > the “Minute Logic”, 1902). > > Peirce’s belief in God was not transcendentalist in that sense, as far as I > can see. > > gary f. > > } The most precious thing in life is its uncertainty. [Kenko] { > www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > From: Matt Faunce [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 24-Jun-14 10:09 PM > To: [email protected] > Cc: Jon Awbrey > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science > and Religion > > Let me restate that less sloppily. It appears to me that Peirce's belief in > realism with the fixed esthetic ideal, and rejection of relativism started > with his personal inclination for realism, and only later after he developed > his philosophy was he able to show that his realism is more coherent than any > extant relativist philosophy. All he did was score a point for the side of > his realism near the beginning of the test. Knowing that philosophy is in its > infancy it's quite a leap of faith to declare realism and the esthetic ideal > to be true—and of all facts, a declaration about the nature of reason has to > be considered amongst the least secure. Judging by his fervor for realism and > animosity for relativism he must have had the will to believe his realism is > true when he started and at the end of his life. > > > Matt > > On Jun 24, 2014, at 2:21 PM, Matt Faunce <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > This bothers me. It appears to me that Peirce invoked this right to will to > believe for his belief that reason reaches toward a fixed esthetic end. > > Can you, or someone, point me toward Peirce's thoughts on James's Will to > Believe, or any of his concepts that are contrary to it? > > Matt > > On Jun 23, 2014, at 5:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > > Matt, List, > > I was minded more of Plato's demiurge > than James' will to believe, a notion > on which Peirce looked rather askance, > if I recall correctly ... > > Jon > > Matt Faunce wrote: > > Here is William James in his lecture Is Life Worth Living? on the urge y'all > are speaking of. "Is it not sheer dogmatic folly to say that our inner > interests can have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world > may contain? In other cases divinations based on inner interests have proved > prophetic enough. Take science itself! Without an imperious inner demand on > our part for ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never have > attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and > interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in > science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often > with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from > we do not know: we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only > classes them with Darwin's 'accidental variations.' But the inner need of > believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and > eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, > as the inner need > of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head. > The toil of many generations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may > not the former one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours outrun the > physical universe, why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is > there? What, in short, has the authority to debar us from trusting our > religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she can > only say what is, not what is not; and the agnostic 'thou shall not believe > without coercive sensible evidence' is simply an expression (free to anyone > to make) of private personal appetite for evidence of a certain peculiar > kind." > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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