Forwarded at the request of Claudio Guerri. GR
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Claudio Guerri <[email protected]> Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> -------- Mensaje original -------- Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 15:17:22 -0300 De: Claudio Guerri <[email protected]> <[email protected]> A: [email protected] Gary, John, List, Firstness is really a complex aspect of the sign... but the more important and difficult aspect for knowledge... "Symbols grow" and so, First is last... but not least... and Firstness is essential to all Design disciplines, because related to Form: conception of form (Math, Geometry...), concrete representation of form (graphic languages...), aesthetic strategy of form (Renaissance, Cubism...). I think that some good should come out of considering a concrete sign instead of an abstract approach to what can be considered First (examples are not easy to give, Peirce not excluded from that difficulty). Everything can be considered a sign, and all signs have to be considered in its triadic aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling and a Qualisign: redness... But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not exist without the experienced "brute force" of lots of red objects, so Secondness is also present. Verbal language is tricky... 'is' and 'are' should not be used for subsigns or aspects of a sign. The Gioconda IS not an Icon, but a complete SIGN, from which I can legally emphasize the iconic aspect in a sentence without naming specifically the other two logically necessary aspects. In this sense, Louis Althusser is very helpful by stating: some aspect can be "dominant". The sign Architecture is an 'easy' example... Somewhere in the old e-mails in the List there should be a complete Semiotic Nonagon of the 'sign Architecture'. Resuming: The three aspects of Architecture are: Design (1ness), Construction (2ness) and Habitability (3ness). At his time, Vitruvius considered also three aspects, but naming the three values or 3ness's of the three aspects (in his own order): Firmitas (Dicisign), Utilitas (Argument) and Venustas (Rhema). In the case of architecture, I would not say that Design is a 'feeling'... it should be (normally) something very concrete, even if only the 'possibility' of being constructed and inhabited. By deepening in the 3 aspects of Design (always simplifying), we have: Geometry, Graphic Languages and Gestalt Theory (for the Qualisign); plans/drawings, models and texts (for the Iconic aspect); and an aesthetic value of that proposal (for Rhema). And I would not dare to say that even Geometry can be considered a 'feeling', except in a very metaphoric way... In this example, Geometry is not considered as a sign in itself, but as a 1ness of 1ness of 1ness of Architecture, and, since it is considered in the context of Architecture it is also related unavoidably to Projective Geometry (2ness, the different graphic languages: Perspective, Monge System and TSD) and to Gestalt Theory (3ness). Though, Geometry IS not something concrete and stable but is an aspect of itself, depending on the context in which it appears. So, given any sign or aspect of a sign all three Categories will be there necessarily, in a way or an other, explicitly or not, by cognitive consciousness or not... The troglodyte that killed the neighbor to get his 'better' cave (the equivalent to a better building today) had no IDEA, was not conscious about DESIGN to decide to kill his neighbor, but, according to Peirce's proposal, he had to have SOME idea about 'forms' of caves (design, 1ness), some idea of the of materiality of caves (construction, 2ness) and some idea of the usability (3ness) of that space, called 'cave'. It seems to me that it is not completely correct, or say, misleading, to say "that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they are unanalyzed experiences of qualities" or are "ineffable", because to say so, we have to imply all knowledge of concrete materialized experiences and use all our symbolic knowledge of speech to say that, in THIS case, "this is ineffable"... but actually meaning: after having reviewed all what I know, I can not recognize the immediate object nor its symbolic meaning. As far as I can think, there can not be a pure 1ness, nor a pure 2ness nor a pure 3ness, but there is always SOME presence of the three categories... perhaps with an emphasis on one aspect. The aspects of 1ness, are not always very ethereal, ineffable, or a mere sensation... it depends of the sign considered. I apologize for my English and the length of the writing after so long absence... All the best CL -- Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires - Argentina Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123 E-mail: [email protected] Gary Richmond said the following on 06/08/2014 11:19 a.m.: John, You wrote: I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of firsts as unclassified "feels". This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as "ineffable". I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to them, but* I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I think that this is required if all thought is via signs (emphasis added).* Your last sentences are, I think, key towards resolving this issue. My point would be that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they are unanalyzed experiences of qualities. The analysis--should it happen at all--happens after the fact. An example: I remember once being in an apple orchard on one of the autumn days when the wind briskly moves stratocumulus clouds across the sky, creating all sorts of rapidly changing shadows on the earth. Upon reflection I analyzed the colors of the apples as I'd experienced them as bright red, dark red, cherry red, almost purple, almost black, etc., the last 'color' experience ('almost black') being the most remarkable for me. Indeed, in the totality of my phaneron I recall that I wasn't even experiencing 'colors' as such so that my sense of them was just what it was, and that experience could only be (inadequately and partially) analyzed *after the fact* as experience of firsts as qualities, at times changing so very rapidly and melding into other hues so subtly that I couldn't have analyzed them--couldn't have found descriptive adjectives to name the colors--had I tried (the only reason that I had tried at all was that the 'black'-red apple sensation shocked me into a moment of analysis). At such moments of pure experience nothing is being represented at all. I wouldn't and couldn't think of all those hues as having color-names as they were experienced and, in some cases, even upon reflection I couldn't (that color between 'almost purple' and 'almost black' doesn't have a name for me). So, all thought is via signs, but the experience of a quality is not a thought. So, I do not see why you say that you "don't think we ever experience them (qualities, firsts) directly." Isn't my example one of the direct experience of qualities before analysis? Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 12:03 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, > > I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of > firsts as unclassified "feels". This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among > other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as "ineffable". > I don't see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as > real from our experience, but I don't think we ever experience them > directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to > them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I > think that this is required if all thought is via signs. > > > > I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a > short exchange privately that I am content with. > > > > John > > > > > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* August 3, 2014 10:00 PM > *To:* Stephen C. Rose; John Collier > *Cc:* Peirce List > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the > basis for > > > > Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since > you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is > confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and > Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure > feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move > into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of > differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that > direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from > the heat. > > > > No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you > outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some > semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for > a sign. > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> > > *To:* John Collier <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* Peirce List <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the > basis for > > > > Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may > seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own > accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what > exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through > some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made > no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! > > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > > On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > > At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a > matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra > which I infer from direct experience. > > > I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so > stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience > is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. > > Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not > mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including > things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers > to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real > I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly > all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing > is something you take to be fundamental to reality. > > > Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure > firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience > directly. > > John > > ---------- > > Professor John Collier > [email protected] > Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South > Africa > T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 > Http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Prof. Dr. Arq. Claudio F. Guerri Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Domicilio particular: Gral. Lemos 270 1427 BUENOS AIRES Telefax: (011) 4553-7976/4895 Celular: (011) 15-6289-8123 E-mail: [email protected] <[email protected]>
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