Edwina wrote: "Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not (6418-1) 'different aspects of the same entity'. A sign, which is an entity, can exist within only one or two or all three of the categorical modes. . . . "
Claudio Guerri wrote ( 8/10/2014, PEIRECE-L): . . . all signs have to be considered in its triadic (6418-2) aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling and a Qualisign: redness... But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not exist without the experienced "brute force" of lots of red objects, so Secondness is also present. . . . My understanding of Peirce is consistent with (6418-2) but not with (6418-2). With all the best. Sung > No, Sung, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not 'different aspects > of the same entity'. A sign, which is an entity, can exist within only one > or two or all three of the categorical modes. And these are not different > aspects - which is trivial (gas and liquid) but have different fundamental > roles. Firstness enables novelty; Secondness enables particularity; > Thirdness enables continuity. > > I am now beginning to wonder whether you and Howard are indeed dualists, > but > rather, materialists, for 'Mind' seems to be absent from your analytic > frames. > > The Platonic model of Form and Matter IS dualistic, as is the Cartesian, > for > in this analytic frame, 'Form' plays the role of Mind, or, the organizing > principle. Howard's 'symbols' seem to play this role in his analysis but, > from what I can gather, they seem to be, like your Form, material. > Therefore, one wonders what is the functionality of two different > 'material > aspects of the same material entity'? At least in the dualistic model, > there > IS a function and it is not a material - that of Mind. > > To insist on the requirement of 'measurement' (or interaction with an > Other) > for both the wave and particle puts the wave into a mode of existential > particularity. To declare that 'something exists' without interaction is > Platonic idealism (his Form). The objective idealist analytic frame > instead > declares that the wave or 'potentiality' CAN NEVER EXIST per se; it is > potentiality not actuality and therefore is REAL but not EXISTENTIAL. > > Aristotle most certainly was NOT a 'complementarian' as you describe > yourself (and as Howard describes himself) for his analysis of the > difference between the potential and the actual never reduced the former - > as you and Howard do - to the material. Oh- and I'm not into 'argument ad > populum'; there's no need to assert your own position by claiming that > many > others agree with you. The argument has to stand on its own merits. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > To: <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> > Sent: Sunday, August 10, 2014 2:48 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:6414] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for > > >> Edwina wrote: >> >> "I don't see that there is any way to resolve the (6410-1) >> conflict between the complementary model (which I >> consider dualistic) of Form and Matter (held by >> Howard and Sung) with the Peircean model which >> rejects such an analysis. >> >> You are mis-understanding my view of complementarity (and most likely >> that >> of Howard). I am not a dualist as you assume in that I do not separate >> waves and particles in quantum objects (or Form and Matter in ordinary >> objects) but consider them as different aspects of the same entity (as >> Peirce considered Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as three basic >> aspects of all phemonena). Physicists often refer to quantum objects >> 'quons' [1] or 'wavicles'. It is my understanding that Bohm (1917-1992) >> believed that quons possessed wave and particle properties both before >> and >> after measurement (as did de Broglie, Einstein, and Schoredinger) while >> Bohr (1885-1962) believed that quons are neither particles nor waves >> before measurement and exhibited one of these behaviors only upon >> measurement. My impression is that no experimental data nor theories >> now >> exist in physics that can discriminate between these two models of >> quons. >> This almost a century-old conundrum in physics may be attribute to the >> "Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics" (UAM) (for which I have >> further evidence to be posted later), or the "unreasonable >> arbitrariness >> of languages" (UAL) in general embodied in the well-known concepts of >> ineffability, the unknowable, etc. >> >> If I may correct your mis-undertanding of my philosophical position, I >> would like to call myself a "complementarian", not a dualist, nor a >> monist. I think Laozi, Aristotle, Spinoza, Merleau-Ponty, Bohr, >> and >> Pattee (and probably many others, including some members on this list) >> belong to the category of complementarians. >> >> With all the best >> >> Sung >> ___________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> >> >> >> References: >> [1] Herbert, N. (1985). Quantum Reality: Beyond New Physics, an >> Excursion int6o Metaphysics. Anchor Books, New York. P. 64: >> >>> Edwina, >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm not sure that solving the problem of the origin of life is a >>> requirement >>> for solving the problem of the evolution of cognition. Aren't these two >>> very >>> different issues? >>> >>> >>> >>> GF: Yes, they are, but both issues are to be addressed semiotically - >>> that >>> is, both Pattee and Stjernfelt consider their work on these different >>> issues to be part of semiotics. Of course it could be that Stjernfelt's >>> Peircean "semiotic" is very different from Pattee's "semiotic" (or >>> "biosemiotic"), but I wouldn't want to make that call just yet. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't think that solving the problem of the origin of life is a >>> requirement for solving the problem of the evolution of cognition, >>> partly >>> because the origin of life happened in the distant past, while >>> cognition >>> is >>> still evolving as we speak, and is therefore more open to observation. >>> If >>> anything, the logical dependence is the other way round, because >>> Peirce's >>> "doctrine of dicisigns" has implications for the logic of inquiry, i.e. >>> how we do science. We could say that Peircean semiotic is more of a >>> metascience than 'special sciences' such as psychology and physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Equally, I don't see that there is any way to resolve the conflict >>> between >>> the complementary model (which I consider dualistic) of Form and Matter >>> (held by Howard and Sung) with the Peircean model which rejects such an >>> analysis. And this complementary model effectively states that 'matter >>> is >>> the only reality' - ignoring the reality (not individual >>> existentiality) >>> of Mind. These are two polar opposite analyses and I think we simply >>> have >>> to acknowledge that if you accept one -you do not accept the other - >>> and >>> persuasion is of limited success to make a change. >>> >>> >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> GF: Peirce does appeal to a kind of form/matter complementarity, >>> notably >>> in his "New Elements" essay >>> (http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm), >>> but he makes it clear and explicit that his usage of these terms is >>> Aristotelian. I would agree that Howard's and Sung's usage is quite >>> different, as they are working with a physical ontology while Peirce is >>> enunciating a semiotic ontology. >>> >>> >>> >>> gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> } Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description >>> whatever. >>> [Peirce, CP 7.119] { >>> >>> <http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ >>> gnoxics >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > >
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