Gary R wrote:that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Yet later, in1908 in NA, Peirce identified 1. Retro. 2 deduction types (theorematic & axiomatic sp?) And 3 kinds of induction (crude, qualitative, quantitative).
Phyllis Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: >Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, >On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the categorial >assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most recent being a >peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy Legg writing: "I don't see >how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* >induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error." >https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html >So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by you, >Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the Peirce >Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way from that >Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a plaque commemorating >that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home there--both held for >induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while I've been arguing, as has Mary >Libertin on the biosemiotics list recently, just the reverse, that, except for >a brief lapse (discusses below), Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as >3ns. >One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard Lectures on >Pragmatism notes for "Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences" a long note (#3) from >which the following excerpt gives an account of Peirce's lapse (his brief >change of mind in the categorial assignations), the reason for it, and his >late tendency to more or less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns >and induction 2ns. He writes: > >"Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference > >through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or > >trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus > >connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations > >of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected > >with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, > >Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed > >by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction > >split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of > >Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right > >Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. > >276-7). > >Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of "confusion" in the >matter. > >"[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns > >Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty > >well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is > >the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh > >volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite > >understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction > >in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures > >here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the > >third category and Deduction with the Second" [op. cit, 277]. > >In the sense that for a few years Peirce was "confused" about these categorial >associations of the inference patterns, he is at least partially at fault in >creating confusion in the minds of many scholars about the categorial >associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he finally sees the error >of his ways and corrects himself: > >At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my > >original opinion. > > >And yet he adds that he "will leave the question undecided." >Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with anything but 3ns, >nor induction with anything but 2ns. >As I wrote in 2012: > >GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but > >thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I > >mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in > >methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in > >consideration of a "complete inquiry"--as he does, for example, very > >late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the > >section the CP editors titled "The Three Stages of Inquiry" [CP 6.468 > >- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction > >(here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the > >retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) > >with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with > >2ns. > >Best, Gary >
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