Gary R, Helmut, lists, It is interesting that my assignment proposed in [biosemiotics:6468] agrees with Peirce's:
"Sung: Choice I, i.e., A = Abduction; B =Induction; (6467-1) C = Deduction" With all the best. Sung ___________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > *Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, * > > > *On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the > categorial assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most > recent being a peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy Legg > writing: "I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness > though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness > of surprise due to error." > https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00747.html > <https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00747.html>* > > > *So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by > you, Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the > Peirce Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way > from that Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a plaque > commemorating that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home > there--both held for induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while I've > been arguing, as has Mary Libertin on the biosemiotics list recently, > just the reverse, that, except for a brief lapse (discusses below), > Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as 3ns. * > > > *One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard > Lectures on Pragmatism notes for "Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences" a > long note (#3) from which the following excerpt gives an account of > Peirce's lapse (his brief change of mind in the categorial > assignations), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or > less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction > 2ns. He writes:* > > *"Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference* > > *through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or* > > *trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus* > > *connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations* > > *of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected* > > *with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,* > > *Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed* > > *by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction* > > *split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of* > > *Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right* > > *Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.* > > *276-7).* > > * > Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of "confusion" in the > matter. > > * > > *"[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns* > > *Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty* > > *well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is* > > *the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh* > > *volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite* > > *understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction* > > *in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures* > > *here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the* > > *third category and Deduction with the Second" [op. cit, 277].* > > * > In the sense that for a few years Peirce was "confused" about > these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at > least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many > scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference > patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects > himself: > > * > > *At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my* > > *original opinion.* > > > *And yet he adds that he "will leave the question undecided." * > > > *Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with > anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. * > > > *As I wrote in 2012: > > * > > *GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but* > > *thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I* > > *mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in* > > *methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in* > > *consideration of a "complete inquiry"--as he does, for example, very* > > *late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the* > > *section the CP editors titled "The Three Stages of Inquiry" [CP 6.468* > > *- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction* > > *(here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the* > > *retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)* > > *with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with* > > *2ns.* > > * > > Best, > > Gary* >
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