Gary, et all, Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of several cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of prednisone. This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects, as I can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may be coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I think I know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it.
So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if ever). Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident that at least some of my analytical abilities have returned. Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: >Phyllis, > > >I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote: > > >PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute >actuality to me. > > >But necessity (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that is, >mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce and >exactly requires that there be brute actuality (vizl, that which has no >reason, 2ns) for it to work on (embodied laws, existential 'results'). > > >This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would necessarily be if the >habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to James. >Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns. > > >On the other hand brute actuality is most decidedly given by Peirce as >existential synonym for secondness. > > >Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting >your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, >silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort >and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of >actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing >which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24) > > >You continued: > > >PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction >of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative & quantitative as >gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, >and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a >generalizing process to me) = 3rd. > > >I see it differently: "deduction as explication" is, in inquiry, the >explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see to what >extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the >'demonstrations' are essentially mathematical, necessarily following from the >hypothesis if true. While any given test certainly has it "generalized" >characters, the testing is typically in the context of some 'brute actuality'. > > >PC: Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I >think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the >proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively >derived. > > >I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here. For example, what do you mean >by "the collapse of a universal proposition" in this context? > > >For my own part, I'm thinking along the line of this quotation, that the >general "consists in governing individual events": > > >The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual >events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have >been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of >growth. , , [T]he development of Reason requires as a part of it the >occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, >all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper >place among the rest. This development of Reason consists, you will observe, >in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (CP 1.615) > > >Best, > > >Gary > > > >Gary Richmond > >Philosophy and Critical Thinking > >Communication Studies > >LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > >C 745 > >718 482-5690 > > > >On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: > >Gary asked: Are you saying that you see him changing his mind yet again in >that regard, Phyllis? > >I'm not sure. Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little >like brute actuality to me. Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed >generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; >qualitative & quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as >explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, >verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. Of course, >the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be >because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no >longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived. > >Of course, you're correct that I'm thinking of inferences for inquiry >(methodeutic) rather than >Regards, >Phyllis > > >Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >Phyllis, all, > > >Ah, so Peirce changes his mind as to the subdivisions he will make of >abduction and induction as he delves ever deeper into these in the N.A., there >in consideration of inquiry, not merely as forms of inference. But I see no >evidence in the N.A. (or elsewhere) that he changed his mind about the >categoriality of induction and deduction. Are you saying that you see him >changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis? > > >Best, > > >Gary > > > >Gary Richmond > >Philosophy and Critical Thinking > >Communication Studies > >LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > >C 745 > >718 482-5690 > > > >On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: > >Gary R wrote:that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, >and the Sampling of Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of >Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). > >Yet later, in1908 in NA, Peirce identified 1. Retro. 2 deduction types >(theorematic & axiomatic sp?) And 3 kinds of induction (crude, qualitative, >quantitative). > >Phyllis > > > > >Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, >On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the categorial >assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most recent being a >peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy Legg writing: "I don't see >how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* >induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error." >https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html >So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by you, >Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the Peirce >Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way from that >Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a plaque commemorating >that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home there--both held for >induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while I've been arguing, as has Mary >Libertin on the biosemiotics list recently, just the reverse, that, except for >a brief lapse (discusses below), Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as >3ns. >One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard Lectures on >Pragmatism notes for "Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences" a long note (#3) from >which the following excerpt gives an account of Peirce's lapse (his brief >change of mind in the categorial assignations), the reason for it, and his >late tendency to more or less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns >and induction 2ns. He writes: > >"Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference > >through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or > >trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus > >connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations > >of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected > >with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, > >Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed > >by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction > >split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of > >Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right > >Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. > >276-7). > >Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of "confusion" in the >matter. > >"[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns > >Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty > >well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is > >the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh > >volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite > >understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction > >in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures > >here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the > >third category and Deduction with the Second" [op. cit, 277]. > >In the sense that for a few years Peirce was "confused" about these categorial >associations of the inference patterns, he is at least partially at fault in >creating confusion in the minds of many scholars about the categorial >associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he finally sees the error >of his ways and corrects himself: > >At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my > >original opinion. > > >And yet he adds that he "will leave the question undecided." >Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with anything but 3ns, >nor induction with anything but 2ns. >As I wrote in 2012: > >GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but > >thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I > >mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in > >methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in > >consideration of a "complete inquiry"--as he does, for example, very > >late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the > >section the CP editors titled "The Three Stages of Inquiry" [CP 6.468 > >- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction > >(here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the > >retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) > >with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with > >2ns. > >Best, Gary > > >
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