Maybe there is a mental Higgs Boson that no one can quite describe. *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>*
On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > > (He came to regard philosophy as consisting of "so-called" logical > analysis (intellectual autobiography, 1904, Ketner editor), and to > regarding such logical analysis as really being phaneroscopic analysis > (Peirce to James, 1909, CP 8.305); obviously by "logical analysis" in that > context Peirce did not mean the study of logic _*per se*_.) > > > What do you think he meant by that term broadly speaking? ("so called > logical analysis") I ask, not because I don't have some vague sense of the > term, but because that seems to be my limit. Earlier on he seemed to speak > of three degrees of clarity with the second degree logical analysis and the > third degree to be the pragmatic maxim. However later on he seems to accord > "logical analysis" as much more finding accurate definitions for concepts. > (He suggests this for instance in the letters to Lady Welby but also the > Neglected Argument) > > It's tempting to see it as somewhat akin to what happened to analytic > philosophy. However I've long found many elements of analytic philosophy > rather tepid relative to what I find in Peirce. I think his logic of > vagueness and generals is rather key to a difference with how analytic > philosophy developed in the 20th century. > > In particular his MS 318 is a great example of how he uses this term (I'm > not sure I could easily define it) > > Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this business of > "phaneroscopic" analysis by which one frames a scientific definition. As I > practice it, in those cases, like the present, in which I am debarred from > a direct appeal to the principle of pragmatism, I begin by seizing upon > that predicate which appears to be most characteristic of the definitum, > even if it does not quite apply to the entire extension of the definitum. > If the predicate be too narrow, I afterward seek for some ingredient of it > which shall be broad enough for an amended definitum and, at the same time, > be still more scientifically characteristic of it. > > Proceeding in that way with our definitum, "sign," we note, as highly > characteristic, that signs mostly function each between two minds, or > theatres of consciousness, of which the one is the agent that utters the > sign (whether acoustically, optically, or otherwise), while the other is > the patient mind that interprets the sign. Going on with my account of what > is characteristic of a sign, without taking the least account of > exceptional cases, for the present, I remark that, before the sign was > uttered, it already was virtually present to the consciousness of the > utterer, in the form of a thought. But, as already remarked, a thought is > itself a sign, and should itself have an utterer (namely , the ego of a > previous moment), to whose consciousness it must have been already > virtually present, and so back. Likewise, after a sign has been > interpreted, it will virtually remain in the consciousness of its > interpreter, where it will be a sign,-- perhaps, a resolution to apply the > burden of the communicated sign,-- and, as a sign should, in its turn have > an interpreter, and so on forward. Now it is undeniably conceivable that a > beginningless series of successive utterers should all do their work in a > brief interval of time, and that so should an endless series of > interpreters. Still, it is not likely to be denied that , in some cases, > neither the series of utterers nor that of interpreters forms an infinite > collection. When this is the case, there must be a sign without an utterer > and a sign without an interpreter. Indeed, there are two pretty conclusive > arguments on these points that are likely to occur to the reader. But why > argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I mean such signs as > symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of experiences serving as > premisses, etc . Signs without interpreters less manifestly, but perhaps > not less certainly, exist. Let the cards for a Jacquard loom be prepared > and inserted, so that the loom shall weave a picture. Are not those cards > signs? They convey intelligence,-- intelligence that, considering its spirit > and pictorial effect, cannot otherwise be conveyed. Yet the woven pictures > may take fire and be consumed before anybody sees them. A set of those > models that the designers of vessels drag through the water may have been > prepared; and with the set a complete series of experiments may have been > made; and their conditions and results may have been automatically > recorded. There, then, is a perfect representation of the behavior of a > certain range of forms. Yet if nobody takes the trouble to study the > record, there will be no interpreter. So the books of a bank may furnish a > complete account of the state of the bank. It remains only to draw up a > balance sheet. But if this be not done, while the sign is complete, the > human interpreter is wanting. > > > Rather different from what we find in analytic philosophy I think. While > not quite what Husserl was doing, it is much more hermeneutic an analysis > than one typically sees among analytic philosophers. The very constructive > has a strong dialogical nature perhaps more Socrates than Quine. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .