Dear Stephen, All,
I agree, that (Esthetics, Ethics, Logic) is a quite fundamental triad, in accord with Peirces categories (1,2,3). Now what do you think of this thought: Categories are supposed to be something most fundamental. Now, what is the most fundamental? The matrix of everything, in which events take place, according to Einstein, is the "Space-time-continuum". So my proposal of assignment is: Time = category 1. Space = Category 2. Continuum = Category 3. Esthetics change with time. Fashion is changing. What was beautiful to me yesterday may seem ugly to me today.  Ethics tell us what space we have to act properly, tell us, how far (in real or virtual space) we can go without hurting others or ourselves. Logic is the time- and spaceless continuum that combines all. A representamen is a piece of time that denotes a piece of space. An object is a piece of space that denotes a piece of time. Here I disagree with Peirce. A sign is not a first, an object not a second. Categories 1 and 2 are equally fundamental or equally unique. Just like one cannot know, whether the hen or the egg is more unique, we can never know, whether time or space is the more unique. Neither is the continuum either a product of, or the cause for the other two, because it is both. So this is triadic irreducibility: No one of the sign elements or of the categories can exist without the other two. And no one is first, second, or third. (1, 2, 3) are just symbols for distinguishment of characters, but not for temporality or essentiality. So far my opinion.
Very best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 18. September 2014 um 21:37 Uhr
Von: "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com>
An: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
Cc: "Peirce List" <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy
The text is a quote Jon not my own thinking. To me beauty and truth are ultimately one as Keats proposes. Ethics in my triad is a second (index) through which a sign passes on its way to being translated into an _expression_ or action or both. I reverse CP's order and name the third aesthetics.  
   
On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 1:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Stephen, All,
 
Sorry, on a 1 dot wifi so hard to chase links, but I always thought aesthetics, ethics, logic as normative sciences whose objects are beauty, goodness (arête), truth, respectively, was a classical notion?
 

On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:02 PM, "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:
 
 
From:
 
Charles S. Peirce on Esthetics and Ethics
A Bibliography
 
Kelly A. Parker
 

"Value theory is the least developed area of Peirce’s philosophy. At the core of  Peircean value theory are the studies of esthetics, ethics and logic that he grouped together under the heading of "normative sciences." What Peirce wrote on esthetics and ethics is indeed fragmentary, but–as the present bibliography indicates–it is not insubstantial.

 

"Sources were identified with the aim of addressing the following two questions concerning Peirce’s value theory:

 

"1) When and how did Peirce come to identify esthetics and ethics as normative sciences, and hence as part of philosophy proper?

 

"2) Which of Peirce’s writings contribute to the development and articulation of his late value theory?" 

 

http://buff.ly/XM88XI

 

 

'via Blog this'

 
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