Dear Gary et al, Or....the painting is not the paint, even though the painting involves the paint. Gene
On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 4:06 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Frederik, lists, > > I haven't spent much time of late studying the literature of contemporary > neuroscience in general and Barsalou's theory in particular. Since I'm away > from my desk until this evening, I thought I'd at least take a glance at > some of that literature before re-reading your section on psychologism in > NP. An hour or so ago I found this brief and cogent commentary on > Barsalou's 'Perceptual Symbol Systems' which might also serve (I think) as > an outline of some of his principal ideas. See: > http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/Reviews/Barsalou.htm > > Here's a link to Barsalou's paper commented on: > > http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_BBS_1999_perceptual_symbol_systems.pdf > > I've cut and pasted some intriguing snippets from the beginning of the > commentary by Lianne Gaboro: > > To insist [as Barsalou does] that abstractions are just arrangements of > perceptual symbols is like insisting that a plant is just seed + water + > sunlight. > > [Rather] it seems more parsimonious to say that what was once a > constellation of memories of similar experiences has organized itself into > an entity whose structure and pattern reside primarily at a level that was > not present in the constituents from which it was derived. This does not > mean that abstractions can't retain something of their "perceptual > character" [p. 5]. > > > One from the middle: > > Barsalou pays surprisingly little attention to the highly relevant work of > connectionists. The only rationale he provides is to say that because 'the > starting weights between connections are set to small *random *values' > ... 'the relation between a conceptual representation and its perceptual > input is arbitrary' [p. 5, S1.2P8]. This is misleading. Just because there > are many paths to an attractor doesn't mean the attractor is not > attracting. Surely there are analogous small random differences in real > brains. This quick dismissal of connectionism is unfortunate because it has > addressed many of the issues Barsalou addresses, but its more rigorous > approach leads to greater clarity. > > Consider, for example, what happens when a neural network abstracts a > prototype such as the concept 'depth', which is used in senses ranging from > 'deep blue sea' to 'deep-freezed vegetables' to 'deeply moving book'. The > various context-specific interpretations of the word cancel one another > out; thus the concept is, for all intents and purposes, amodal, though > acquired through specific instances. There is no reason to believe this > does not happen in brains as well. The organizational role Barsalou > ascribes to 'simulators' emerges implictly in the dynamics of the neural > network. Moreover, since Barsalou claims that "a concept is equivalent to a > simulator" [p. 15, S2.4.3P2], it is questionable whether the new jargon > earns its keep. Why not just stick with the word 'concept'? > > And one from the latter part of the article, pointing to her own research: > > Harder to counter is Barsalou's critique that an amodal system > necessitates "evolving a radically new system of representation" [p. 40, > S4.2P3]. Barsalou repeatedly hints at but does not explicitly claim that > the origin of abstract thought presents a sort of chicken-and-egg problem. > That is, it is difficult to see how an abstraction could come into > existence before discrete perceptual memories have been woven into an > interconnected worldview that can guide representational redescription down > potentially fruitful paths. Yet it is just as difficult to see how the > interconnected worldview could exist prior to the existence of > abstractions; one would expect them to be the glue that holds the structure > together. In [Gabora, 1998; Gabora, in press] I outline a speculative model > of how this might happen, drawing on Kauffman's [1993] theory of how an > information-evolving system emerges through the self-organization of an > autocatalytic network. Self-organizing processes are rampant in natural > systems [Kauffman 1993], and could quite conceivably produce a phase > transition the catapults the kind of change in representational strategy > that Barsalou rightly claims is necessary. > > Perhaps more on this tomorrow after I reread and reflect on your remarks > in NP, Frederik. Meanwhile, I'd be very interested to see what you and > other list members think of Gabora's critique of Barsalou as well as her > own suggestion that since self-organizing processes are ubiquitous in > nature that they "*could quite conceivably produce a phase transition the > catapults the kind of change in representational strategy that Barsalou > rightly claims is necessary**."* > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Dear Lists - >> Now we have taken several weeks discussing ch. 2 of "Natural >> Propositions" concerning (anti-)psychologism. >> Many interesting viewpoints and subjects have been marshaled - including >> some not addressed in the chapter. >> Absent, however, have been the chapter's discussion of contemporary >> psychologism, discussed in the versions of Barsalou's symbol theory as well >> as in contemporary neuroscience (which was what prompted me to write the >> chapter in the first place - rather than Peirce philology). >> If anyone have comments about those parts of the chapter, however, I >> would still be interested in hearing them! >> Best >> Frederik >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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