List, Ben, Clark: I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept of "formal" causality (telos).
CSP used the triad - "thing, representation, form". Mathematics uses the concept of formula generate forms, usually geometric forms. As physics uses mathematics to generate all physical formula related to natural forms, I view nearly all of physics as formal (mathematic formula) causality. Indeed, it is exactly because formal causality in physics generates physical forms that necessitates the creation of chemical symbol systems as a clear and distinct symbol system. Agreed, the sciences of physics and chemistry and biochemistry are intertwined and interlaced, but their formal logics are different and their formal symbol systems are different. I suggest you look at the pragmatic foundational logic of physics, the International System of Units, an ask yourself the question: Why does the System International (SI Units) lack any term to represent molecules and represents a "molar quantity" merely as a number? Secondly, what motivates such a deep parsing of the ancient view of causality? Cheers Jerry On Sep 27, 2014, at 9:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Clark, list, > > Responses interleaved. > > On 9/27/2014 7:41 PM, Clark Goble wrote: >>> > On Sep 26, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:>/p> >>> >>> >> Clark, list, >>> >>> >>I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal cause >>> >>in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler ones for >>> >>me since I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add a clarification of >>> >>the idea of formal causation. >>> >> > [CG] I think there are things like formal causes in physics. For instance >> > if you are discussing symmetries how different really is that from >> > discussing forms? >> > [BU] Yes, I should have sad a difficulty of finding usefulness for formal > _causation_ in physics, and of finding a useful kinetic quantity in the > manner of momentum, mass, energy. Insofar as a thing's form is its formal > cause, physics obviously has use for forms. >> > [CG] However I think there’s a huge gap within physics simply because of >> > how physics views foundational theories. Right now there’s near universal >> > consensus we don’t have a foundational theory and (except for the string >> > proponents) most don’t think we have any idea what one would look like. >> > (I’ve no idea how far string theory has fallen in favor the last few >> > years. There’s definitely been a backlash, but how widespread it is at the >> > moment I couldn’t say) >> > [BU] On _The Big Bang Theory_, Sheldon has given up on string theory. Clearly > the walls have been breached. > >> > [CG] Given that acknowledged ignorance of foundations there’s a strong >> > sense even among realists that most of what we do in physics is model >> > making with the models highly idealized from what’s really going on. So a >> > realist might be a realist towards certain structures and behaviors about >> > GR or QM but a bit of a skeptic regarding particular models. >> > [BU] A realist can and often enough ought to be skeptical about particular > models and diagrams as representative of reality. A realist believes not that > all generals are real but instead that some generals are real and some > generals are figmentitious. >> > [CG] If that’s true, even if a realist appears to be appealing to >> > Aristotle’s four causes in practice what they really think is going on is >> > probably something different. That is on a practical basis for most >> > physical theories even realists behave as an instrumentalist. If true, >> > then in what way can Aristotle’s categories really be seen ontologically? >> So it’s really a subtle point about realism, foundational ontology and >> Aristotle I'm making. >> > [BU] I'm not sure that I get you. Skepticism toward particular models, the > desire that they 'do the job' (i.e., stand up to evidence) doesn't by itself > seem to amount to choosing instrumentalism over realism. > >>> >> [BU] If I remember Peirce correctly, the ideas of force, impulse, >>> >> momentum were ideas of ways to quantify (efficient) 'causativeness' or >>> >> capacity to cause, impart motion, etc., while power (wattage), work, >>> >> energy, were ways to quantify effect (_telos_, end, in a sense) or >>> >> capacity for effect. The matter obviously was quantified as mass, and >>> >> related mechanical quantities would be change of mass and the rate of >>> >> it, which I guess one could call 'affluence' :-), but nowadays I guess >>> >> one would say that internal work, internal power, are also mechanical >>> >> counterparts to rest mass (i.e., to rest energy). >>> >> > [CG] It’s true that Peirce adopts telos in terms of capacity. So he says >> > idea in the Platonic sense is “anything whose Being consists in its mere >> > capacity for getting fully represented.” >> > [BU] I was talking about capacity in all cases. Momentum isn't 'casativeness' > in the sense that impulse and force seem, but it is a kind of 'causative' > capacity. Work is a kind of effect, energy is capacity for work, capacity for > effect. > >> > [CG] I only have the EP to search through but I couldn’t find a passage >> > like that. I’d be interested if you know it. >> > [BU] It was a brief passage, it'd be hard to find again. Peirce was merely > mentioning the history of the idea, not his philosophy of it. > >> > [CG] The closest I could find was the more typical (even today) physicts >> > view that we haven’t a clue what energy is beyond it’s place in an >> > equation. >> >> We should hardly find today a man of Kirchhoff’s rank in science saying that >> we know exactly what energy does but what energy is we do not >> know in the least. For the answer would be that energy being a term in a >> dynamical equation, if we know how to apply that equation, we thereby know >> what energy is, although we may suspect that there is some more fundamental >> law underlying the laws of motion. (EP 2:239) >> >> Peirce here was using energy and its meaning as an analogy for relations. > [BU] I like to think that Peirce would think that the equations tell us a > little more now. Energy, in nearly the sense that he understood it, is a > time-minus-proper-time quantity in the sense that momentum is a distance (or > displacement) quantity. Energy, momementum, mass, can all be expressed in the > same units, in a sense they're the same thing in terms of different > reference-frame structures. I should add at some point that Peirce didn't > think that energy was an cenoscopically philosophical subject, since the > conservation of energy requires special experiments to establish. >> I do think Peirce is influenced by Aristotle’s two grades of being as >> actuality and potentiality. But I’m not sure he put things in quite the form >> you suggest. >> > [BU] Peirce did not relate all four causes to kinetic quantities > >> > [CG] I may be completely wrong here I should add - this is just coming >> > from me scanning EP. If you have a reference I’d be very interested as >> > I’ve honestly not even looked to see what Peirce’s theory of physics was. >> > Partially because he wrote before the great revolutions of the early 20th >> > century. >> > [BU] It wasn't Peirce's theory of physics, just a bit of physics lore that he > was passing on, about an idea encapsulated in the statement that 'a force can > do work'. I think he discussed only causativeness and effect. The part about > mass as quantity of matter is so obvious that I added it, sorry that I didn't > say that I didn't remember Peirce saying that. > > Best, Ben > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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