Ben, Tom, lists,
It’s true that denotation (the noun) is one of the synonyms for extension or breadth (as opposed to comprehension or depth) when applied to a term. But Peirce, from early on, extended the application of these terms from terms to propositions; and in any context where he is discussing the proposition and its structure, as he is in “Kaina Stoicheia”, he is always careful to distinguish between denoting and signifying as the semiotic functions which furnish the proposition with its breadth and depth respectively. In a proposition the subject denotes the individual object (indexically), while the predicate signifies its characters (iconically). The noun form “denotation” is properly derived from the verb “denote”, but this can lead to confusion if applied to terms. In his Baldwin’s Dictionary entry on “Signification” — http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Signification — where Peirce tried to clear up some of the confusion resulting from Mill’s use of “connotation” for depth, he wrote: A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the characters which it signifies; J. S. Mill uses, in place of signifies, the term connotes, a word which he or his father picked up in Ockham. But signify has been in uninterrupted use in this sense since the 12th century, when John of Salisbury spoke of ‘quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur.’ Nothing can be clearer. Singulars are denoted (or named), universals are signified; or in more Peircean English, a proposition conveys information by denoting an individual object and signifying the general characters of that object. Rhemes and predicates cannot denote. In the dicisign, which has the same structure, the denoting is done by an index, and the signifying by an icon; the icon is incapable of denoting, but the index must involve an icon (which may be quite complex) in order to inform the ‘reader’ of the sign about the object (which, though singular, can also be quite complex). Rhemes, predicates and icons This is crucial for understanding the syntax of the dicisign, which is the subject of NP 3.7. gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 7:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign? Gary F., Tom, list, Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation or indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the population of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of 'red' is the quality _red _ and all that that implies. That's why denotation (breadth) and comprehension (depth) vary inversely when the information remains the same. Anyway, that's how I've understood it. Best, Ben On 10/4/2014 7:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Tom, I’m afraid you’re adding to the confusion here by talking about “two kinds of denotation.” In a proposition, the subject denotes objects, while the predicate signifies characters. This is what Peirce is saying in your quote from “Kaina Stoicheia” (MS 517), and it’s the standard terminology in Peircean logic. If we confuse denoting with signifying, we will end up confusing indices with icons, and then we’ll be lost when it comes to the semiotics of dicisigns, which must connect iconic with indexical signs. gary f. From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 5:55 PM Evgenii and list, I find your example interesting in that the two kinds of denotation: "If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B." (MS 517) involved with the subject and predicate of a dicisign seem clearer. 1. The analogical denotation of the subject between the shape of the artwork and the shape of the United States. While this analogy is not so problematic here, it can be, and I think the commentators have been too quick to dismiss it, if they even mention it. The casuistry surrounding this denotation has been lost to philosophy, thanks to Pascal, but it still survives, to some extent, in our legal profession, and being the basis of applying the dicisign in the first place, it should not be ignored. 2. The consequential denotation of the predicate, the guns filling the United States. This does involve the "operations" of the dicisign and the way that the guns "fill" the country. As with all works of art, there is some ambiguity there. But more importantly, as denoting the same object as the subject, it involves the truth of the different expressions, they different ways guns fill or characterize the country. The denotation of the predicate seems to depend on the truth or falsity of what is being expressed, perhaps even the extensional correspondence of the two "objects" being denoted. Tom
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