Gary F., Tom, lists,
A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and anyway can't be broadened)
by an index attached to it. The resultant compound's denotation is thus
the index's denotation. So one could get to thinking that the index does
the denoting, while the icon or symbol does not. Yet the falsehood of a
proposition is reflected in a clash of denotations: 'Jack is a farmer'
is false if 'farmer' does not include Jack in its denotation, which
amounts to the same thing as that Jack lacks the characteristic
signified by 'farmer'.
Predicates, rhemes, etc., can and do denote. (Also, both subject sign
and predicate sign are rhemes.) I don't think that Peirce, for his part,
ever said or implied otherwise.
As to the Salisbury quote:
[Quote Peirce]
This has to do with the distinction of logical Extension and
Comprehension which Professor Bowen teaches was discovered by the
Port Royalists although it was pretty well known in the middle ages.
Enough so for John of Salisbury to refer to it as "quod fere in
omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa
_/significant/_, et aliud esse quod _/nominant/_. Nominantur
singularia, sed universalia significantur." By _/appellativa/_ here
he means as I take it adjectives and such like.
[W 2.328 in "Ockham", Lecture 3 on British logicians, 1869]
Note there Peirce identifies the notion of logical Extension with the
idea of naming, not just of describing. Singulars are denoted, named
('singularia nominantur'), not only by proper names (proper nouns) but
also by common names (common nouns). 'Lion' is a name for lions; it also
signifies certain characters. (Translation of Salisbury's quote: "which
almost in everyone's mouth frequently is that one thing clearly is that
which appellatives signify, and another is that which they name. Named
are singulars, universals are signified.")
Best, Ben
On 10/5/2014 7:15 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Ben, Tom, lists,
It’s true that /denotation/ (the noun) is one of the synonyms for
/extension/ or /breadth/ (as opposed to /comprehension/ or /depth/ )
when applied to a term. But Peirce, from early on, extended the
application of these terms from /terms/ to /propositions/ ; and in any
context where he is discussing the proposition and its structure, as
he is in “Kaina Stoicheia”, he is always careful to distinguish
between /denoting / and /signifying/ as the semiotic functions which
furnish the proposition with its breadth and depth respectively. In a
proposition the subject /denotes/ the individual object (indexically),
while the predicate /signifies/ its characters (iconically).
The noun form “denotation” is properly derived from the verb “denote”,
but this can lead to confusion if applied to /terms/ . In his
/Baldwin’s Dictionary/ entry on “Signification” —
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Signification — where
Peirce tried to clear up some of the confusion resulting from Mill’s
use of “connotation” for /depth/ , he wrote:
A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the
characters which it signifies; J. S. Mill uses, in place of
signifies, the term connotes, a word which he or his father picked
up in Ockham. But signify has been in uninterrupted use in this
sense since the 12th century, when John of Salisbury spoke of
‘quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse
appellativa /significant/ , et aliud esse quod /nominant/ .
Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur.’ Nothing can
be clearer.
Singulars are denoted (or named), universals are signified; or in more
Peircean English, a proposition conveys information by denoting an
individual object and signifying the general characters /of that
object/ . Rhemes and predicates cannot denote. In the dicisign, which
has the same structure, the denoting is done by an index, and the
signifying by an icon; the icon is incapable of denoting, but the
index must involve an icon (which may be quite complex) in order to
inform the ‘reader’ of the sign /about/ the object (which, though
singular, can also be quite complex). Rhemes, predicates and icons
This is crucial for understanding the syntax of the dicisign, which is
the subject of NP 3.7.
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 4-Oct-14 7:35 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:*
Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Gary F., Tom, list,
Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation
or indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the
population of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of
'red' is the quality _/red/ _ and all that that implies. That's why
denotation (breadth) and comprehension (depth) vary inversely when
the information remains the same. Anyway, that's how I've understood it.
Best, Ben
On 10/4/2014 7:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Tom, I’m afraid you’re adding to the confusion here by talking about
“two kinds of denotation.”
In a proposition, the subject denotes objects, while the predicate
signifies characters. This is what Peirce is saying in your quote
from “Kaina Stoicheia” (MS 517), and it’s the standard terminology
in Peircean logic. If we confuse denoting with signifying, we will
end up confusing indices with icons, and then we’ll be lost when it
comes to the semiotics of dicisigns, which must connect iconic with
indexical signs.
gary f.
*From:* Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com ]
*Sent:* 4-Oct-14 5:55 PM
Evgenii and list,
I find your example interesting in that the two kinds of denotation:
"If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements
(or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to
be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes
real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by
another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial
part) of B." (MS 517)
involved with the subject and predicate of a dicisign seem clearer.
1. The analogical denotation of the subject between the shape of
the artwork and the shape of the United States. While this analogy
is not so problematic here, it can be, and I think the commentators
have been too quick to dismiss it, if they even mention it. The
casuistry surrounding this denotation has been lost to philosophy,
thanks to Pascal, but it still survives, to some extent, in our
legal profession, and being the basis of applying the dicisign in
the first place, it should not be ignored.
2. The consequential denotation of the predicate, the guns filling
the United States. This does involve the "operations" of the
dicisign and the way that the guns "fill" the country. As with all
works of art, there is some ambiguity there. But more importantly,
as denoting the same object as the subject, it involves the truth
of the different expressions, they different ways guns fill or
characterize the country. The denotation of the predicate seems to
depend on the truth or falsity of what is being expressed, perhaps
even the extensional correspondence of the two "objects" being denoted.
Tom
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