> On Oct 14, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> An important point. For now I would only add, perhaps anticipating what is to 
> come in Chapter 6, that we should recall that Peirce says somewhere that the 
> utterer or interpreter need not be a person, but that 'nature' itself might 
> be said to make utterances and interpretations.

One thing I’ve sometimes struggled with but that it’s important to keep clear 
is to not confuse the logical analysis of such things with what one might call 
a causal chain or an analysis of meaning. All three are very different sorts of 
analysis although in some cases they can overlap.

Also our discussion of virtual interpretants and the like from a few weeks ago 
is important to keep in mind here.

Something else to keep in mind is how the code (using Eco’s term) or context 
stands in relation to the objects that are making interpretants. This is one of 
those things that seems obvious. I think we usually skip over this step when 
considering a lot of interpretations. Yet especially for natural signs thinking 
about it can be quite helpful. We (or at least I) tend to think through signs 
using a simple language model to understand what’s going on. When we move more 
broadly away from copula/proposition signs to dicisigns that are not 
linguistical I think we need to be very careful so we don’t miss the functions 
at play.

I tend not to focus on biology, although I’m a little familiar with chemistry 
and simple microbiology. But I’d imagine figuring out the application for all 
this in biology might be a tad trickier than it appears at first glance. (I’ll 
let those better informed on such matters than I chime in as I’m very 
interested in hearing their concerns here)

> In truth, while the connection of the relational structure which Peirce calls 
> the "continuous predicate" to the Nota Notae has been discussed in the past 
> on this list, I remain a bit unclear yet how "the idea that identity, 
> co-existence, and relation " as "continuous predicates" provide "the deepest 
> key to logical form" (89). Perhaps a better working knowledge of Existential 
> Graphs would help me here.

I’m not sure myself. I’ve always assumed a kind of fractal reality to Peirce’s 
signs. That’s not continuity the way some consider it, but does suggest that 
any sign can itself be analysis as composed of numerous other signs. Even at 
the molecular level you have to worry about movement through space, 
electromagnetic interactions and so forth. And those can themselves be broken 
down into Feynman diagrams, which can themselves be considered as an infinite 
integration of paths (even if in practice you just use the first few orders of 
terms).

All that suggests that ones logical analysis is always a simplification and 
that the signs are themselves always more complex due to continuity. That is 
there’s never a norma semioticl atomism (unless one perhaps considers a more 
Leibnizean conception of infinity)

As to how that helps on a practical level with logical form I can’t imagine, 
beyond imagining that each line of an existential graph is itself open to 
analysis.
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