Gary F., Stephen, lists,
Gary F. wrote,
When an /object/ is given a name, it’s either a proper name (which
is essentially an indexical symbol) [....]
[End quote]
Just a note on the idea of the personal name as kind of indexical
symbol. This is by way of a little more followup on the question of what
became of the idea of the Singular Symbol that Peirce discussed in
"Sundry Logical Conceptions" (EP 2, the third part of "Syllabus" of
1902). To be an indexical symbol such as a personal name with many
possible instances, something would need to be a symbol with an
indexical legisign attached, or at any rate some complexus of symbol and
indexical legisign. But in 1904 Peirce classifies proper names as
rhematic indexical legisigns.
CP 8.341. From draft Letter to Lady Welby, 1904 October 12
http://www.unav.es/gep/Welby12.10.04.html :
P.S. On the whole, then, I should say there were ten principal
classes of signs
1. Qualisigns
2. Iconic Sinsigns
3. Iconic Legisigns
4. _/Vestiges,/_ or Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns
5. _/Proper Names,/_ or Rhematic Indexical Legisigns
6. Rhematic Symbols
7. Dicent Sinsigns (as a portrait with a legend)
8. Dicent Indexical Legisigns
9. _/Propositions,/_ or Dicent Symbols
10. Arguments.
I can see an argument that a symbol should be able to symbolize an
individual person, to the extent that an individual person is a
_/general individual/_ (in Peirce's earlier terminology) as opposed to a
_/singular individual/_ (existing at just one point of space and time),
and to the extent that one accepts Peirce's idea stated elsewhere that
people are not so individual at all and live on in other people, and so
on. But Peirce doesn't turn to such ideas in his sign classifications in
"Nomenclature" (fifth part of "Syllabus") or in the October 12, 1904
draft letter to Lady Welby.
Best, Ben
On 10/15/2014 8:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Stephen, a somewhat belated reply:
If I stick to Peircean usages of these terms (as I understand them), I
can’t say that language is basic to secondness. On the contrary, I’d
say that the Secondness, the “Reaction” or brute Otherness between
sign and object, is basic to indexicality, which is basic to
Dicisigns, whether they are linguistic or not. I’m not sure what you
mean by a /sign/ being given a name. When an /object/ is given a name,
it’s either a proper name (which is essentially an indexical symbol)
or a common name (which is essentially /general/ and identifies the
object as a token of a type). So Thirdness in the form of generality
is what language contributes to semiosis; which is why words don’t
work very well as indices.
But if we take language as given, and look into the psychology of its
use, then yes, it can be used bluntly and brutally. This takes us far
from the context of Peircean semiotics, though; and certainly
brutality (in that quasi-ethical sense) does not depend on language.
gary f.
*From:* Stephen C. Rose
*Sent:* 13-Oct-14 12:56 PM
*To:* Gary Fuhrman
*Cc:* Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10
I am interested in whether language is, in this context, basic to
secondness. At some point a sign (a first) is given a name. I have
generally thought this naming was a sort of conclusion of firstness
and that secondness was where the name (word) encountered the
somewhat brutal function of an index. But I am a slow learner
grateful for any instruction on these matters. Concisely where does
word (language) crop up in considerations? I should add I suppose,
when the sign is not initially a word. And maybe: Does language not
itself represent something blunt and even brutal in confining the
meaning of a sign?
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose> *
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Lists,
After spending three weeks on Chapter 3 of NP, we have one more week
to go before Tyler Bennett launches our discussion of Chapter 4.
Section 3.10 is again a relatively long and complex one, pointing
out some of the other implications of the continuity Peirce sees in
semiosis. One key point is that when an utterer or interpreter is
using a “system of signs” (such as a language) to convey
information, the current circumstances of the utterance (what we
might call the ‘objective context’ are actually an indexical /part
of the sign/ . The explicit linguistic utterance, then, is /not/ the
whole sign but only part of it — and not the most crucial part, for
that is the index (involving an icon) which is the core component of
the dicisign.
Also essential to the understanding of the sign is the interpreter’s
“collateral acquaintance” with the object(s) of the sign, which
amounts to her procedural memory gleaned from previous experience
with it. And to the extent that the sign is linguistic or otherwise
symbolic, acquaintance with the “system of signs” is also required.
Both kinds of “acquaintance” contribute to what we might call the
‘subjective context’ of the sign; they vary from person to person,
of course, which helps to explain why people speaking the same
language can often “talk past each other”. Their common language is
part of the /objective context/ of the signs they utter, but their
/knowledge/ of the language (and of what they are talking about!) is
part of the /subjective context/ for each of them.
Another point which complicates the semiotic analysis of a
proposition is that although it must include both subject and
predicate, the identification of these parts can vary for a given
sign, depending on the context and purpose of the analysis. The
title of 3.10 refers to this as the “interpretability of the S-P
distinction”, and the latter part of this section explains Peirce’s
fascinating concept of the “continuous predicate”.
But rather than ramble on about these points, I’ll simply direct the
reader’s attention to 3.10 itself, and (as usual) invite questions
about it.
gary f.
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