Re:Tyler Bennet
At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14779
Peircers,
The Peirce I have known for nigh unto the last 50 years is not much in evidence
on the Peirce List anymore, so I'll just limit myself to one general observation
that I've made before and then hope find a more productive occupation for the
duration of the bi-haviorist bi-semiotic winter of our discontext.
I do not think that jumping out of the pan of psychologism into the pyre of
biologism is doing logic, pragmatisim, or semiotics much good.
So watch out for that ...
Later,
Jon
Tyler Bennett wrote:
Hello.
It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural Propositions,
"Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I come to the discussion as a
student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main interest here is in
contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for empirical sign
analysis.
Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter 2, and the
definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some consequences
of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the distinction between
conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the definition of
inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of knowledge so it
fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the reality of laws
of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the most important is
that "the purely functional definition of propositions liberates Dicisigns
from the confinement to human language, intention, and consciousness." (105)
This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six regarding dicisigns in
biology as well as later discussion of propositions in non-verbal human
semiosis.
In ethos this work appears as one of the most technical attempts to defend
what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis, that semiosis and life are
coextensive. A major difference here from other biosemiotic defenses of the
Sebeok thesis is that, where many other biosemioticians abandon the use of
terms from traditional logic altogether (such as proposition and inference)
for describing non-verbal semiosis, Frederik salvages some of these terms by
generalizing or deflating them, and this seems more consistent with Peirce's
own project. Also, where other biosemioticians have used Peirce in a more
taxonomic fashion with semiotic thresholds describing evolutionary phases
(Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the dicisign doctrine seems to reject this
approach, favoring what is sometimes called the mereological approach, where
even the simplest semiosis involves the highest type of sign within the 1903
classification (argument) and any sign that does not attain to this level is
considered in Peircean terms "degenerate" or fragmentary. The meaningful
world obtains as one sophisticated argument, the details of which work
themselves out as the constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.
In Natural Propositions, the difference between the semiosis of single-celled
organisms and verbal language for example consists in the difference between
what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged propositions or
arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms of the 1903
classification of signs. I think one likely target for list dispute
pertaining specifically to this chapter is whether the gains made by
deflating the concept of proposition are worth the price of deposing the
conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to replace it with
proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the same for (4.4).
We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across the board in
semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly in order to
salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness (inferences can
happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher"
organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the
distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions,
without which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically
contrasting the character of E. coli bacteria moving toward sugar with that
of verbal language
My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to differentiate
proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms, specifically in the
terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions of
arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction
trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation
between the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option
would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of E. Coli for example to the
dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol
dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way
that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's
theory of signs would seem really limited.
Thanks for letting me participate.
Regards,
Tyler Bennett
--
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