Tyler, Edwina, lists,
Thanks for your good introduction to Chapter 4 of NP. I think your question
concerning differentiating proto-propositions from propositions *per se* is
an important one and key to the application of the dicisign theory to
biosemiotics and elsewhere. I am myself still struggling with that
differentiation so that I won't comment on it just now, but rather turn to
another important point taken up in Chapter 4, viz., the relation of
propositions (and presumably proto-propositions) to inference.
Frederik quotes Peirce as writing that ". . the production of propositions
is of the general nature of inference" (118) and then refers to the famous
Peirce dictum that sound reasoning resembles a cable, "many connected
inferences pointing in the same direction" (119).
At this point Frederik remarks: "As to inference being basically action
habits rather than (only) mental representations, this leads Peirce to the
important step of conceptually separating inferences from consciousness"
(119) and quotes a longish passage of Peirce which includes such remarks as
"habit is by no means exclusively mental. Some plants take habits, and so
do some things purely inorganic" (at CP 5.492 he gives the example of a
"stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit." Edwina
occasionally points to a passage which goes even beyond this notion in
claiming that "Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops
there."
Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs (CP 4.551)
Peirce continues in the passage quoted by Frederik:
The observed laws of habit follow necessarily from a definition of habit
which takes no notice of consciousness. Thus the facts that great numbers
of individuals which die and are replaced by reproduction is favourable to
a marked prominence of habit, and that highly complex organisms of which
multitudes of parts exercise interchangeable functions are so, follow from
such a definition. (119)
He immediately comments that he does not, however, see consciousness as an
"epiphenomenon" but rather that "the function of consciousness is to
render self-control possible and efficient." (119)
The passage quoted concludes with the "living definition" (versus the
"inferior" "verbal definition") of the concept, "the living definition that
grows up in the habit." (119-120)
Consequently, the most perfect account we can give of a concept will
consist in a description of the habit that it will reproduce; and how
otherwise can a habit be described than by a general statement of the kind
of action it will give rise to under described circumstances? ("Pragmatism"
1907, Ms. 318, NEM III/I, 493-494
This understanding of habit--along with the "spatialization-of-logic
hypothesis" discussed somewhat earlier--will, as Frederik concludes the
chapter, clear the road "for considering Dicisigns in cases where
consciousness can not necessarily be presumed," (122)
Still, your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of
proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be
addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of
thinking just discussed above. I am still pondering Edwina's comments on
that problem as well as her including the hypothesis that "the natural
world also uses that Rhematic Indexical Legisign," that idea advanced also
by C.W.Spinks as I recall. On the non-symbolic Dicisign Edwina wrote;
ET: This leaves the non-human realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a
local mechanical reaction, and the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by
virtue of its Legisign, connected to the truths of the Universal and thus,
not merely reactive. It remains, however, firmly 'connected' to the local
actual existentiality.
So there seems to me much of value to ponder in this chapter.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 9:45 AM, Tyler Bennett <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Hello.
>
> It is now time to begin discussion of chapter four of Natural
> Propositions, "Some Consequences of the Dicisign Doctrine". I come to the
> discussion as a student of applied semiotics in Tartu and my main interest
> here is in contemporary debates about the application of Peirce for
> empirical sign analysis.
>
> Having covered the anti-psychologism of Peirce in chapter 2, and the
> definition of the dicisign in chapter 3, chapter 4 outlines some
> consequences of the doctrine in the terms of co-localization, the
> distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content, as well as the
> definition of inference. Here, "naturalization means the reformulation of
> knowledge so it fits into a naturalist evolutionist world-view based on the
> reality of laws of nature" (105). Regarding consequences, to my mind the
> most important is that "the purely functional definition of propositions
> liberates Dicisigns from the confinement to human language, intention, and
> consciousness." (105) This chapter sets up the discussion in chapter six
> regarding dicisigns in biology as well as later discussion of propositions
> in non-verbal human semiosis.
>
>
> In ethos this work appears as one of the most technical attempts to defend
> what is sometimes called the Sebeok thesis, that semiosis and life are
> coextensive. A major difference here from other biosemiotic defenses of the
> Sebeok thesis is that, where many other biosemioticians abandon the use of
> terms from traditional logic altogether (such as proposition and inference)
> for describing non-verbal semiosis, Frederik salvages some of these terms
> by generalizing or deflating them, and this seems more consistent with
> Peirce's own project. Also, where other biosemioticians have used Peirce in
> a more taxonomic fashion with semiotic thresholds describing evolutionary
> phases (Deacon 1997; e.g. Kull 2009), the dicisign doctrine seems to reject
> this approach, favoring what is sometimes called the mereological approach,
> where even the simplest semiosis involves the highest type of sign within
> the 1903 classification (argument) and any sign that does not attain to
> this level is considered in Peircean terms "degenerate" or fragmentary. The
> meaningful world obtains as one sophisticated argument, the details of
> which work themselves out as the constituents of that 'fully fledged' sign.
>
> In *Natural Propositions*, the difference between the semiosis of
> single-celled organisms and verbal language for example consists in the
> difference between what are called 'proto-propositions' and fully fledged
> propositions or arguments which seem not to be differentiable in the terms
> of the 1903 classification of signs. I think one likely target for list
> dispute pertaining specifically to this chapter is whether the gains made
> by deflating the concept of proposition are worth the price of deposing the
> conceptual/non-conceptual dichotomy just to replace it with
> proto-proposition/fully fledged proposition (4.3). Much the same for (4.4).
> We generalize inference so as to give it applicability across the board in
> semiosis (all instances of semiosis entail inference), seemingly in order
> to salvage a hard definition of intention and consciousness (inferences can
> happen without intention or consciousness, which are unique to "higher"
> organisms). To my mind both of these arguments depend heavily on the
> distinction between proto-propositions and fully fledged propositions,
> without which distinction it appears we have no way of really semiotically
> contrasting the character of *E. coli* bacteria moving toward sugar with
> that of verbal language
>
>
>
> My main question pertains to how/whether we should try to differentiate
> proto- from fully fledged propositions in Peircean terms, specifically in
> the terms of the mature theory of signs where there are sub-divisions of
> arguments (more sophisticated than the abduction-induction-deduction
> trichotomy) that would make possible a still taxonomic differentiation
> between the semiosis of "lower" organisms and humans. The only other option
> would seem to be to delimit the semiosis of *E. Coli* for example to the
> dici-indexical-legisign, in which case we could retain the entire symbol
> dimension for the description of "higher" instances of semiosis, in the way
> that Deacon does. Otherwise the taxonomic-descriptive power of Peirce's
> theory of signs would seem really limited.
>
>
> Thanks for letting me participate.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Tyler Bennett
>
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