Again, I think that one must be careful of terminology. When Peirce writes that habit is 'by no means exclusively mental', I think it is clear that he means that habit both in its production and in its expression need not be 'conscious'. After all, to repeat yet again, his 4.551 concept - "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world"....and..'there cannot be thought without Signs".
That is why I confine the symbolic Relation to consciousness, for it is entirely different mode of habit production/expression from the Indexical and Iconic Relations which DO also contribute to the formation of habits within the Representamen. Consciousness is not the same as habit-production; although, as Peirce points out, it can verbally express a habit. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Fuhrman To: Peirce List ; [email protected] Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 1:56 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four Lists, Before we move on (next week) to Chapter 5 of NP, I'd like to draw attention to one of the Peirce "rarities" found in Frederik's book, one which clarifies the relations between habit-taking and consciousness, and does so in connection with pragmatism. This brief passage is from MS 318 (1907), which is partially published in EP2 (398-433) under the title "Pragmatism"; but neither EP2 nor CP contains this particular passage, which as far as I know has been previously published only in NEM III/I, 493-4, which Frederik cites as his source (NP p. 120). Here Peirce says that habit is . by no means exclusively mental. Some plants take habits; and so do some things purely inorganic. The observed laws of habit follow necessarily from a definition of habit which takes no notice of consciousness. Thus the facts that great numbers of individuals which die and are replaced by reproduction is favourable to a marked prominence of habit, and that highly complex organisms of which multitudes of parts exercise interchangeable functions are so, follow from such a definition. Nevertheless, I am far from holding consciousness to be an "epiphenomenon", though the doctrine that it is so has aided the development of science. To my apprehension, the function of consciousness is to render self-control possible and efficient. For acccording to such analysis as I can make the true definition of consciousness is connection with an internal world; and the first impressions of sense are not conscious, but only their modified reproductions in the internal world. I do not deny that a concept, or general mental sign, may be a logical interpretant; only, it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant, precisely because, being a sign, it has itself a logical interpretant. It partakes somewhat of the nature of a verbal definition, and is very inferior to the living definition that grows up in the habit. Consequently, the most perfect account we can give of a concept will consist in a description of the habit that it will produce; and how otherwise can a habit be described than by a general statement of the kind of action it will give rise to under described circumstances? The pragmatistic character of that last paragraph should be obvious enough. What may not be so obvious is the definition of consciousness as "connection with an internal world." This is rather vague on the face of it, but I think it offers the key to a concept of "consciousness" which harmonizes very well with contemporary neuroscience - at least among those who, like Peirce, hold that consciousness is functional and not an epiphenomenon - and with the von Uexkull's Innenwelt/Umwelt distinction, which is widely applied in biosemiotics. I won't say more about it just now, but I'm hoping that as the seminar continues we'll be able to draw on these other disciplines to spell out more clearly what "connection with an internal world" might mean in a pragmatistic semiotics. gary f. } If one falls on the ground, one rises from the ground; there is no way to rise apart from the ground. [Dogen, "Immo" (Cleary)] { www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
