Gary F, Lists,
I agree with you that the passage you quoted from MS 318 is instructive as
involving the idea of an "inner world"--precursor of the *Innenwelt* of von
Uexkull--in the definition of consciousness.
Equally important, and perhaps especially for biosemiotics, where questions
of consciousness are not *necessarily* in play, in my first post in
response to Tyler's introduction of Chapter 4, I pointed to the way in
which Frederik appears to be saying that Peirce, at the conclusion of this
passage in his "living definition" of the 'concept', frees dicisigns from a
connection to consciousness. So, I'd like to reconsider this point as we
move forward in NP as I probably jumped the gun in pointing to it earlier
in the Chapter 4 discussion. Peirce writes:
Consequently, the most perfect account we can give of a concept will
consist in a description of the habit that it will reproduce; and how
otherwise can a habit be described than by a general statement of the kind
of action it will give rise to under described circumstances? ("Pragmatism"
1907, Ms. 318, NEM III/I, 493-494
GR: This understanding of habit--along with the "spatialization-of-logic
hypothesis" discussed somewhat earlier--will, as Frederik concludes the
chapter, clear the road "for considering Dicisigns in cases where
consciousness can not necessarily be presumed," (122)
So, these several ideas fully comprehended, along with the understanding
that inference is the essential logical process as you just noted, should,
it would seem that Frederik is suggesting, prepare the ground for the
discussions to come in the next two chapters in particular.
However, reflecting on this further in light of the recent discussion
involving the role (or not) of the symbol in non-human semiosis, I am
wondering, given the fact that a concept *is* typically seen as a symbolic
product of human mentality, whether Frederik isn't extrapolating too far
from Peirce's "living definition" of the concept to "cases where
consciousness can not necessarily be presumed"? (Unfortunately, I'm not at
my desk and haven't a copy of NP with me at the moment so I'm working from
memory and previous posts at the moment.)
So any clarification of this question of the "living definition" of the
concept as Frederik considers it at the conclusion of Chapter 4 would be
appreciated.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 1:56 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote:
> Lists,
>
>
>
> Before we move on (next week) to Chapter 5 of NP, I'd like to draw
> attention to one of the Peirce "rarities" found in Frederik's book, one
> which clarifies the relations between habit-taking and consciousness, and
> does so in connection with *pragmatism*.
>
>
>
> This brief passage is from MS 318 (1907), which is partially published in
> EP2 (398-433) under the title "Pragmatism"; but neither EP2 nor CP contains
> this particular passage, which as far as I know has been previously
> published only in NEM III/I, 493-4, which Frederik cites as his source (NP
> p. 120). Here Peirce says that habit is
>
> ... by no means exclusively mental. Some plants take habits; and so do some
> things purely inorganic. The observed laws of habit follow necessarily from
> a definition of habit which takes no notice of consciousness. Thus the
> facts that great numbers of individuals which die and are replaced by
> reproduction is favourable to a marked prominence of habit, and that highly
> complex organisms of which multitudes of parts exercise interchangeable
> functions are so, follow from such a definition. Nevertheless, I am far
> from holding consciousness to be an "epiphenomenon", though the doctrine
> that it is so has aided the development of science. To my apprehension, the
> function of consciousness is to render self-control possible and efficient.
> For acccording to such analysis as I can make the true definition of
> consciousness is connection with an internal world; and the first
> impressions of sense are not conscious, but only their modified
> reproductions in the internal world.
>
> I do not deny that a concept, or general mental sign, may be a logical
> interpretant; only, it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant,
> precisely because, being a sign, it has itself a logical interpretant. It
> partakes somewhat of the nature of a verbal definition, and is very
> inferior to the living definition that grows up in the habit. Consequently,
> the most perfect account we can give of a concept will consist in a
> description of the habit that it will produce; and how otherwise can a
> habit be described than by a general statement of the kind of action it
> will give rise to under described circumstances?
>
>
>
> The pragmatistic character of that last paragraph should be obvious
> enough. What may not be so obvious is the definition of consciousness as
> "connection with an internal world." This is rather vague on the face of
> it, but I think it offers the key to a concept of "consciousness" which
> harmonizes very well with contemporary neuroscience -- at least among those
> who, like Peirce, hold that consciousness is functional and not an
> epiphenomenon -- and with the von Uexkull's Innenwelt/Umwelt distinction,
> which is widely applied in biosemiotics. I won't say more about it just
> now, but I'm hoping that as the seminar continues we'll be able to draw on
> these other disciplines to spell out more clearly what "connection with an
> internal world" might mean in a pragmatistic semiotics.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> } If one falls on the ground, one rises from the ground; there is no way
> to rise apart from the ground. [Dogen, "Immo" (Cleary)] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
>
>
>
>
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