I'll disagree on several issues with Howard's comments.

1) Again, I think that terminology is important. I think that using the term 
'symbol' to refer to either the whole triadic Sign or the Legisign 
Representamen, is confusing.

I understand the term 'symbol' to refer only to the Relation between the 
Representamen and the Object. This Relation, as a symbol, means that the input 
data is accepted as meaningful (i.e., it is not discarded as noise) even though 
there is no indexical connection (direct physical connection) or iconic 
connection (mimesis of type). Such acceptance requires, I think, consciousness 
and thus, I confine the use of the Symbol to the human species.

The term 'Legisign', however, in my view refers to habits of formation held 
within the Representamen. These habits can be generated over time by symbolic, 
indexical and/or iconic Relations between the Object and Representamen. Howard 
wrote:

" I will add that genetic information is symbolic because the primary function 
necessary for life, which is self-replication, requires copying information 
without initiating its control function. That is, for self-replication, symbols 
must be copied and transmitted without being interpreted, i.e., without 
constraining action ( von Neumann). The most efficient and reliable 
communication from genes to the Internet is executed by one-dimensional 
sequences of simple symbols.

That is why symbols must be arbitrary coded structures with no direct physical 
connections to their function (i.e., not indexical, iconic or mimetic 
structures).The arbitrariness of the relation of the symbol to its object 
(Monod's "chemical gratuity principle") is illustrated by how the symbolic 
codon is coupled to its amino acid by the tRNA's completely separate binding 
sites. "

And I disagree. I consider that the genetic information is not symbolic but, as 
a HABIT held within the Representamen, it is not a Relation between the 
Representamen and the Object but is a LEGISIGN. A legisign is a representamen 
that is 'of the nature of a general type' (8.334) . It is 'a law that is a 
Sign. ...It is not a single object but a general type"..(2.246).

It is this rigidity of habit, expressed as a generality,  that is the key 
characteristic of the nature of a Legisign and thus, of genetic information. 
The definitive characteristic of a Symbol, on the other hand, is its 
arbitrariness, its openness to change because the Symbol is totally dependent 
on interpretation for its information content to have any weight.

2) Howard wrote: "Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to 
imagine an individual sign without a living interpreter."

And, I'll have to yet again, state, that as a confirmed believer in 
'pansemiosis', since I agree with Peirce that Mind is evident even in crystals, 
I consider that semiosis and thus signs, do not need a 'living interpreter'. 
That slips into the semiology of de Saussure...and I'm not interested. 

3) I'll also confine the term of 'language' to the human species, although 
'communication systems' are evident throughout the natural world.

Edwina 


  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Howard Pattee 
  To: Frederik Stjernfelt ; Peirce List ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 
  Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2014 11:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4


  At 02:45 PM 11/2/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

    Dear Howard, Gary, lists, 

    I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if not in 
all details.
    I think Howard's generalization of "language" goes too far because that 
seems to require an elaborated system to exist as a prerequisite to even the 
very first occurrences of signs in early life. I find it implausible such a 
system was in place well before any individual sign. My own generalization of 
"proposition", I think, is less demanding. 

  HP: Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to imagine an 
individual sign without a living interpreter. That is, I agree with the 
(non-Peircean) Biosemiotic Principle (for some, "Sebeok's Principle") that 
semiosis and life are coextensive.That demand is just the origin problem. I 
also assume life and evolution begins with self-replication. 

  What I mean by "language" in this context I repeated in my Response to Umerez:
       "The genetic language and human language are the only general-purpose 
languages that are known, according to this principle of evolutionary potential 
( Pattee, 1973b, p. 152). This potential is the crucial metaphorical 
similarity. They both have unpredictable potential expressive power because of 
their unlimited information capacity for generating functions and meanings. 
Again, by this evolutionary criterion, other symbol systems and codes, 
including all forms of signal transduction, cell signaling and chemical 
messengers, and all communication forms, such as bee-dances, spider drumming, 
and bird songs, should be recognized as special purpose languages, or better, 
special symbol [sign] systems that are limited to specific functions (e.g., 
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch, 2002). Except for very limited learning potential, 
like imprinting, these symbol [sign] systems depend on genetic information for 
their construction and for their evolution. 
       Sebeok (2000) clearly appreciated this distinction between a 
general-purpose language and a special-purpose symbol system, but he applied it 
only to animal and human languages. As he expressed it, "All animals 
paleontologists classify generically as Homo, and only such, embody, in 
addition to a primary [special-purpose] modeling system (Theorem I), a 
secondary [general-purpose] modeling system, equivalent to a natural language. 
The difference amounts to this: while the Umwelten of other animals model 
solely a (for each) 'existent world', man can, by means of the secondary 
system, also model a potentially limitless variety of 'possible worlds' 
(containing sentences with alethic, deontic, or epistemic modalities)."
       Of course I would agree with Sebeok that the rich modalities of human 
expressions cannot be compared with the primitive modalities of genetic 
expressions. Perhaps this lack of human modalities is why Sebeok did not want 
to call genetic information a language; but it is still the case that only 
these languages have the crucial potential to describe a limitless variety of 
possible worlds. 
       The fact remains that no matter how important the modalities of human 
language appear to linguists, they are not necessary for evolution or even for 
intelligent behavior. We cannot even be confident that the technologies based 
on human language will promote the survival of the species. Whatever the case, 
genetic language will exist as long as life exists. Genetic language is the 
primal general-purpose language from which all other symbol systems and human 
language evolved."

  I will add that genetic information is symbolic because the primary function 
necessary for life, which is self-replication, requires copying information 
without initiating its control function. That is, for self-replication, symbols 
must be copied and transmitted without being interpreted, i.e., without 
constraining action ( von Neumann). The most efficient and reliable 
communication from genes to the Internet is executed by one-dimensional 
sequences of simple symbols.
   
  That is why symbols must be arbitrary coded structures with no direct 
physical connections to their function (i.e., not indexical, iconic or mimetic 
structures).The arbitrariness of the relation of the symbol to its object 
(Monod's "chemical gratuity principle") is illustrated by how the symbolic 
codon is coupled to its amino acid by the tRNA's completely separate binding 
sites. 

  Howard
   
  Hauser, M. D, Chomsky, N, and Fitch, W.T. (2002) The faculty of language: 
what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298: 1569-1579.

  Sebeok, T.A. (2000) Semiotics as Bridge Between Humanities and Science. In 
Semiotics and Information Sciences, P. Perron, L. G. Sbrocchi, P. Colilli, and 
M. Danesi (Eds.), Ottawa: Legas Press, p. 86.






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