Ben, lists,

Ben, thanks for providing links to the heart of the discussion with Joe
Ransdell on this topic. Reviewing it has been very helpful.

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote:

>  Gary F., lists,
>
> It's not that Joe Ransdell simply saw no difference between phaneroscopy
> and semiotics. It's that he had trouble understanding, among other things,
> how phaneroscopy, as conceived as a science by Peirce, could work
> successfully.
>
> Some posts on the subject:
>
> June 11,2009 from Joe R.:
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5644/focus=5650
> June 12, 2009 from Gary R.:
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5644/focus=5654
> June 12, 2009 from Joe R.:
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5644/focus=5665
> July 3, 2009 from Gary R.:
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5687
> July 4, 2009 from Joe R.:
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5687/focus=5691
>
> That's not the whole discussion! But it's a start.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 11/30/2014 11:58 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> "Firstness", "Secondness" and "Thirdness" are hypostatic abstractions. I'm
> afraid those who can't see the difference between hypostatic abstraction
> and prescission -- see *Natural Propositions* 6.10 -- are always left
> "bending over backwards" to force Peirce's terms into their own prior
> categories, because the *practice* of prescission eludes them. This
> produces the kind of muddle that confuses semiotics with phaneroscopy, and
> both with introspective psychology.
>
> The elements of the phaneron, which those hypostatic abstractions give
> names to, are undiscernible in that muddle. Once you've made their
> acquaintance, they are unavoidable; but words can't furnish that
> acquaintance, and if your universe of discourse is totally verbal, I
> suppose it's quite inaccessible. Perhaps some people, even some
> accomplished philosophers and scientists, are constitutionally
> (genetically?) unable to practice phaneroscopy -- even such a distinguished
> Peircean as Joe Ransdell didn't see a difference between phaneroscopy and
> semiotics! -- and there's no hope of understanding it without *practicing*
> it.
>
> I guess one way of coping with the situation (of not knowing what Peirce
> was talking about) is to argue that *Peirce* didn't know what he was
> talking about. Unfortunately such arguments are impervious to experience,
> and thus to logic as an experiential science (CP 7.526).
>
> gary f.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joseph Brenner
> Sent: 30-Nov-14 7:22 AM
>
> The Peircean semiotic doctrine could be made more acceptable, to me at
> least, by the elimination of just one word - pure. I do not see, even in
> its own universe of discourse, why Firstness and Secondness must be totally
> disjunct. It is this that makes them, as Howard says, abstractions.
>
> A vague, semi-unconscious awareness of general aspects of existence is
> something that can be experienced or observed but is qualitatively
> different enough from everyday experience to justify (I am leaning over
> backwards) the designation of Firstness. But there is no necessary
> ontological 'boundary' between Firstness and Secondness. They are
> inseparable categorial features of existence, one or the other of which is
> (primarily) actualized or predominates in any real (cognitive) situation,
> at the expense of the other.
>
> Joseph
>
>
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