Gary F, lists, Gary wrote: "Firstness", "Secondness" and "Thirdness" are hypostatic abstractions."
and "T he elements of the phaneron, which those hypostatic abstractions give names to, are undiscernible in that muddle. Once you've made their acquaintance, they are unavoidable; but words can't furnish that acquaintance, and if your universe of discourse is totally verbal, I suppose it's quite inaccessible. " Well, that seems to be it in a nutshell. Thanks for making it just that clear (except, I suppose, for those whose "universe of discourse is totally verbal" or otherwise wholly abstract. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 11:58 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > "Firstness", "Secondness" and "Thirdness" are hypostatic abstractions. I'm > afraid those who can't see the difference between hypostatic abstraction > and prescission -- see *Natural Propositions* 6.10 -- are always left > "bending over backwards" to force Peirce's terms into their own prior > categories, because the *practice* of prescission eludes them. This > produces the kind of muddle that confuses semiotics with phaneroscopy, and > both with introspective psychology. > > > > The elements of the phaneron, which those hypostatic abstractions give > names to, are undiscernible in that muddle. Once you've made their > acquaintance, they are unavoidable; but words can't furnish that > acquaintance, and if your universe of discourse is totally verbal, I > suppose it's quite inaccessible. Perhaps some people, even some > accomplished philosophers and scientists, are constitutionally > (genetically?) unable to practice phaneroscopy -- even such a distinguished > Peircean as Joe Ransdell didn't see a difference between phaneroscopy and > semiotics! -- and there's no hope of understanding it without *practicing * > it. > > > > I guess one way of coping with the situation (of not knowing what Peirce > was talking about) is to argue that *Peirce* didn't know what he was > talking about. Unfortunately such arguments are impervious to experience, > and thus to logic as an experiential science (CP 7.526). > > > > gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Joseph Brenner [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 30-Nov-14 7:22 AM > > The Peircean semiotic doctrine could be made more acceptable, to me at > least, by the elimination of just one word - pure. I do not see, even in > its own universe of discourse, why Firstness and Secondness must be totally > disjunct. It is this that makes them, as Howard says, abstractions. > > A vague, semi-unconscious awareness of general aspects of existence is > something that can be experienced or observed but is qualitatively > different enough from everyday experience to justify (I am leaning over > backwards) the designation of Firstness. But there is no necessary > ontological 'boundary' between Firstness and Secondness. They are > inseparable categorial features of existence, one or the other of which is > (primarily) actualized or predominates in any real (cognitive) situation, > at the expense of the other. > > > > Joseph > > >
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