At 08:31 AM 12/1/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
So Howard's claim about the indecidability of epistemologies does not extend to his own basic epistemologic assumptions which remain stably realist.
HP: By "undecidable" I was thinking of the typical philosopher's either-or views between epistemologies, or the ideological commitment to a single epistemology. In physics, each case requires a pragmatic decision. I appear to be a realist toward events that I cannot conceive of as depending in any way on my existence. That would include the concept of natural laws. I appear as a nominalist toward those aspects of events which are dependent on my choice or intervention. That usually includes aspects of observation and measurement (the quantum measurement problem may require something new). The concept of probability has to be viewed at least two ways.
Einstein: "[The scientist] therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist. He appears as a realist insofar as he seeks to describe the world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences!"
Howard
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
