PS I was asked off-list if I were saying in my last post that Einstein's epistemology and Peirce's "complete inquiry" were equivalent. Not at all--merely that they *resemble* each other (one can ignore the categorial 1ns/2ns/3ns in considering that resemblance, btw). Best, GR
[image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 3:31 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Howard quoted Einstein: > > "[The scientist] therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist > as a type of unscrupulous opportunist. He appears as a realist insofar as > he seeks to describe the world independent of the acts of perception; as > idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free > inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is > empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and > theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical > representation of relations among sensory experiences!" > > Einstein's three-pronged epistomology resembles, at least to me, Peirce's > three staged, tricategorial approach to what he called " a complete > inquiry": > > 1ns, first stage: abduction (or, retroduction, i.e., hypothesis > formation): "idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories > as free inventions of the human spirit" > |> 3ns, second stage: deduction (i.e., deduction of the implications of > the hypothesis for the purpose of devising experimental tests of it): > "positivist > insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the > extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among > sensory experiences" > 2ns, third stage: induction (i.e., the actual experimental testing of the > hypothesis): " realist insofar as he seeks to describe the world > independent of the acts of perception" > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> At 08:31 AM 12/1/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: >> >> So Howard's claim about the indecidability of epistemologies does not >> extend to his own basic epistemologic assumptions which remain stably >> realist. >> >> >> HP: By "undecidable" I was thinking of the typical philosopher's >> *either-or* views between epistemologies, or the ideological *commitment* >> to a single epistemology. In physics, each case requires a pragmatic >> decision. I appear to be a realist toward events that I cannot conceive of >> as depending in any way on my existence. That would include the concept of >> natural laws. I appear as a nominalist toward those aspects of events which >> are dependent on my choice or intervention. That usually includes aspects >> of observation and measurement (the quantum measurement problem may require >> something new). The concept of probability has to be viewed at least two >> ways. >> >> Einstein: "[The scientist] therefore must appear to the systematic >> epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist. He appears as a >> realist insofar as he seeks to describe the world independent of the acts >> of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and >> theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable >> from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his >> concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a >> logical representation of relations among sensory experiences!" >> >> Howard >> >> >
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