Representamen and Object are two "perimeters", Edwina? And where do you get that from?
gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 16-Dec-14 4:55 PM To: Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]; 'Peirce-L' Subject: [biosemiotics:7763] Re: Peirce categories Gary F, you wrote: The reason that "people keep saying you support dyads" is that your three "relations" have only two "members" each, to use Peirce's term. A triadic relation has three members, not two; and a complexus of three dyadic (two-member) relations is not, according to Peirce, "a triadic relation." That's a completely different analytic frame from Peirce's The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations." Peirce is referring, in his use of the term 'member' to the Relations (see his outline in 8.335) and was declaring that the Sign, as a triad, has three bound parts, the Relations. YOU weren't; you were talking about what YOU see, incorrectly, in my definition of each single Relation as an interaction between, eg, the Representamen and the Object; those two perimeters are what you define as two members. That's not how Peirce used the term - and so, I ask you again, where do you get the sense that the perimeters are 'members'? My response was to point out that the perimeters of the Relation between the, eg, Representamen and the Object are NOT 'members'. So, when I refer to three Relations; that between the Representamen-Object; the Representamen in itself; the Representamen-Object....YOU define these as DYADS, with each perimeter node a 'member'. That, as I have constantly pointed out, is absolutelyincorrect. I could say the same about you - 'if you think your version of semiotics...and..even..if you think you are correct in your interpretation of Peirce'...for I don't agree that your interpretation is correct. And that's as far as it should go. You reject debate and discussion and accept only consensus. Otherwise, you get 'testy'. Again, kindly speak only for yourself; there is no need to 'appeal to others' to stand up and cheer for you. Your arguments should stand or fall, totally on their own merit. I admit, I can never understand why some people feel the need for a crowd around them tocheer on their arguments. You don't agree with me. That's fine - you haven't convinced me that my analytic frame is incorrect, and name-calling or putting me down is not a successful method. You don't agree with me -; I haven't convinced you of the validity of my analysis. and that's as far as it should go. There is no need for insults. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Fuhrman <mailto:[email protected]> To: [email protected] ; 'Peirce-L' <mailto:[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 4:32 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7750] Re: Peirce categories Edwina, speaking of the three "members" of a triadic relation, you say that relations "are NOT composed of 'members' (where do you get that from?)" I get it from CP 2.274, the very passage (quoted by Gary R.) that you claimed to be in agreement with: "The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations." Did you even look at that passage before you posted your "interpretation" of it? or afterwards? If you think your version of semiotics is better than Peirce's, fine, just say so. But you can't expect anyone to believe that it's the same as Peirce's when you directly contradict Peirce on such a basic matter. The rest of your message requires no comment, but I include it so that others can see for themselves (if they haven't already). gary f.
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