Von: "Gary Fuhrman" <[email protected]>
An: "'Helmut Raulien'" <[email protected]>, [email protected]
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thoughts On Normative Sciences
Helmut,
Jon’s reference to “nomos” is a red herring, I think, based on a pseudo-etymology (or maybe just one of his jokes). A carpenter’s square (Lat. norma) is a tool for checking that the angles in a constructed object are close enough to the norm of a “right angle” (90 degrees).
Logic is a normative science because its aim is to discover norms or standards of inquiry. Ethics is a normative science because it aims to discover norms or standards of right practice more generally (i.e. logic in the narrow sense is the ethics of reasoning). Esthetics is a normative science because it aims to discover norms or standards in perception as opposed to practice. The beautiful is what looks right, sounds right, etc. (from Greek aesthesis, sense experience, although it’s commonly applied to imagined objects as well).
gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 2-Jan-15 10:23 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Thoughts On Normative Sciences
Supplement: Now there is one thing, I am not clear about, that is the meaning of the adjective "normative". To me- might be, because I am not a native speaker of English, "normative" sounds somewhat like "dogmatic". I think, that proper (in my understanding of proper) science is nothing but inquiry. When science applies norms, this application can only be a tentative one, seemingly valid only until these tentative norms will have been falsified or altered by elaboration. What I want to say, I have a problem with the adjective "normative". Have I got something wrong?
Dear John, List,
in your definition of pragmatic ethics you have included: "in order to achieve the admirable or the "good in itself" that is determined by a prior consideration of esthetics". Now I dont see, what might be left for the other kind of ethics, the prescriptive ethics. Especially, if one (proposal by me) would add to "consideration of esthetics":"and of logic" (such as Kant did, I think), then what would remain except superstition, such as blind belief in prophecies, myths, social structures that have lost their connection to reason (logic) and to needs (reasonably confirmed other elements of pragmatic ethics) and wishes (esthetics). Well, I agree with all you have written- and you have disproved the "people of prescriptive persuasion"s critique and their suggestion that pragmaticism would be "relative and utilitarian"- with your mentioned inclusion. Is that so? Now, there is another point of view, the sceptic. One Sceptician I talked with neglects the concept of "truth", because he supposes it to be supersticious aka metaphysical. He says, there is no true or false, there is only existing or non-existing. I think, this is a pseudo-argument. You (and me too) i think, dont use the term "truth" in another (eg. supersticious) way than in the logical, like whether or not a sign refers to "its proper object", i.e. whether a logical comprehension exists or not. And: Metaphysical is not supersticious- There can hardly be any statement that is not a tautology, that does not contain any metaphysics. My conclusion to all that would be: The middle way, the pragmatic one, is good enough- it includes both edge-positions: The prescriptive and the sceptic position, or (rather) makes them redundant. Prescripticism is blinded by supersticion, and scepticism is sick from prescripticism´s supersticion- legitimatedly so, but it overreacts, fights against windmill wings, by condemning mere terms, such as "truth". So far so much for that. Happy year,
Helmut
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