Gary F., lists, Thanks for reproducing this excerpt from Peirce's letter to Lady Welby as it is most pertinent to the material we'll be discussing in NP, Chapter 8, on existential graphs (EGs). In doing so you are, perhaps, moving things along a bit more quickly in that direction than I might have wished, but as the principal topic of the chapter is the optimal diagram type of Peirce's invention, namely, EGs, we might as well plunge right ahead and perhaps get back to the matter of what "optimal" iconicity means more generally (as discussed briefly in my last post in this thread and your response to it).
But before moving on to EGs more iconic way of diagramming logical relations (in sentential logic, Boolean algebra, first--order logic with identity, and modal logic) I would like to briefly consider two points brought up in your response. You wrote: GR: All notation systems, including Peirce's existential graphs, have a symbolic component: using them requires knowledge of some conventions and rules. But Peirce's claim, as I understand it, is that his graph systems require a minimal number of rules and minimal arbitrariness in their conventions for representing the thought-process. We might say that they are more instinctively readable than other ways of representing that process, because they are more iconic (and less symbolic). Yes, all notation systems having a symbolic component, once one knows the relatively minimal number and minimal arbitrariness of the rules and conventions of EGs they are found to more iconic and less symbolic than other ways of so-called "knowledge representation" according to those I've spoken with who are adept at using them, such as Frithjof Dau (whom I first met at ICCS many years ago, and who has since done some excellent work with them). Indeed, as optimal iconicity comes in degrees, one might say that John Sowa's conceptual graphs (CGs) exhibit an even greater iconicity than EGs (upon which, of course, they are solidly based) for several reasons, including that they are capable of being read by machines, and were, indeed, devised in large part for that purpose. In fact, CGs are being used for knowledge representation in libraries, medical facilities, and most recently, in police work in places in the UK (this, according to friend, Simon Polovina, of Sheffield University). I'd like to make one other comment in response to your earlier post in this thread. Speaking of the game of Go, you wrote that although there might be several reasons for it, that if you're correct about Go being more iconic than chess that "at least it shows that iconicity does not necessarily imply simplicity." I would hazard to guess that if this is the case with Go, that it is probably the exception which proves the rule. So I'd like to conclude by emphasizing that one of the two principal reasons Frederik offers for preferring diagrams which are more iconic is exactly that they--at least typically--can be more easily observed and manipulated. The other is, of course, the ontological side of the matter, which we'll get to soon, I'd imagine. But in my next post I'd like to turn to the Lady Welby excerpt you posted, then in later posts to what Frederik calls an ontological reason to prefer EGs to other ways of diagramming the "moving picture of thought." Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 7:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Lists, > > > > As we move into 2015 we'll be resuming our study of Stjernfelt's *Natural > Propositions*, with Gary Richmond continuing the discussion of Chapter 8. > We'll also have time in January to revisit questions about previous > chapters, as we won't be starting Chapter 9 etc. until next month, but > we're also focussing on iconicity (or rather iconicities). > > I thought this would be a good time to post an excerpt from a draft letter > to Lady Welby which Peirce wrote in the spring of 1906. This passage, in > the course of explaining the relation between "thought" and "sign", > explicitly relates existential graphs to dicisigns, which "we may, from one > point of view, regard as the principal kind of signs." This struck me as a > good way to reintroduce the discussion of iconicity in NP Chapter 8; it > also reminds us of the peculiar syntax of the dicisign (NP 3.7). > > > > Existential graphs are to be conceived as scribed upon the different > leaves of a whole book. This whole book represents the thought (upon a > given subject) of one mind. Each leaf represents a single stage of that > thought. In the beginning, the successive leaves must represent strictly > successive states of thought--I speak of, *logical* succession. But > afterward when the minute anatomy of the thinking process has been mastered > by the reader one can successively enlarge the intervals of development > between the states of thought that successive leaves represent. > > The blank leaf itself is the quasi-mind. I almost despair of making clear > what I mean by a "quasi-mind;" But I will try. A *thought* is not *per se* > in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same sense as I might say > that Right or Truth would remain what they are though they were not > embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain any > active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special > variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal > from the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and > of the general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign > even if external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This > quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for example a > blank-book. It is meant to be written in. Words written in that in due > order will have quite another force from the same words scattered > accidentally on the ground, even should these happen to have fallen into > collections which would have a meaning if written in the blank-book. The > language employed in discoursing to the reader, and the language emplyed to > express the thought to which the discourse relates should be kept distinct > and each should be selected for its peculiar fitness for the purpose it was > to serve. For the discoursing language I would use English, which has > special merits for the treatment of logic. For the language discoursed > about, I would use the system of Existential Graphs throughout which has no > equal for this purpose. > > I use the word "*Sign*" in the widest sense for any medium for the > communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is > determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, > called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be > borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object > and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or > communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a > Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there > should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in > consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of > the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent > of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can > be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to > reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to > distinguish the *immediate* object from the *dynamical* object. > > The same form of distinction extends to the interpretant; but as applied > to the interpretant, it is complicated by the circumstance that the sign > not only determines the interpretant to represent (or to take the form of) > the *object*, but also determines the interpretant to represent the sign. > Indeed in what we may, from one point of view, regard as the principal kind > of signs, there is one distinct part appropriated to representing the > object, and another to representing how this very sign itself represents > that object. The class of signs I refer to are the dicisigns. In "John is > in love with Helen" the object signified is the pair, John and Helen. But > the "is in love with" signifies the form this sign represents itself to > represent John-and-Helen's Form to be. That this is so, is shown by the > precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the same made > the object of "I tell you." "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus wept." > > > > The last two of these paragraphs, plus two more, are printed in EP2:477-8. > *Semiotic > and Significs*, p. 197-201, continues the excerpt still further, if > anyone wants to follow up. > > > > gary f. > > > > } Every man is fully satisfied that there is such a thing as truth, or he > would not ask any question. [Peirce] { > > www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > >
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