Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15622
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15623
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15625
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15626
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15627
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15628
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15629
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15630
Jeff, List,
The chemical analogy, like all so-called "iconic" representations of relations,
has a tendency to invite confusion between signs and their objects, especially
among those who have a tendency to confuse such things. It will not, I think,
avail us here.
It looks like I had the better idea in returning to Peirce's core papers
on the logic of relatives and the mathematics of relations, and so I'll
put this thread back on the spool for another day. It may do some good
in the mean time for all and sundry to meditate on the following figure:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.png
Regards,
Jon
On 2/4/2015 5:17 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Hello Lists,
Following Peirce's classification of the different kinds of molecules that can be built
from the combinations of dyads and triads that he provides in "The Logic of
Mathematics", we should be able to sort out what kinds of dyadic and triadic
relations obtain within and between the subjects that comprise the three correlates in a
genuinely triadic relation that is governed by the laws of fact, and we should be able to
say what is special about the case where the rules are mechanical in character. Having
done this, we should be able to take the next step and sort out what is different in the
case of the relations that obtain within and between subjects in a thoroughly genuine
triadic relation involving representation.
Peirce is using this classification of kinds of relations in order to show us
the possible connections that may obtain for each of the classes that he is
considering--where they are being sorted along lines of relative genuineness
and degeneracy. Just out of curiosity, Jon, do you take Peirce to be saying
that the 3! kinds of logical relations that hold when we analyze a conception
like A gives B to C is a point that applies to all genuinely triadic relations
of any sort, or that it holds only for those that are thoroughly genuine, or
for all genuinely triadic relations except those that are thoroughly genuine?
My assumption is that Peirce is making this point as part of an argument that
genuine triads can't be reduced to the component dyads that hold between the
three correlates. The question is: what kind of combination or mediation is
found where we have a genuinely triadic relation. This leaves open the
question of what kind of combination or mediation is found in!
thoroug
hly genuine triads.
Peirce makes a distinction that I find helpful for sorting through questions of
this sort. In the notes he later made on his early essay on the new list of
the categories, he says:
"By logical relations, I mean those in respect to which all pairs [of] objects
in the universe are alike; by hemilogical relations those in respect to which there
is in reference to each object in the universe only one object (perhaps itself) or
some definite multitude of objects which are different from others; while the
alogical relations include all other cases. The logical and hemilogical relations
belong to the old class of relations of reason, while relations in re are alogical.
But there are a few not unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical.
In my paper of 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations
constituted by non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with
necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of
disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out of one
error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with relations of
reason and relat!
ions in
re." (CP, 1.567)
In our discussions of Frederik's book thus far, we've circled around the
following kind of question a number of times: what are the differences between
the relations that hold when something is governed by a general rule where the
rule determines things in a mechanical way and the kinds of relations that
obtain when the general rule determines things as a representation that
functions as a purpose? I've pointed to one place where Peirce says that the
difference between what is a living process and what is really just a
mechanical process is better framed in terms of the kinds of dyadic and triadic
relations that hold in each case. It is a better way of framing the issue
because the latter kind of question is something that we can make clearer. As
such, I'd like to put some weight on Peirce's distinction between a genuinely
triadic relation that is governed by a law of fact and a thoroughly genuine
triadic relation that is govern by a representation that is functioning !
as a pur
pose.
Anyone have suggestions for how we might more clearly articulate the
differences between a genuinely triadic relation that is under a general law of
fact, and a thoroughly genuine triadic relation that is determined by the
representation of a purpose?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jon Awbrey [[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 1:40 PM
To: Edwina Taborsky; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15622
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15623
Edwina,
As often happens I do not understand enough of your language to make much reply.
Peirce says "these six sentences express one and the same indivisible
phenomenon"
and that much I understand to the extent that it resonates with several
important
lessons of my math and scientific training over the years, for example, to be on
guard against the errors of "Grammar Reified As Metaphysics". That doesn't mean
there are no truths of being, it just means that we have to think very
critically
about the metaphysical assumptions that seem to come "ready made" out of
language.
As far as I can understand your statement that "the reality of Mind as
represented
in the modal categories differentiates them by function", it doesn't appear to
say
anything more than what I already stipulated, namely, that those six variations
on
the same logical theme are "grammatically and rhetorically different". Of
course
the mind imagines that nuances of expression correspond to substantial
differences,
but that's a matter that has to be tested.
Regards,
Jon
On 2/4/2015 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I'm not sure, Jon, what your point is, in this post. Although there may be six
'mechanical' ways of relating three
'logical subjects', the reality of Mind as represented in the modal categories
differentiates them by function.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]>
To: "Peirce List" <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 1:45 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1
Post : Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/04/six-ways-of-looking-at-a-triadic-relation-%e2%8c%ac-1/
Posted : February 4, 2015 at 1:00 pm
Author : Jon Awbrey
Peircers,
Here's a triadic factoid from the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism
that raises a number of important questions for me. I isolated Peirce's
observation about the "ordinary logic of relations" from the context of his
remarks that follow, partly in order to render the puzzle more striking.
There's better copy on my blog, and I'll copy out more as I get time.
---
A triadic relation has 3! = 6 ''converses'', six grammatically and rhetorically
different ways of representing what is
logically the same information. Peirce illustrates the situation as follows,
with six variations on the theme of giving.
<blockquote>
So in a triadic fact, say, for example
A gives B to C
we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the ''subject
nominative'', the ''direct object'', and
the ''indirect object''. We say that the proposition has three ''logical
subjects''. We regard it as a mere affair of
English grammar that there are six ways of expressing this:
A gives B to C
A benefits C with B
B enriches C at expense of A
C receives B from A
C thanks A for B
B leaves A for C
These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon.
</blockquote>
References
* Peirce, C.S., “The Categories Defended”, Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism :
Lecture 3 (MS 308, delivered on 9 April
1903). Published in Collected Papers (CP 5.66–81, 88–92, in part), Harvard
Lectures (HL 167–188), Essential Peirce :
Volume 2 (EP 2, 160–178).
* Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols.
7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935,
1958. Volume 5 : Pragmatism and
Pragmaticism, 1934. (Cited as CP).
* Peirce, C.S., Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking : The
1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism,
Patricia Ann Turrisi (ed.), State University of New York Press, Albany, NY,
1997. (Cited as HL).
Peirce, C.S., The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2
(1893–1913), Peirce Edition Project
(eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998.
(Cited as EP 2).
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