Jeff, hi! You wrote: "Anyone have suggestions for how we might more clearly articulate the differences between a genuinely triadic relation that is under a general law of fact, and a thoroughly genuine triadic relation that is determined by the representation of a purpose?"
Actually I think, this being pragmatism, some highlighting and discussion of specific examples could be very useful. So I suppose an example of the former might be gravitational pull, and an example of the latter might be people applying for a job -? I think it would also be really helpful if you could give specific examples of the categories Peirce distinguishes in the passage CP1.567 that you cited earlier: logical relations, hemilogical relations, and alogical relations. I found that exposition of Peirce's so abstract that I couldn't follow it, at least taken out of context. Cheers, Cathy On 2/5/15, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote: > Hello Lists, > > Following Peirce's classification of the different kinds of molecules that > can be built from the combinations of dyads and triads that he provides in > "The Logic of Mathematics", we should be able to sort out what kinds of > dyadic and triadic relations obtain within and between the subjects that > comprise the three correlates in a genuinely triadic relation that is > governed by the laws of fact, and we should be able to say what is special > about the case where the rules are mechanical in character. Having done > this, we should be able to take the next step and sort out what is different > in the case of the relations that obtain within and between subjects in a > thoroughly genuine triadic relation involving representation. > > Peirce is using this classification of kinds of relations in order to show > us the possible connections that may obtain for each of the classes that he > is considering--where they are being sorted along lines of relative > genuineness and degeneracy. Just out of curiosity, Jon, do you take Peirce > to be saying that the 3! kinds of logical relations that hold when we > analyze a conception like A gives B to C is a point that applies to all > genuinely triadic relations of any sort, or that it holds only for those > that are thoroughly genuine, or for all genuinely triadic relations except > those that are thoroughly genuine? My assumption is that Peirce is making > this point as part of an argument that genuine triads can't be reduced to > the component dyads that hold between the three correlates. The question > is: what kind of combination or mediation is found where we have a > genuinely triadic relation. This leaves open the question of what kind of > combination or mediation is found in thoroughly genuine triads. > > Peirce makes a distinction that I find helpful for sorting through questions > of this sort. In the notes he later made on his early essay on the new list > of the categories, he says: > > "By logical relations, I mean those in respect to which all pairs [of] > objects in the universe are alike; by hemilogical relations those in respect > to which there is in reference to each object in the universe only one > object (perhaps itself) or some definite multitude of objects which are > different from others; while the alogical relations include all other cases. > The logical and hemilogical relations belong to the old class of relations > of reason, while relations in re are alogical. But there are a few not > unimportant relations of reason which are likewise alogical. In my paper of > 1867, I committed the error of identifying those relations constituted by > non-relative characters with relations of equiparance, that is, with > necessarily mutual relations, and the dynamical relations with relations of > disquiparance, or possibly non-mutual relations. Subsequently, falling out > of one error into another, I identified the two classes respectively with > relations of reason and relations in re." (CP, 1.567) > > In our discussions of Frederik's book thus far, we've circled around the > following kind of question a number of times: what are the differences > between the relations that hold when something is governed by a general rule > where the rule determines things in a mechanical way and the kinds of > relations that obtain when the general rule determines things as a > representation that functions as a purpose? I've pointed to one place where > Peirce says that the difference between what is a living process and what is > really just a mechanical process is better framed in terms of the kinds of > dyadic and triadic relations that hold in each case. It is a better way of > framing the issue because the latter kind of question is something that we > can make clearer. As such, I'd like to put some weight on Peirce's > distinction between a genuinely triadic relation that is governed by a law > of fact and a thoroughly genuine triadic relation that is govern by a > representation that is functioning as a purpose. > > Anyone have suggestions for how we might more clearly articulate the > differences between a genuinely triadic relation that is under a general law > of fact, and a thoroughly genuine triadic relation that is determined by the > representation of a purpose? > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 1:40 PM > To: Edwina Taborsky; Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1 > > Thread: > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15622 > ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15623 > > Edwina, > > As often happens I do not understand enough of your language to make much > reply. > Peirce says "these six sentences express one and the same indivisible > phenomenon" > and that much I understand to the extent that it resonates with several > important > lessons of my math and scientific training over the years, for example, to > be on > guard against the errors of "Grammar Reified As Metaphysics". That doesn't > mean > there are no truths of being, it just means that we have to think very > critically > about the metaphysical assumptions that seem to come "ready made" out of > language. > > As far as I can understand your statement that "the reality of Mind as > represented > in the modal categories differentiates them by function", it doesn't appear > to say > anything more than what I already stipulated, namely, that those six > variations on > the same logical theme are "grammatically and rhetorically different". Of > course > the mind imagines that nuances of expression correspond to substantial > differences, > but that's a matter that has to be tested. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 2/4/2015 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >> I'm not sure, Jon, what your point is, in this post. Although there may be >> six 'mechanical' ways of relating three >> 'logical subjects', the reality of Mind as represented in the modal >> categories differentiates them by function. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> >> To: "Peirce List" <[email protected]> >> Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 1:45 PM >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1 >> >> >>> Post : Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1 >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/04/six-ways-of-looking-at-a-triadic-relation-%e2%8c%ac-1/ >>> Posted : February 4, 2015 at 1:00 pm >>> Author : Jon Awbrey >>> >>> Peircers, >>> >>> Here's a triadic factoid from the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism >>> that raises a number of important questions for me. I isolated Peirce's >>> observation about the "ordinary logic of relations" from the context of >>> his >>> remarks that follow, partly in order to render the puzzle more striking. >>> There's better copy on my blog, and I'll copy out more as I get time. >>> >>> --- >>> >>> A triadic relation has 3! = 6 ''converses'', six grammatically and >>> rhetorically different ways of representing what is >>> logically the same information. Peirce illustrates the situation as >>> follows, with six variations on the theme of giving. >>> >>> <blockquote> >>> >>> So in a triadic fact, say, for example >>> >>> A gives B to C >>> >>> we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the >>> ''subject nominative'', the ''direct object'', and >>> the ''indirect object''. We say that the proposition has three ''logical >>> subjects''. We regard it as a mere affair of >>> English grammar that there are six ways of expressing this: >>> >>> A gives B to C >>> A benefits C with B >>> B enriches C at expense of A >>> C receives B from A >>> C thanks A for B >>> B leaves A for C >>> >>> These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon. >>> >>> </blockquote> >>> >>> References >>> >>> * Peirce, C.S., “The Categories Defended”, Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism >>> : Lecture 3 (MS 308, delivered on 9 April >>> 1903). Published in Collected Papers (CP 5.66–81, 88–92, in part), >>> Harvard Lectures (HL 167–188), Essential Peirce : >>> Volume 2 (EP 2, 160–178). >>> >>> * Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, >>> Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. >>> 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, >>> 1931–1935, 1958. Volume 5 : Pragmatism and >>> Pragmaticism, 1934. (Cited as CP). >>> >>> * Peirce, C.S., Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking : >>> The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, >>> Patricia Ann Turrisi (ed.), State University of New York Press, Albany, >>> NY, 1997. (Cited as HL). >>> >>> Peirce, C.S., The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, >>> Volume 2 (1893–1913), Peirce Edition Project >>> (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998. >>> (Cited as EP 2). >>> >>> Add a comment to this post: >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/04/six-ways-of-looking-at-a-triadic-relation-%e2%8c%ac-1/#respond >>> > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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