Jon, you are dancing around or should I say, with, red herrings - which in
themselves are fallacious arguments.
There is: argument ad verecundiam (appeal to authority) and ad populum
(appeal to a broad consensus) ...as in your claim that your view is held by
'a long chain of perceptors'. But referring to this long chain and broad
consensus doesn't, in my view, substantiate your claim that scientific
knowledge 'rests on results that are replicable'. Furthermore - you are
switching terms: the 'scientific method' is not at all the same as
'scientific knowledge'.
Scientific knowledge, in my view, has the capacity to acknowledge events and
situations that are not replicable, i.e., are not within the control of an
agent or system, but, are random non-controlled events that have taken
place (a chance event) and might probably take place (a deviation from the
norm and the development of a new species).
And your definition of 'chance' as, apart from not being similar to any you
know (have you not read Peirce?!)...as
"A pattern of results not significantly different from those predicted by
the null hypothesis are what we call "chance" in scientific inference and
yet results of that ilk are most annoyingly and eminently reproducible"
is, to me, ambiguous and ignores the reality that is chance, ..see Peirce's
argument in favour of 'pure spontaneity' and 'absolute chance' in the
Doctrine of Necessity, and "by thus admitting pure spontaneity of life as a
character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained
within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law
continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the
variety and diversity of the universe" 6.59......The ordinary view has to
admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has to admit
that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least, that variety
can spring only from spontaneity..... (ibid)...
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]>
To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>; "Peirce List"
<[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 3:42 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Scientific Attitude
Inquiry Blog
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/03/10/scientific-attitude-1/
Peirce List
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15803
ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15804
Edwina, List,
I hope no one thinks I was trying to write anything novel
or shocking in my little SA. I merely aimed to summarize
the precepts that a long chain of preceptors have handed
down to us regarding what forms the bare bones of the SA.
That first line you quibble with is stock in trade for scientific method.
No one says you have to buy it, but you quibble with a broad consensus.
And you appear to have a different definition of "chance" than any I know.
A pattern of results not significantly different from those predicted by
the null hypothesis are what we call "chance" in scientific inference and
yet results of that ilk are most annoyingly and eminently reproducible.
Regards,
Jon
On 3/10/2015 10:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> I will quibble with Jon's view that
>
> "scientific knowledge rests on results that are reproducible".
>
> I would consider that to refer to 'mechanical knowledge' (Secondness)
> for the scientific approach acknowledges the reality, which also means
> the 'probability-to-be-actual' (Secondness), as Peirce insisted, of
> 'chance, freedom' or Firstness.
>
> Chance events are never, by definition, reproducible. Only mechanical
> processes are such, and scientific knowledge has to acknowledge the
> reality of all three modes, not just those that are in Secondness and
> Thirdness (, as Jon also pointed out with reference to Thirdness ...
> "It is knowledge of particulars in general terms". )
>
> We can of course, quibble over what is 'knowledge'
> and what is 'approach, attitude and so on' but I'm
> not into needles-on-a-pin.
>
> Edwina
>
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