Edwina says: "Scientific knowledge, in my view, has the capacity to
acknowledge events and situations that are not replicable, i.e., are not
within the control of an agent or system, but, are random non-controlled
events that have  taken place (a chance event) and might probably take
place (a deviation from the norm and the development of a new species)."


I would very much like to see an example of, or even to hear an account of,
such an event or situation, and how you would propose that science deal
with it.

This is where Charles goes off the rails later in life from the views of
his father. If we allowed such "spontaneity" in necessity then how could
science state any law?

This is a case where Charles threatens to undermine the entire venture of
his inquiry.

Steven





On Tue, Mar 10, 2015 at 1:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon, you are dancing around or should I say, with,  red herrings - which
> in themselves are fallacious arguments.
>
> There is: argument ad verecundiam (appeal to authority) and ad populum
> (appeal to a broad consensus) ...as in your claim that your view is held by
> 'a long chain of perceptors'. But referring to this long chain and broad
> consensus doesn't, in my view, substantiate your claim that scientific
> knowledge 'rests on results that are replicable'. Furthermore -  you are
> switching terms: the 'scientific method' is not at all the same as
> 'scientific knowledge'.
>
> Scientific knowledge, in my view, has the capacity to acknowledge events
> and situations that are not replicable, i.e., are not within the control of
> an agent or system, but, are random non-controlled events that have  taken
> place (a chance event) and might probably take place (a deviation from the
> norm and the development of a new species).
>
> And your definition of 'chance' as, apart from not being similar to any
> you know (have you not read Peirce?!)...as
>
> "A pattern of results not significantly different from those predicted by
>
>> the null hypothesis are what we call "chance" in scientific inference and
>> yet results of that ilk are most annoyingly and eminently reproducible"
>>
>
> is, to me, ambiguous and ignores the reality that is chance, ..see
> Peirce's argument in favour of 'pure spontaneity' and 'absolute chance' in
> the Doctrine of Necessity, and "by thus admitting pure spontaneity of life
> as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though
> restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures
> from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account
> for all the variety and diversity of the universe" 6.59......The ordinary
> view has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has
> to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least, that
> variety can spring only from spontaneity..... (ibid)...
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]>
> To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>; "Peirce List" <
> [email protected]>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 3:42 PM
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Scientific Attitude
>
>
>  Inquiry Blog
>> • http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/03/10/scientific-attitude-1/
>>
>> Peirce List
>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15803
>> ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15804
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>> I hope no one thinks I was trying to write anything novel
>> or shocking in my little SA.  I merely aimed to summarize
>> the precepts that a long chain of preceptors have handed
>> down to us regarding what forms the bare bones of the SA.
>>
>> That first line you quibble with is stock in trade for scientific method.
>> No one says you have to buy it, but you quibble with a broad consensus.
>>
>> And you appear to have a different definition of "chance" than any I know.
>> A pattern of results not significantly different from those predicted by
>> the null hypothesis are what we call "chance" in scientific inference and
>> yet results of that ilk are most annoyingly and eminently reproducible.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 3/10/2015 10:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> > I will quibble with Jon's view that
>> >
>> > "scientific knowledge rests on results that are reproducible".
>> >
>> > I would consider that to refer to 'mechanical knowledge' (Secondness)
>> > for the scientific approach acknowledges the reality, which also means
>> > the 'probability-to-be-actual' (Secondness), as Peirce insisted, of
>> > 'chance, freedom' or Firstness.
>> >
>> > Chance events are never, by definition, reproducible.  Only mechanical
>> > processes are such, and scientific knowledge has to acknowledge the
>> > reality of all three modes, not just those that are in Secondness and
>> > Thirdness  (, as Jon also pointed out with reference to Thirdness ...
>> > "It is knowledge of particulars in general terms". )
>> >
>> > We can of course, quibble over what is 'knowledge'
>> > and what is 'approach, attitude and so on' but I'm
>> > not into needles-on-a-pin.
>> >
>> > Edwina
>> >
>>
>> --
>>
>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>
>>
>
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