I've got my own book to finish, so I for one need to get off this detour. My apologies for taking it in the first place.
I accept your apology. It may be a detour from your book, but I don't think that my discussion of the subject-object distinction is a "detour" from Frederik's book. Like John Bell ( Against Measurement) Frederik believes that the "received subject-object dichotomies" are a "quagmire" (p' 307). A common issue in the book (e.g., p. 6 and p. 307) is that Peircean signs and semiotics can avoid the subject-object distinction.
The nature of the subject-object distinction should be as important to phenomenologists as it is for physicists. In physics, the subject-object distinction is at the foundation of empiricism. This distinction must be made clearly, "if the method is not to proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible" [von Neumann].
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Does Peirce claim explicitly that his semiotics and signs eliminate the epistemic subject-object distinction? Or is this only an interpretation by some of his followers? All I have read is Peirce's comment that pretty well matches Hertz's epistemology that clearly distinguishes subject and object.
Peirce: “The result that the chemist observes is brought about by nature, the result that the mathematician observes is brought about by the associations of the mind. . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." .
Could someone explain or even suggest how signs and semiosis make the subject-object distinction less occult and mysterious?
Howard
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